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formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of

But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects ; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of par ticular men. To this war of every man, against every man, In such a

war nothing this also is consequent ; that nothing can be unjust. is unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct ; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in ; though with a possibility to come out of it,


that incline

PART 1. consisting partly in the passions, partly in his

reason. The passions The passions that incline men to peace, are fear men to peace. of death ; desire of such things as are necessary to

commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature : whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters.




Right of nature THE RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly what.

call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life ; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall

conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. Liberty what.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments : which impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a

of nature


every man

man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive PART 1. of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it

may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law: yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to Difference of

right and law. forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them : so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man, as hath been Naturally declared in the precedent chapter, is a condition of has right to war of every one against every one; in which case

every thing. every one is governed by his own reason ; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.' And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far The fundamenas he has hope of obtaining it; and when he can- ture. not obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which



of nature.

men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived

this second law; that a man be willing, when The second law others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace,

and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh ; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he ; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his : for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi fieri non vis,

alteri ne feceris. What it is to To lay down a man's right to any thing, is to lay down a right. direst himself of the liberty, of hindering another

of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before ; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature : but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him ; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another man's defect of right, is but so much diminution of

impediments to the use of his own right original. Renouncing a

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing right, what it is.

it; or by transferring it to another. By simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the



benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in Transferring

right what. either manner abandoned, or granted away his obligation. right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his duty, not to make void that Duty. voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being sine jure; Injustice. the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that injury, or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning : so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth, or transferreth his right, is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce, or transfer; or hath so renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and actions. And the same are the bonds, by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word, but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some

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