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power not so
want of it, and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part
to a less.
Part 11. under the government of democracy, or other sove
reign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to Sovereign that form of commonwealth ; whereas the power in hurtful as the all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them,
is the same: not considering that the state of man
can never be without some incommodity or other ; from not sub- and that the greatest, that in any form of governmitting readily
ment can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.
forms of com
OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY
SOVEREIGN POWER. The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the PART II. difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And The different because the sovereignty is either in one man, or monwealths in an assembly of more than one; and into that but three. assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest ; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth : when an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire.
There be other names of government, in the Tyranny and histories, and books of policy; as tyranny, and oli- different names garchy: but they are not the names of other forms of monarchy,
and aristocracy of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, call it oligarchy: so also, they which
PART 11. find themselves grieved under a democracy, call it
anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want of government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the governors.
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute representatives dangerous. liberty, may, if they please, give authority to one
man, to represent them every one; as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever ; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch, as absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace, is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed ; that in a monarchy, he that had the
sovereignty from a descent of six hundred years, PART II. was alone called sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their representative; the name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them. The difference between these three kinds of Comparison
of monarchy, commonwealth, consisteth not in the difference of with sovereign
assemblies. power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people ; for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is
PART II. the public most advanced. Now in monarchy, the
private interest is the same with the public. The Comparison riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only with sovereign from the riches, strength and reputation of his
subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies : whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.
Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth ; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it. For the understanding is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude.
Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other inconstancy, than that of human nature ; but in assemblies, besides that of nature,