military commander along with the Strategi. 2. It retained the archons as elected annually by the body of citizens and not by lot. 3. It still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from the archonship and other magistracies. Solon had confined the public offices to the first class; but Clisthenes appears to have opened them to the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. It is to the reform of Clisthenes that we are to trace the first burst of democratical fervour, which altered instantaneously the position of Athens among the Grecian states, and nerved the Athenians to face the Medes and Persians upon the field of Marathon.

After the battle of Platea the archonship was opened to all classes of Athenian citizens indiscriminately upon the proposition of Aristides.* This change is closely connected in the Athenian constitutional law with two others, which probably took place soon afterwards; first, the choice of archons by lot; and, secondly, the limitation of the duties of the archons, by transferring them to the popular courts of justice on the one hand, and to the Strategi, on the other. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was, that it equalized the chance of office among the rich and the poor. But the lot was only applicable in cases where no special competence was required in discharging the duties of the office; and accordingly the Strategi, or Generals, were never appointed in this way, but always by show of hands in the Athenian assembly. We may, therefore, regard it as certain, that the archons had been

The causes of this important change are thus stated by Mr. Grote :-"The oligarchical but high-principled Aristides was himself the proposer of this constitutional change, shortly after the battle of Platea, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalised as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. (iv. 194.) The same idea is carried out in the following passage:'Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work [the hurried building of the walls of Athens]-performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak-men, women, and children-must have been intense as well as equalising: all had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians, and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century, and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon-if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering selfconfidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command-together with that still wider spread of democratical organization-which marks their character during the age immediately following.'-v. 333.

deprived

deprived of their most important functions when they were elected by lot, and had only to perform the routine duties of police and administration, which, it was supposed, might be discharged by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity; for it must be recollected that the 'Dokimasia,' or preliminary examination into character, excluded from office all persons of notoriously discreditable life, even if they had been elected.

Though the popular courts of justice were instituted by Clisthenes, and their powers were probably increased soon after the time of Aristides, yet their full organization was the work of Pericles and of his friend and coadjutor Ephialtes. This was the fourth phase of Athenian democracy. All the judicial functions were now taken away from the magistrates, except that of imposing a small fine, and also from the Areopagus, except in cases of homicide, and were transferred to the public dikasts or jurors. These dikasts were 6000 citizens above thirty years of age, annually elected by lot out of the whole body of citizens, and bound by a solemn oath to administer justice fairly: of these,. 5000 were distributed into ten panels of 500 each, the remaining 1000 forming a supplement in case of vacancies. They were regularly employed throughout the year, and as they consisted for the most part of poor citizens, they were paid for their services by the state. The full bearing of this important constitutional change had previously been inadequately conceived. It was commonly said that Pericles was the first to assign a salary to the dikasts, as if all that he did was to make himself popular with the dikasts, by paying them for services which they had before rendered gratuitously. The error has arisen from regarding the dikasteries as the institution of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Pericles; whereas the pay was a necessary part of the working of the system, without which such a large body of citizens could not have given their continuous services for a whole year. Mr. Grote shows that what Pericles really did was to separate the administrative functions of the magistrates from that judicial authority which they originally possessed—a separation which had not been fully carried into effect by the previous reforms; and when we recollect the importance attached in the governments of modern Europe to the division of the administrative and judicial powers, we shall at once appreciate the immense change effected by Pericles. Another important reform, which we may also regard as the work of Pericles, is the institution of the Nomotheta. These men were, in fact, a portion of the 6000 dikasts, bound by the same oath and receiving the same pay; but instead of being distributed into panels for trying particular causes, they were summoned upon special occasions for legis

lative purposes. According to the reform now introduced the public assembly became incompetent to enact a new law or repeal one already in existence, and could only pass a Psephisma, or a decree, applicable to a particular case. If a law was to be enacted or repealed, it was necessary to refer the subject to the Nomothetæ, before whom the matter was fully discussed by advocates on each side, and who gave their decision upon oath, as in a court of justice. Mr. Grote observes, there can be no doubt that the Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens-upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole-not permanent, but delegated for the occasion-assembled under a solemn sanction, and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The depriving of the magistrates and the Areopagus of their judicial powers, and the providing popular, numerous, and salaried courts of justice, to decide all the judicial business at Athens, as well as to repeal and enact laws, is, in Mr. Grote's judgment, the consummation of the Athenian de

mocracy.

