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hasten that advance the more rapidly-a still greater amount of such labour, or a judicious application of the existing amount upon works of general benefit? And here again we will put a case--a case, we should think, very likely to occur. Suppose two fertile valleys separated from each other by a barren tract. On the uniform price system, the fertile would be bought up and cultivated, the barren left waste and unappropriated. An easy communication between these fertile tracts would no doubt increase the value of both; but whose interest would it be to make it? Import as much combinable labour as you will, two hands will not be combined for this object. As fast as you can pour it in, it will be bought up by the purchasers of the good land, so long as any good land remains to be purchased. Yet it is not the less certain, that by employing a portion of the labour actually in the colony, to make a good road between the two, you might increase the value of both in a much greater degree than the temporary subtraction of that labour from cultivation would diminish it. Not to mention the political and social advantages that would come from thus correcting the evils of dispersion, every individual proprietor of that fertile land would gain more in the actual value of the produce of that land, than he would have gained by his share of the additional combinable labour which the same sum spent on immigration would have placed at his command. How can it be said that, in such a case, by the application of a portion of the land-fund to such an object, the progress of the best sort of colonization would be retarded? Yet, to the re
servation of any such discretionary power, Mr Wakefield decidedly objects. Why? Because, either by disturbing the ratio between land and labour, (which was assumed to be the exact ratio that would make profits and wages as high as possible,) or by altering the price of land, (which was assumed to be the exact price that would keep up that ratio,) it would diminish the produce of the colony; and would therefore, however desirable the object, be an expensive method of obtaining it. It is clear to us that, unless this ratio and this price can be determined with the precision which Mr Wakefield's assumption implies, the whole of this reasoning falls to the ground; and until we can find some more promising clew to the discovery of them than Mr Wakefield's evidence supplies, we must continue to believe, that there are occasions when some portion of the land-fund may be appropriated to other uses than the introduction of immigrants, not only without injury, but with the greatest benefit to those who paid it; and therefore that the Government was quite right (if it were for this consideration alone), in refusing to divest the Crown of such discretionary power. We agree with Mr Wakefield, that
the land-fund ought to be wholly spent in promoting the best interests of the colony; we agree with him, that the introduction of immigrants is one of the most effectual ways to advance those interests; we differ from him only in supposing that it is not the only way.
These, as far as we can make out, are the only points of difference, with regard to the principles and main objects of Australian colonization, between Mr Wakefield and the Government: compared with the points of agreement we cannot but think them of very small moment. Other differences no doubt there are, and will always be, concerning matters of detail-concerning the manner of carrying those principles into practice and concerning the complex questions which will arise when collateral objects are to be taken into the account. Such differences have arisen with regard to New Zealand, to Port Natal, to the West Indies, to Canada, to the convict establishment in New South Wales; they must be expected to arise in many other quarters; and where all the authority, the responsibility, the duty of taking into consideration contending and collateral principles and purposes, and we may add, where all the authentic information is on one side -whilst all the facilities of writing and talking, and, if not all the zeal, at least all the partiality for a favourite theory, is on the other-we must expect to find such differences made the most of, and imputed to the corrupt will of office. But into such questions it is useless to enter at all, without being prepared to go fairly through them. At present we will only suggest by way of caution, that in these times a writer in a newspaper, a private gentleman, an orator at a public meeting, or even an independent Member of Parliament, has much less to fear from making an unjust charge against a responsible Minister, than that Minister has to fear from exposing himself to a just one.
For our own part, after what we have said concerning the nature and objects of the new theory, we can hardly be suspected of entertaining any hostility to it. If we have succeeded in showing that the resistance of the Government to some of the doctrines of its propagators and more zealous advocates, may be accounted for in other ways than by supposing them secretly hostile to it, or incapable of carrying it out; still more, if we have succeeded in turning the attention of those advocates to a reconsideration of their doctrines; and above all, if we have interested in the progress and prospects of the system minds not hitherto engaged in the consideration of it; this paper, imperfect as it is, will not be without its use.
ART. VIII-1. Papers respecting the North American Boundary between the British Provinces and the United States. Presented to Parliament. 1840.
2. Memoranda on the Contest in Spain. By Sir DE LACY EVANS, M. P. 8vo. London: 1840.
3. Report on the Prussian Commercial Union. Presented to Parliament. 1840.
4. An Examination of the Origin, Progress, and Tendency of the Commercial and Political Confederation against England and France, called the Prussian League. By WILLIAM CAR8vo. Newcastle: 1840.
