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from the list of cardinal virtues, as usually given, which is unphilosophical, viz. temperance, fortitude, justice, and wisdom. These moral principles or virtues may be variously combined with the springs of human action; but yet each has its own peculiar sphere of operation.

"Benevolence is mainly concerned in guiding and governing the affections; justice, in controlling and correcting our mental desires; truth, in directing the mutual understanding of men; purity, in regulating the bodily desires. Order engages the reason in the consideration of rules and laws, by which virtue and its opposite are defined."-(p. 143.)

The want of virtue is vice. These names are abstract terms, and the variation of character, the departure from virtue, or the approximation to vice, are designated by the adjectives connected with them.

"But the limits of virtue and vice, however, are far from being manifest and obvious. It is often very difficult to say where virtue ends and vice begins."-(p. 144.)

To avoid such limits and be on the safe side, the moral affections should be cultivated as a duty. It is not true that we have no power over our own character; we have the power of directing our trains of thought. The continuance of a thought, and the dwelling of the mind on a moral sentiment, will strengthen that sentiment. As the remembrance of any event is recorded more indelibly by repetition of remembrance, and memory itself strengthened by exercise, so does a moral sentiment receive power from its constant presence in the mind. The following extract is remarkably clear and concise, and an admirable statement of the power of continued and habitual thought.

"And besides this direct operation of thought upon the affections, there are many circumstances and conditions which have an influence in the formation of our character; and which, being in our power, put the formation of our character also in our power. As we have already said, acts of duty generate virtues and our acts depend upon our will. We can, by directing our acts, form our habits; and habits of external action extend their influence to the internal feelings. Each link of this chain may be in some degree loose; and yet the whole will exert a constant pressure upon the character, drawing it towards the line of duty. The acts of duty may be imperfectly done; the good habits may be imperfectly formed; the internal feelings may imperfectly correspond to the habits; but yet, by the steady performance of acts of duty, the cultivation of a virtuous character is perpetually promoted. It may be objected, that when we have done all that is possible in the formation of our character, still there will remain in it much of good and evil, the result of our original native qualities we cannot alter, and of external circumstances over which we have no control; and thus, that our character and disposition is not in our own power. To this we reply, that, as we have before said, our character and disposition is in our own power, so far as to be a subject of praise or blame. For if praise and blame are not applied to character and disposition, to what can they be applied? We are endeavouring to define those dispositions which are the proper objects of approbation. An opponent,

whose objections imply that nothing is a proper object of approbation or disapprobation, has no common ground with us; and with him, therefore, it is useless to reason. But further, when it is said that there will remain in our character much that is good and evil, the result of its native elements, even when we have done all that is possible to repress the evil and promote the good, we reply, that we never can be said to have done all that is possible, in the improvement of our character. So long as life continues, thoughts of duty and acts of duty, by which our internal being may be improved, are possible: and so long, therefore, we are responsible for not labouring to remove the evil which remains, and to forward the good.”—(pp. 186, 187.)

This self-cultivation,-for such in fact it is,-causes a mental and moral progress: but since a condition is impossible in which there should be no further progress to be made in mental culture, and greater clearness and precision in the moral sight, the formation of the human character can never end; there must always be something to amend, somewhat to perfect. The mind is, as it were, undergoing constant change by the acquisition of new thoughts; constantly in operation, thought succeeds thought, and the mind by memory retains these new elements, the foundation it may be, of new opinions, and themselves the causes of another and more extended development of mind. As the current of thought flows on, how important that each new wave should be impelled in the true direction, that every addition to the current should be " tinged by virtuous thought, and the imagination of vice warded off.

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"As there is in the head a fountain of perpetual internal change, there must be in the heart a fountain which shall give to every change a character of good." "Thus there is a duty of moral self culture, which can never be interrupted nor terminated. With reference to that part of morality of which we are now speaking, this is the duty of the culture of the affections. It is our duty constantly to cultivate the affections which have been described as duties: gratitude, compassion, reverence, family love, the love of our fellowcountrymen, the love of our fellow-men. This culture of the benevolent affections is a duty which never stops nor ends."—(p. 189.)

The desires and affections receive culture by transformation into their active elements, which are the operative moral principles. The culture of these faculties, together with the reason, cause the formation and adoption in our minds of rules of duty, and the application of these rules to our own actions, with an accompanying sentiment of approval or disapproval of ourselves.

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"These faculties thus cultured are the conscience of each man." word conscious implies a reflex attention of the mind to its own condition or operation, a contemplation of what we ourselves feel and do. We feel pain, but we are conscious of impatience. We start unconsciously at a surprise, but in danger we are conscious of fear."-(p. 234.)

That which the mind receives directly from without, it is not conscious of, strictly speaking, for it was not previously in the mind: but that which arises in the mind from itself,-that is, a thought

eliminated from a thought,-is what alone the mind is conscious of. In general, however, the word is used in a much wider sense, and we talk of being conscious of every mental act.

Moral culture can never reach its termination; it is a progress always to be persisted in, although moral perfection is only ideal. It is the duty of man constantly to prosecute his moral and intellectual culture, and conform his actions to the standard of his morality; but this requires also that this moral standard be in conformity to the supreme law. Consequently we must seek for such light and knowledge, as may enable us constantly to promote this conformity. "We must labour to enlighten and instruct our conscience." Then comes the question, whether he who acts according to his conscience is always right. The standard of right and wrong must vary in the minds of men. Not only is the conscience of one different from that of another, but even the same individual is not at all times under the guidance of a similar moral code or rule of morality. Also the influence of education, national and individual prejudices, local laws and customs, renders an act immoral in one place, which in another might be committed without being condemned by the conscience of any man. But it is the duty of man constantly to prosecute his moral and intellectual culture, and any neglect on his part is culpable. Thus an act committed by him, which, had he properly cultivated that intellect and moral feeling, they would have prohibited him from committing, is an act for which he is responsible, although he acted perhaps in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. This requires not only that

we should conform our actions to the standard which we have in our minds for the time, but that also we make this standard truly moral. Whatever subordinate law we have in our minds, is to be looked upon only as a step to the supreme law.

