at least belonged to the Mosquitos; for Mr. Chatfield writes, September 11th, 1847,* that he had not only claimed for the Mosquito King the territory from Cape Honduras to the mouth of the river San Juan, but had inserted the words "without prejudice to the right of the Mosquito King to any territory south of that river, partly on the views of Lord Palmerston, but partly also on the views confidentially communicated to him in Lord Aberdeen's despatch of the 23rd of May, 1845." Now the whole Mosquito dispute, so far as Nicaragua and the United States are concerned, arises from our sanction of the claims of the Mosquitos to this station, which has since acquired such ominous celebrity under the name of Greytown. And if we erred in our geographical warrant for such a sanction, we have at least this excuse

that the evidences for it were brought before the most wary of living statesmen, the Earl of Aberdeen; that doubtless those evidences were deliberately examined by a chief minister so attentive to business as Sir Robert Peel; that it was by these careful ministers that the Mosquito claim was maintained and sanctioned in 1845; and to them must be ascribed all the inevitable consequences of enforcing the claim to which they committed the honour of their country.

Meanwhile, however, the station at San Juan remained in the hands of the Nicaraguans: various attempts were made to negotiate the matter, to determine the right boundaries of the Mosquito territory, to settle the claims of the rival Spanish republics, and to induce the Nicaraguans peacefully to withdraw till these questions could be decided. Nicaragua refusing, and only answering by insult and threats, a small vessel was at last commissioned by our Government to place itself at the disposal of our Vice-Consul. That small vessel, by his orders, expelled the Nicaraguan Government of the station in January, 1848, but with such chivalrous courtesy that the heroic Nicaraguan Commandant and other valiant co-officials, who had declared they would resist to the last drop of their blood, paid a polite visit to the ship that had expelled them in the course of the same evening, and partook of refreshments on the occasion, provided by British hospitality. And thus commenced the political destinies of Greytown.

It seems scarcely necessary to vindicate the expulsion of the Nicaraguan Government from the charge of undue harshness. The step was not taken till several years had been wasted in vain upon friendly remonstrance. The protection afforded to the Mosquitos would have indeed been the sham pretence it has been

* Mosquito Correspondence, p. 56.

alleged

alleged to be, if we had suffered what we had declared to be. their possession, by the lips of two successive administrations, to be usurped by an ambitious and greedy neighbour; and even granting the Mosquito title were doubtful, or that that station ought to be occupied by one of the civilized communities of the Isthmus, other states besides Nicaragua then claimed the station, and it was just to all parties not to allow one state forcibly to possess itself of a port that might be of great commercial value to the whole of Central America, and to which its right was not satisfactorily proved. What was its right? Nicaragua and the American Government have relied on a royal decree of Spain in 1796, by which they maintain that San Juan was made a port of the 2nd class for Nicaragua. But is it so? Does that decree give to Nicaragua an exclusive right to that station? No! We have looked into its provisions and find that it made the station a port of the 2nd class, not for Nicaragua alone, but also for the whole of the ancient viceroyalty or kingdom of Guatemala, within a range of 300 leagues from the capital, including therefore Costa Rica and New Granada. So that, even according to this decree, the Nicaraguan republic had not the smallest right to seize upon the place for its own special and monopolizing possession.

The Nicaraguans, being thus expelled, appealed to the United States, as indeed they had done before, when they anticipated that expulsion. The United States at first took no notice whatever of the appeal; but America about this time had annexed to herself, upon grounds that we do not presume to question, the very substantial acquisition of California, in the previous possession of Mexico. Central America became an object of importance in connexion with California; there was a project to unite the Atlantic and Pacific by a canal up the river San Juan, and thus Greytown, situated at the mouth of the river, suddenly arose into a place of great consideration in American eyes. The democratic party in America were then in administration under President Polk. Of that administration Mr. Buchanan was Secretary of State. He sent an agent, Mr. Hise, to Nicaragua, to assist an American company in obtaining from that State concessions towards facilitating the construction of the meditated canal; and Mr. Hise made a treaty with Nicaragua, which committed the United States to defend the Nicaraguan claim to Greytown, even, if necessary, by force of arms. But the Whig party under President Taylor coming into office declined to sanction this treaty, and sent to Nicaragua an agent of their own, Mr. Squiers. He made another treaty, less objectionable in some points than that of his predecessor, but still containing a clause which, re

