18. PART II. is in vain; or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect, in the conservation of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths are instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand: for unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil war; first between those that disagreed in politics; and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right, that there be few now in England that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been. And can by no grant pass away And because they are essential and inseparable without rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever direct renoun- words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if vereign power. the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms cing of the so renounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them, the grant is void for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto. This great authority being indivisible, and in 18. honour of sub in the presence separably annexed to the sovereignty, there is little PART II. ground for the opinion of them, that say of sovereign kings, though they be singulis majores, of The power and greater power than every one of their subjects, yet jects vanisheth they be universis minores, of less power than them of the power all together. For if by all together, they mean not sovereign. the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by all together, they understand them as one person, which person the sovereign bears, then the power of all together, is the same with the sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough, when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun. power not so want of it, and But a man may here object, that the condition of Sovereign subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to hurtful as the the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or the hurt prothem that have so unlimited a power in their hands. ceeds for the And commonly they that live under a monarch, from not subthink it the fault of monarchy; and they that live to a less. greatest part mitting readily 18. Sovereign power not so want of it, and greatest part mitting readily to a less. PART II. under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth; whereas the power in hurtful as the all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, the hurt pro- is the same: not considering that the state of man ceeds for the can never be without some incommodity or other; from not sub- and that the greatest, that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance ; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided. CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY SOVEREIGN POWER. 19. And The different forms of com THE difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the PART II. difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. because the sovereignty is either in one man, or monwealths in an assembly of more than one; and into that but three. assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth: when an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire. oligarchy, but and aristocracy There be other names of government, in the Tyranny and histories, and books of policy; as tyranny, and oli- different names garchy: but they are not the names of other forms of monarchy, of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, call it oligarchy: so also, they which 19. PART II. find themselves grieved under a democracy, call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want of government, is any new kind of government : nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the governors. Subordinate It is manifest, that men who are in absolute representatives dangerous. liberty, may, if they please, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch, as absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace, is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a monarchy, he that had the |