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PART 1. ledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not.

Love.

Hate.

Contempt.

That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

But

Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemn; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same

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appetites, and aversions: much less can all men PART L. consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good and the object of his hate and aversion, Good. evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. Evil. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum Pulchrum. and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, Turpe. which by some apparent signs promiseth good ; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mien, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum,

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PART 1. delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in Delightful. promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and Unpleasant. end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and Unprofitable. evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

Profitable.

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c. so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we Displeasure. either call delight, or trouble of mind.

Delight.

Pleasure.

Offence.

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, à juvando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation, or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called Pleasures of pleasure of sense; the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations

sense.

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and exonerations of the body; as also all that is PART I. pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things; whether those things in the sense please or displease. And these are pleasures of the mind of Pleasures of him that draweth those consequences, and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, displeasures Joy. are some in the sense, and called PAIN; others in Pain. the expectation of consequences, and are called

GRIEF.

These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.

For appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

The same, without such opinion, DESPAIR.
Aversion, with opinion of HURT from the object,

FEAR.

The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, cOURAGE.

Sudden courage, ANGER.

Constant hope, CONFIDENCE of ourselves.

the mind.

Grief.

Hope.

Despair.

Fear.

Courage.

Anger.

Confidence.

Constant despair, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we con

Diffidence.

ceive the same to be done by injury, INDIGNATION. Indignation. Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, Benevolence. GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally,

GOOD NATURE.

Good nature.

PART I. 6.

Desire of riches, COVETOUSNESS; a name used always in signification of blame; because men conCovetousness. tending for them, are displeased with one another attaining them; though the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought.

Ambition.

Desire of office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of things that are but of little

Pusillanimity. hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity. Contempt of little helps and hindrances, MAGNA

Valour.

Liberality.

NIMITY.

Magnanimity, in danger of death or wounds,

VALOUR, Fortitude.

Magnanimity in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.
Pusillanimity in the same, WRETCHEDNESS,

Miserableness. MISERABLENESS, or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindness.

Natural lust.

Luxury.

The passion of love. Jealousy.

Revengefulness. Curiosity.

Love of persons for society, KINDNESS.

Love of persons for pleasing the sense only,

NATURAL LUST.

Love of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of pleasure past, LUXURY.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, JEALOUSY.

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEfulness.

Desire to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of