I' T has often been a matter of observation and of just complaint, that, except in extreme cases and under peculiar circumstances, the British public manifest a careless indifference on the subject of Foreign Affairs, quite unexampled in the history of other nations. Unless when revolutions break out, or when wars are impending, the mass of the people of England do not pause to contemplate the movements of other states: contented in their own repose, they disdain to examine the events which are in progress on the continent, or to form a just and provident estimate of what the future may contain. By foreigners this is attributed, and to a certain extent it is attributable, to a spirit of reserve and national pride, which tempts some among us to treat the British dominions as a species of celestial empire,' and to undervalue, as of minor importance, our relations with those whom some of our country gentlemen and country parsons regard as little better than outside barbarians. The agriculturist considers foreign politics to have some dangerous connexion with the corn question; the fate of Poland is associated in his mind with the price of Dantzic wheat; and the very orthodox shrink from foreign alliances, as they do from foreign literature, or, foreign systems of education; believing both to be synonymous with jacobinism, immorality, and irreligion. Another cause tends, also, to the same result. The public Schools and Universities of England neglect altogether, if they do not specifically exclude from their course of study, those branches of learning which lead to a knowledge of the condition of other countries, of their constitutions, and of their interests. A boy at the head of Eton or Harrow may possibly know something of the strength and organization of the Roman legion, or the Macedonian phalanx; but of the military power and resources of Prussia or Austria, he has learned nothing, except by mere accident; or by private, unaided, and unrequited study.
He may describe the voyages of Nearchus, and remain in igno-
‹ The fool returns then perfectly well bred,
Whilst we point out, with regret, these discreditable causes of our national indifference to the subject of foreign affairs, we are far from considering that it is traceable to these causes alone. On the contrary, the increased pressure and interest of our home affairs the mighty questions which Parliament has been called upon to decide--the excited passions which a near balance of parties never fails to produce, all divert public attention from continental interests. Local duties, which cannot be overlooked or neglected when public opinion exercises, as at present, a vigilant control over the actions of all men, engross the time and the attention of many whose minds might otherwise be directed to objects of greater magnitude, though more remote. The smallest
insect, close to the eye, may conceal the whole outline of Mont Blanc. The time which, in other countries, is devoted to the consideration of European politics, is occupied in England by a county election, by attendance at quarter-sessions, or in meetings of poor-law guardians.
In these cases, the public receive some equivalent for the loss they sustain; but there are other losses for which they do not receive any equivalent whatever. Though reason may be silent, it must not be expected that party spirit should sleep. On the contrary, if we look back at the events of the last ten years, we shall find that the readiness with which fools rush in,' has never been more strongly manifested than in the Parliamentary proceedings on foreign affairs. If we could condescend to personalities, and exhibit a series of portraits of those individuals who during this period have been the active opponents to the foreign policy of the Government-if we were to expose them to the wonder of their countrymen as much as they have exposed themselves, no illustrations by Mr Cruikshank would be half so ludicrous. In many cases, it is quite true that the legitimate leaders of the Conservative party have stood aloof. They were too wise to intrust their fortunes to a crazy, and a foundering bark. But yet they have never omitted to turn to a party account every circumstance which would furnish an argument against their opponents. To this course, within certain limits, no objection can fairly be made. It is the practice, and it may appear to be the duty, of an Opposition, to press upon the Government wherever they can do so with effect. But in attacking the Foreign Minister, a statesman, who really deserves that name, should never wound his country. An assault upon Downing Street may be justifiable, but the war should not be against England. Her weight and her authority with foreign courts should not be diminished by exhibitions of domestic dissensions; by attempts to frustrate the course of her policy; by misrepresentations of the most exaggerated kind; and by holding out the false and deceptive notion, that she had made unworthy sacrifices, and submitted to degrading indignities. Yet all this has been done by some of our public men, and done advisedly; contrary to that truer wisdom and those more generous impulses which should have governed the movements of political parties, and proved to all the world, that however Englishmen might be severed by domestic differences, yet when the interests of England in her foreign relations were concerned, and where the national glory was involved, they would speak, act, and feel as one man, regardless of all considerations whatever but those of duty and of an enlarged patriotism.