cognising

cognising the right of Nicaragua over the river San Juan, from sea to sea, and engaging to defend and protect the American company in the enjoyment of territory which Great Britain maintained to be the immemorial inheritance of the Mosquito tribe, would have brought into immediate conflict the honour of England and the engagements of America. This treaty was before the government of the United States. Its consideration was fraught with imminent danger. It has,' said Mr. Clayton, who was then head of the American Cabinet, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, ' placed the Government of the United States in the most embarrassing situation.' For that Government was weak, it was in a minority, not only in the House of Representatives, but in the Senate. 'You can form an idea,' continued Mr. Clayton to Mr. Crampton, then Secretary to the Legation, and acting for the time as chargé d'affaires, of the eagerness with which the party opposed to the Government will avail themselves of the opportunity of either forcing us into collision with Great Britain on this subject, or of making it appear that we have abandoned through pusillanimity great and splendid advantages fairly secured to this country by treaty. It will require great caution on both sides to prevent a collision on the account of this comparatively worthless country (Mosquitia).'* Happily for both nations, each then chose a diplomatic representative suited to the difficulty of the time. The United States sent to St. James's Mr. Abbott Laurence, Great Britain sent to Washington Sir Henry Bulwer. Mr. Laurence was a man whose large wealth and serene character placed him, the one above the necessity, the other above the passions that often actuate the heated and needy chieftains of democratic commonwealths. With a clear judgment which comprehended the practical advantages at which his country should aim, and with a steadfast patriotism not inclined to relinquish them, he united an amenity of temper and a dignity of bearing which conciliated affection and won respect. He was an admirable specimen of the true American gentleman. Sir Henry Bulwer, on the other hand, united all the essential qualities fitted for difficult negotiation, and some of those qualities peculiarly applied to a state divided by angry parties, and subject to popular control. He had a large and profound diplomatic experience, acquired in the principal courts of Europe. He was accustomed to the consideration of commercial affairs, and had received not only the applause of his Government but the thanks of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce for the success with which he had effected a treaty

*Correspondence with the United States respecting Central America.-p. 2.

at

at the Porte, obtaining greater advantages for Great Britain than the Ottoman Court had ever yet yielded to a Christian power. He had been member of Parliament for large and popular constituencies, and acquired that practical knowledge of the feelings and habits of thought by which masses are swayed and governed, which is of no secondary importance to ministers who would understand the social and political conditions of the United States.

And he had need of all these qualities on his arrival at Washington. He found the American public yet more deeply excited against Great Britain than it has been of late. The claim enforced upon Greytown chancing almost simultaneously with the annexation of California, and threatening to obstruct the project of a canal up the river, of which Greytown was the key, and in which American capital was already embarked, the vehement representations of Mr. Squiers on behalf of Nicaraguan pretensions, and in denunciation of British cupidity,-produced an irritation, suddenly increased tenfold by a mistaken act of Mr. Chatfield (the Consul-General of Central America), in authorizing the seizure of a small island (Tiger Island) in the Gulf of Fonseca, which had been ceded by Honduras to the United States, until the ratification of a treaty between the United States and that republic. Thus it was said, we intended to command the projected inter-oceanic communication on either side, under different pretexts. The first object of Sir Henry Bulwer was to soothe this prevalent irritation, by showing the fallacious grounds on which it rested. He hastened to explain away the mistake in the seizure of Tiger Island an act which was promptly disavowed by the British Government; and aware that the best way to solve the disputes of nations, is to encourage the most friendly sentiments between the nations themselves, he did not entrench himself behind the stiff rules of diplomatic reserve he faced the popular excitement against his countryhe suffered a genial English voice to be heard in public meetings, and the Americans respected him the more, because, while cordially sympathising with their own just causes of national pride, he never bowed the majesty of his own nation, nor suffered the language of courtesy to be construed into the adulation of fear. Thus he rapidly acquired a popularity and influence which he as rapidly used to the advantage of both the nations; and within three short months of his arrival in Washington he completed the treaty, which was based upon the grand idea of making Central America the neutral ground on which the Old World and the New disarmed their ambition in order to unite their commerce. We will now show why it was impossible that

the

the treaty could include the complete disposal of the question affecting Greytown and Mosquitia, and why nothing can be more unfair than to seek in its provisions for objects which we will also show, as we proceed, that the American Cabinet fully understood at the time the treaty was never intended to include.

The object of the Bulwer and Clayton treaty was simply this, to effect a canal up the river San Juan, and other modes of interoceanic communication, which should be open equally to the commerce of all nations. The desire of Great Britain was to satisfy the Americans that these modes of communication should be free from British control-the desire of the United States was to obtain this satisfaction as soon as possible, and to give full scope and immediate activity to the capital already enlisted in the enterprise. It became obvious at once to both the negotiators, as it is to common sense, that in order to effect this mutual desire, nothing should be introduced into the treaty to which neither of the contending parties could agree. Now America had never formally recognized the right of any European state to protect or regard Indian Natives as independent tribes. Her reason for this refusal is obvious. Such a right once acknowledged might give to European states the pretence to treat as independent princes with Indian chiefs on the borders of her own great lakes and rivers. On the other hand, Great Britain could not abandon her peculiar protection over the Mosquitos, to which her honour had been pledged by all her successive Governments of every shade of party, without due guarantees for their security from aggression, the provisions of which might necessarily be long and complicated; yet since the only part of the Mosquito territory of the least importance to the objects in view, was clearly defined by the American negotiator, 'as embracing the river San Juan and the territory from the Machuca rapids to the sea, and that importance depending entirely upon its connexion with the proposed canal'*-might not the question of the protectorate, since it could not be wholly disposed of by the terms of the commercial treaty, be so arranged and modified, that it should not interfere with the intentions and objects of the treaty, and thus be left-free from the irritation caused by contending interests-to be finally terminated in subsequent negotiations, to which the time necessary to adjudge controversial evidences and settle disputed boundaries, could be tranquilly afforded? How could this best be done? Fortunately the American minister in London had decided that point. In a note to Lord Palmerston, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 8,

* Mr. Clayton's words, as quoted by Mr. Crampton, Despatch to Lord Palmerston, October 1st, 1849. Correspondence with the United States respecting Central America, page 4.