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of mankind, the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui ; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities ; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.

As much experience, is prudence ; so, is much Prudence and science sapience. For though we usually have one their difference name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia ; ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or guard : the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter, as prudence to sapience; both useful; but the latter infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills or disgraces him.

The signs of science are some, certain and infal-Signs of lible ; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pertendeth the science of any thing, can teach the same ; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another ; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain ; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible.




But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general sentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence enough for their private affairs : but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit, than the success of another's business.




Motion, vital THERE be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar and animal.

to them: one called vital ; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life ; such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, &c. to which motions there needs no help of imagination : the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion ; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.; and that fancy is but the relics of the


same motion, remaining after sense, has been al- PART 1. ready said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible ; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE ;

Appetite. the latter, being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endea- Hunger. vour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words, appetite and aversion, Aversion. we have from the Latins ; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are ópur and apopun. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all : but because some motion they must acknow..




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PART 1. ledge, they call it metaphorical motion ; which is

but an absurd speech : for though words may be called metaphorical ; bodies and motions can not.

That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE : and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing ; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object ; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men ; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know

whether they will hurt us, or not. Contempt. Those things which we neither desire, nor hate,

we are said to contemn ; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions : much less can all men PART 1. consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good : and the object of his hate and aversion, Good. eril ; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. Evil. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them : there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth ; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum Pulchrum.

Whereof the former signifies that, Turpe. which by some apparent signs promiseth good ; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair ; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable ; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require ; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mien, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum ; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum,

and turpe.

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