"So long as life and powers of thought remain to us, we may always be able to acquire a still clearer and higher view than we yet possess, of the supreme law of our being; we never can have done all that is in our power, in this respect. It never can be consistent with our duty to despair of enlightening and instructing our conscience beyond what we have yet done. Our standard of virtue is not high enough if we think it need be no higher." "Conscience is never fully formed, but always in the course of formation.". (p. 237.)

But in attempting to enlighten and instruct our conscience, and to carry on our moral progress,

"We are led to feel the want of some light and some power, in addition to the light of mere reason, and the ordinary powers which we possess over our own minds, and that religion offers to us the only hope of such a power, which will, if duly sought, be exercised upon us."-(p. 238.)

It is evident, therefore, that conscience cannot be a supreme authority.

"As the object of reason is to determine what is true, so the object of conscience is to determine what is right."—(p. 238.)

As each man's reason may err, and thus lead him to a false opinion, so each man's conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral standard. As false opinion does not disprove the reality of truth, so the false moral standard of men does not disprove the reality of a supreme rule of human action. Since conscience is thus a subordinate and fallible rule, it appears that a man may act according to the dictates of his conscience, and yet not act rightly. His conscience may be erroneous, and even very culpably so; for he may not have taken sufficient pains to enlighten and instruct his conscience; and this imperfection is no justification of what is done under its influence. "A conformity to an erroneous conscience is no more blameless than an act of imperfect benevolence or imperfect justice." Consequently conscience, having only a subordinate authority, it cannot be right for a man to refer to his own conscience as a supreme and ultimate ground of action. An act will be conscientious when it is in conformity to benevolence, justice, &c.; and this rather than because it is in accordance with his own ideas of those virtues,-which may be erroneous. Ignorance and error are often considered to be excuses for actions which are not justified by morality. Ignorance may arise from a want of information which the delinquent had no means of obtaining; and it may be, that a more careful examination and consideration of probable consequences, might have induced a different course of conduct. The delinquency in the last case cannot be justified; while in the former, ignorance may sometimes be unavoidable, and the transgressor is not strictly a delinquent.

"We are led to this maxim-' that unavoidable ignorance and error removes the blame of the actions which it causes, but that we are to be very careful of not too easily supposing our ignorance to be unavoidable." "-(p. 291.)

It is by no means easy to avoid all imperfection in the use of reason as for instance, in deciding on the probability of a fact, which may become, or in reality be, evidence which should determine our opinion in approving or disapproving, and decide our course of conduct. An error might be excusable in an instance of this kind. But when an act is adverse to the main principles of benevolence, justice, or other virtues, an error is inexcusable; for the difficulty of deciding is small, and, in comparison with the other case, presents little or no possibility of doubt. The improvement and strengthening of the intellect becomes a matter of duty, if only on this ground of reasoning; and what has been advanced as to the discipline and culture of the moral virtues,

applies also to the intellect. "Many employments of the mind, apparently unimportant and indifferent, are important parts of our intellectual and moral formation." Thus favourite studies can hardly fail to have great influence over the intellectual habits.

"Studies and reading which have in them no direct immoral tendency, may yet dissipate and distract the mind. The love of mere intellectual amusement, may destroy the habit of solid thought, and interfere with those duties of consideration and of acting rationally."-" Any course of intellectual employment, if allowed too much to absorb the mind, may check and pervert that balanced and complete intellectual culture, which is most conducive to the progress of the whole man."-(p. 286.)

We

The use of moral terms often causes confusion and perplexity. Abstract terms are not only representatives of a certain class of thought, but are also instruments in the use of the reason. reason by means of abstract conceptions, and they help the memory in the process of reasoning: consequently, if they are used in a doubtful, confused, or variable manner, may lead as easily to error as to truth. But this state of things is almost a necessary consequence of our nature. "We live in an atmosphere of language, by which we see moral truths obscured and distorted." When we remember that without language we could not be taught, or even perhaps comprehend, a moral principle:-" without the use of language, we should not be able to see moral truths at all; as without an atmosphere we should have no light." This evidently must give rise to apparent variations of principle, even when no real difference exists between different persons, nations, or communities, professing certain opinions and doctrines; but it also gives rise to real and permanent differences.

It might be contended, that a natural impulse exists to approve or disapprove of actions independently of any other cause; for otherwise it seems impossible to assign any reason for the first moral movement. Thus the initial impulse would be to form an opinion either of approval or disapproval, and the moral feelings would then come into activity. These feelings require culture, and cannot exist without previous thought and instruction; while a simple natural impulse requires no experience, but prepares the way for the action of the moral feelings. We readily admit certain impulses of mind to be of the nature of instincts; why then should we not admit the instinct of approval or disapproval? Give to man a natural impulse to approve or disapprove any act, and then the form and character of the approval will be regulated by the reason and other elements of mind. Instinct is necessary to the animal; the particular instinct to the particular animal. If the peculiar instinct of any animal is known, its habits, nay even its bodily form and anatomy, may be determined upon with much

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