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PART II. think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that hand, than on the other.

A crime, what.

Where no civil

law is, there is no crime.

A CRIME, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath commanded. So that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To intend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which distinction the Greeks observed, in the word auáрτnμa, and ἔγκλημα, or αιτία ; whereof the former, which is translated sin, signifieth any swerving from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are translated crime, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by peccatum, which is sin, signify all manner of deviation from the law; but by crimen, which word they derive from cerno, which signifies to perceive, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear before a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.

From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all facts contrary to any

Secondly, PART 11,

moral virtue, can never cease to be sin.
that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there
being no other law remaining, but that of nature,
there is no place for accusation; every man being
his own judge, and accused only by his own con-
science, and cleared by the uprightness of his own
intention. When therefore his intention is right,
his fact is no sin: if otherwise, his fact is sin; but
not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign power
ceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is no
such power, there is no protection to be had from
the law; and therefore every one may protect him-
self by his own power: for no man in the institu-
tion of sovereign power can be supposed to give
away the right of preserving his own body; for
the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained.
But this is to be understood only of those, that
have not themselves contributed to the taking away
of the power that protected them; for that was a
crime from the beginning.

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the law of na

The source of every crime, is some defect of the Ignorance of understanding; or some error in reasoning; or ture excuseth some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the no man. understanding, is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. Again, ignorance is of three sorts; of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach

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PART II. them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country, though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law, shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no civil law is binding.

Ignorance of the civil law excuseth sometimes.

Ignorance of the sovereign

excuseth not.

Ignorance of the penalty excuseth not.

In the like manner, if the civil law of a man's own country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other cases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth

not.

Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a man's ordinary residence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man: for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not, then he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will,

should suffer punishment without other limitation, PART II. than that of his will whose law is thereby violated.

because

27.

declared before

from greater

punishments

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Punishments crime in the law itself, or hath been usually in- the fact, excuse flicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty. For the punish- after it. ment foreknown, if not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which appeareth best for themselves and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same crime; it is the law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

made a crime

No law, made after a fact done, can make it Nothing can be a crime because if the fact be against the law of by a law made nature, the law was before the fact; and a positive after the fact, law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made ; and therefore cannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made before the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is liable to the penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediately before alleged.

ples of right

ses of crime.

From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from False princierror, men are prone to violate the laws, three & wrong cauways. First, by presumption of false principles : as when men, from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorized, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the

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PART II. weaker sort, and those that have failed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the only criminals; have thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, that justice is but a vain word: that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry, and hazard, is his own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust: that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be virtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar, the same laws standing, turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth.

False teachers mis-interpret

nature.

Secondly, by false teachers, that either misining the law of terpret the law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws, such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject.

And false in

ferences from

Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true printrue principles, ciples; which happens commonly to men that are by teachers. hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but only common experience, and a good natural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided whereas the knowledge, of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study.