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PART 1. which presseth the organ proper to each sense,

either immediately, as in the taste and touch ; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odour ; to the tongue and palate, in a savour; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object



is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So PART I. that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species, in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye, is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an audible species, that is an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say the thing understood, sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech

is one.



That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion,


PART 1. it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else

stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, Imagination. that nothing can change itself, is not so easily as

sented to. For men measure, not only other men,
but all other things, by themselves; and because
they find themselves subject after motion to pain,
and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary
of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord ; little
considering, whether it be not some other motion,
wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves,
consisteth. From hence it is, that the schools say,
heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to
rest, and to conserve their nature in that place
which is most proper for them ; ascribing appetite,
and knowledge of what is good for their conserva-
tion, which is more than man has, to things inani-
mate, absurdly.

When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless
something else hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever
hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and
by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in
the water, though the wind cease, the waves give
not over rolling for a long time after: so also it
happeneth in that motion, which is made in the
internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams,
&c. For after the object is removed, or the eye
shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen,
though more obscure than when we see it. And
this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the
image made in seeing; and apply the same, though
improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks
call it fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as
proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION
therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is

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found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

The decay of sense in men waking, is not the Imagination. decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object. being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved : so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voices grow weak, and inarticulate ; so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean fancy itself, we call imagination, as I said

PART 1. before: but when we would express the decay, 2.

and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, Memory. it is called memory. So that imagination and

memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; the former, which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense, is simple imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is compounded; as when, from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression made in sense : as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after ; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes ; which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men's discourse.

The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams. And these also, as all other


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