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If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be ; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of it will be, or, it will not be ; or, it has been, or, has not been. All which is opinion. And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of past, and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation, is called the
will ; so the last opinion in search of the truth of Judgment, or past, and future, is called the JUDGMENT, or reso
lute and final sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good, or bad, is called deliberation ; so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called DOUBT.
No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely : but only, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been ; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another ; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general
affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the PART I. end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. Science. But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions ; or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth Opinion. of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it Conscious. one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third ; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to speak against his conscience : or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.
When a man's discourse beginneth not at defini
PART I. tions, it beginneth either at some other contempla
tion of his own, and then it is still called opinion ; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the dis
course is not so much concerning the thing, as the Belief. person; and the resolution is called BELIEF, and
FAITH: faith, in the man; belief, both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To have faith in, or trust to, or believe a man, signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to believe what is said, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, I believe in; as also the Latin, credo in ; and the Greek, misévw tic, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, I believe him ; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin, credo illi : fido illi : and in Greek, misévw avrw : and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.
But by believing in, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person ; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever : but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.
From whence we may infer, that when we believe
any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from argu- PART I. ments taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority, Faith. and good opinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith ; and the honour done in believing, is done to him only. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Cæsar ; I do not think the ghost of Alexander, or Cæsar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the historian. If Liry say the Gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but Licy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.
OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLEC
TUAL; AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.
Intellectual virtue defined.
Wit, natural, or acquired.
VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. And by virtues intellectual, are always understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good wit ; though the same word wit, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.
These virtues are of two sorts ; natural, and acquired. By natural, I mean not, that which a man hath from his birth : for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean, that wit, which is gotten by use only, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURAL wit, consisteth principally in two things; celerity of imagining, that is, swift succession of one thought to another; and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS,stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.