The preceding brief, and necessarily imperfect, sketch of Mr. Grote's account of the Athenian constitution is nevertheless sufficient to convey some idea of his many novel opinions upon one of the most important portions of Grecian history. We now turn to two or three separate points connected with the institutions and history of Athens, which have hitherto been most fiercely attacked, but which find in Mr. Grote a warm champion and defender. First, as to Ostracism. This institution is represented by Mr. Grote in an entirely new light. The ostracism is ordinarily quoted as a memorable example of the injustice with which the Athenian democracy treated their superior men; and the observation of Plutarch, that it took its origin from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy, and not from justifiable fears, has been repeated with little examination from ancient to modern times. Mr. Grote endeavours to show that this is demonstrably untrue; and he certainly makes out a strong case. Whether a state which required such a safety-valve as ostracism would be the most pleasant state to live in, is a different question; but that it was salutary and almost necessary to the infant and

growing democracy of Athens, seems to us to be fully established. The practice was instituted by Clisthenes, just after the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ from Athens. The constitutional morality,' of which Mr. Grote speaks was, it must be remembered, entirely unknown at that time at Athens :

'It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality-a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts— combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will not be less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint-of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising itmay be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons; and the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence.'-vol. iv. p. 205.

The recent history of Athens had shown that it was comparatively easy for an ambitious man, supported by a numerous body of partisans, to overthrow the existing government, and make himself master of the state. It was for the purpose of guarding against this danger, and for removing quietly from the city a formidable party leader, before he could employ his power for the subversion of the constitution, that Clisthenes devised ostracism. Every precaution was taken to protect the institution against abuse. The senate and public assembly had first to determine that such a measure was necessary: ample notice was given of the day on which the assembly was to meet for the purpose; the people voted by ballot; and then six thousand votes had to be recorded against a person, or nothing was done. The large number of votes required (one-fourth of all the citizens) was a sufficient guarantee that such a person was deemed dangerous to the state; and it is no small proof of the efficacy of the institution, that the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force. At a later time the Athenians could dispense

with the safeguard which ostracism afforded; and though it was never formally abolished, it fell entirely into disuse soon after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

The dikasteries, of which we have already spoken, are regarded by Mr. Grote as exhibiting on a broad scale all the excellencies and defects of the system of trial by jury. Accordingly all the praises which it is customary to pronounce upon trial by jury are, in Mr. Grote's view, applicable to the Athenian dikas

teries :

'Nor is the parallel less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavour-every censure, or sneer, or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been overstated (in England at least), and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the revolution of 1688, are one and the same; recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them.'— vol. v. p. 518.

The large number of the dikasteries, which is extravagant, according to our notions of judicial business, was necessary as a protection against corruption and intimidation. Rich and powerful men have in all ages and in all countries been able to a greater or a less extent to set the laws at defiance. A small body of citizens sitting as judges, most of them poor, and some of them old, would have been overawed, cajoled, or bribed by wealthy criminals like Critias and Alcibiades. An incidental advantage of the Athenian dikasteries was the stimulus they gave both to thought and speech. Their first establishment was nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy, in passing from Eschylus to Sophocles. As private citizens had to plead their own causes before the popular courts of justice, the power of speaking effectively became an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility. Hence teachers of rhetoric arose, and style and oratory began to be reduced to a system.

Mr. Grote likewise reverses the almost unanimous judgment of modern writers respecting two classes of men who play a prominent part in Grecian history. These are the so-called Demagogues and Sophists. It is to them that the misfortunes and degradation of Athens are usually attributed. The demagogues are represented as mischief-makers and revilers,