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add nothing to the weight ; and then there is none PART 1. of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.
The laws of nature oblige in foro interno ; The laws that is to say, they bind to a desire they should oblige in take place : but in foro externo; that is, to the always, but putting them in act, not always. For he that in effect should be modest, and tractable, and perform all when there
is security. he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation. And again, he that having sufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war ; and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence.
And whatsoever laws bind in foro interno, may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his action in this case, be according to the law ; yet his purpose was against the law; which, where the obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.
The laws of nature are immutable and eternal ; The lays of for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, eternal. acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.
The same laws, because they oblige only to a And yet easy. desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. F in that they require nothing but endeavour, he
The science of these laws, is
that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them ;
and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.
And the science of them, is the true and only the true moral moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nophilosophy.
thing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil : from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which, as I have shewed before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good ; that is to say; moral rirtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness; nor that they
ime to be praised, as the means of peaceable,
the law is the true moral
sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause, The science of but the quantity of a gift, made liberality.
These dictates of reason, men used to call by the philosophy. name of laws, but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves ; whereas law, properly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws.
OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS
PERSONATED. A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are con- A person what. sidered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then is he Person natural,
and artificial. called a natural person : and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person. The word person is Latin : instead whereof the The word per
son, whence. Greeks have mpóownov, which signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage ; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard :
and from the stage, hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres. So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et judicis : 1 bear three persons; my own, my adversary's, and the judge's; and is called in divers occasions, diversly; as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.
Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor ; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an owner, and in Latin dominus, in Greek kúproc speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of possession,
is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, Authority. is called AUTHORITY. So that by authority, is
always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission, or licence
from him whose right it is. Covenants by From hence it followeth, that when the actor authority, bind the author.
maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerl
XIV) of the nature of covenants
nan in their natural capacity, is
true also when they are made by their actors, repre- Part I. senters, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no further.
And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author ; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.
When the actor doth anything against the law of But not the nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature ; for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his : but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.
And he that maketh a covenant with the author, The authority by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged : for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counterassurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word ; then is the covenant valid ; because the actor in this case maketh himself the anthor. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor ; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself. There are few things, that are incapable of being Things
personated, represented by fiction.
Inanimate things, as a inanimate. church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate,
is to be shown.