LECTURE II.

TASTE.

THE nature of the present undertaking leads me to begin with some inquiries concerning Taste, as it is this faculty which is always appealed to in disquisitions concerning the merit of discourse and writing.

There are few subjects on which men talk more loosely and indistinctly than on taste; few which it is more difficult to explain with precision; and none which in this Course of Lectures will appear more dry or abstract. What I have to say on the subject shall be in the following order. I shall first explain the Nature of Taste as a power or faculty in the human mind. I shall next consider how far it is an improvable faculty. I shall shew the sources of its improvement, and the characters of taste in its most perfect state. I shall then examine the various fluctuations to which it is liable, and inquire whether there be any standard to

which we can bring the different tastes of men, in order to distinguish the corrupted from the true.

66

Taste may be defined, "The power of receiv

ing pleasure from the beauties of nature and of "art." The first question that occurs concerning it is, whether it is to be considered as an internal sense, or as an exertion of reason? Reason is a very general term; but if we understand by it that power of the mind which in speculative matters discovers truth, and in practical matters judges of the fitness of means to an end, I apprehend the question may be easily answered. For nothing can be more clear, than that taste is not resolvable into any such operation of reason. It is not merely through a discovery of the understanding, or a deduction of argument, that the mind receives pleasure from a beautiful prospect or a fine poem. Such objects often strike us intuitively, and make a strong impression, when we are unable to assign the reasons of our being pleased. They sometimes strike in the same manner the philosopher and the peasant; the boy and the man. Hence the faculty by which we relish such beauties, seems more nearly allied to a feeling of sense, than to a process of the understanding; and accordingly, from an external sense it has borrowed its name; that sense by which we receive and distinguish the pleasures of food having, in several languages, given rise to the word taste in the metaphorical meaning under which we now consider

it. However, as in all subjects which regard the operations of the mind, the inaccurate use of words is to be carefully avoided, it must not be inferred from what I have said, that reason is entirely excluded from the exertions of taste. Though taste, beyond doubt, be ultimately founded on a certain natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty, yet reason, as I shall shew hereafter, assists taste in many of its operations, and serves to enlarge its power.*

Taste, in the sense in which I have explained it, is a faculty common in some degree to all men. Nothing that belongs to human nature is more general than the relish of beauty of one kind or other; of what is orderly, proportioned, grand, harmonious, new, or sprightly. In children, the rudiments of taste discover themselves very early in a thousand instances; in their fondness for regular bodies, their admiration of pictures and statues, and imitations of all kinds; and their strong attachment to whatever is new or marvellous. The most ignorant peasants are delighted with ballads and tales, and are struck with the beautiful appearance of nature in the earth and heavens. Even in the deserts of America, where human nature

* See Dr Gerard's Essay on Taste.-D'Alembert's Reflections on the Use and Abuse of Philosophy in matters which relate to Taste.-Reflections Critiques sur la Poësie et sur la Peinture, tome ii. ch. 22-31.-Elements of Criticism, c. 25.Mr Hume's Essay on the Standard of Taste.-Introduction to the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful.

shews itself in its most uncultivated state, the savages have their ornaments of dress, their war and their death songs, their harangues and their orators. We must, therefore, conclude the principles of taste to be deeply founded in the human mind. It is no less essential to man to have some discernment of beauty, than it is to possess the attributes of reason and of speech.*

*On the subject of taste, considered as a power or faculty of the mind, much less is to be found among the ancient than among the modern rhetorical and critical writers. The following remarkable passage in Cicero serves however to shew, that his ideas on this subject agree perfectly with what has been said above. He is speaking of the beauties of style and numbers: "Illud autem nequis admiretur quonam modo hæc vulgus im"peritorum in audiendo, notet; cum in omni genere, tum in hoc "ipso, magna quædam est vis, incredibilisque naturæ. Omnes "enim tacito quodam sensu, sine ulla arte aut ratione, quæ sint "in artibus de rationibus recta et prava dijudicant: idque cum "faciunt in picturis, et in signis, et in aliis operibus, ad quoram "intelligentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, tum multo “ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum, vocumque judicio ; "quod ea sunt in communibus infixa sensibus; neque earum 66 rerum quenquam funditus naturæ voluit esse expertem." Cic. de Orat. lib. iii. cap. 50. edit. Gruteri.—Quinctilian seems to include taste (for which, in the sense which we now give to that word, the ancients appear to have had no distinct name) under what he calls judicium. "Locus de judicio, meâ qui"dem opinione adeo partibus hujus operis omnibus connectus "ac mistus est, ut ne a sententiis quidem aut verbis saltem singulis possit separari, nec magis arte traditur, quam gustus "aut odor.-Ut contraria vitemus et communia, ne quid in eloquendo corruptum obscurumque sit, referatur oportet ad sen"sus qui non docentur." Institut. lib. vi. cap. 3. edit. Obrechti.

But although none be wholly devoid of this faculty, yet the degrees in which it is possessed are widely different. In some men only the feeble glimmerings of taste appear: the beauties which they relish are of the coarsest kind; and of these they have but a weak and confused impression: while in others, taste rises to an acute discernment, and a lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties. In general we may observe, that in the powers and pleasures of taste, there is a more remarkable inequality among men, than is usually found in point of common sense, reason, and judgThe constitution of our nature in this, as in all other respects, discovers admirable wisdom. In the distribution of those talents which are necessary for man's well-being, Nature hath made less distinction among her children. But in the distribution of those which belong only to the ornamental part of life, she hath bestowed her favours with more frugality. She hath both sown the seeds more sparingly, and rendered a higher culture requisite for bringing them to perfection.

ment.

This inequality of taste among men is owing, without doubt, in part, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and finer internal powers, with which some are endowed beyond others. But, if it be owing in part to nature, it is owing to education and culture still more. The illustration of this leads to my next remark on this subject, that taste is a most improvable faculty, if