accuracy and, on the other hand, the instinct of the animal may be judged by its form, food, and what may be termed its domicile, as terrestrial, aquatic, or amphibious. Apply the same reasoning to man: his position in the world, as man, requires a moral power; that power is more applicable as an instinct acting directly, than indirectly by remote agency. The desires of food, of possession-for the mere sake of possession-are instinctive; and were they not so, it is difficult to say how, anterior to experience, these feelings, so practically useful, could be acquired. Children could not show those feelings which every one knows they do, if they were not instinctive; they are previous to experience, and exercise their power when reason has scarcely dawned upon the mind. And the moral feeling or instinct is also shown by children; it must then arise, in the first instance, from a native impulse. If conscience were one simple faculty of the mind, it would show itself constantly in the same form of invariable cause and effect; its only alteration would be in power, not in form; it would be constantly the same. For every act of conscience would be of the same type, and arise from the same cause. In every case the same elements would be exhibited, the same effect being produced by the same cause. But this being contrary to fact and to the experience of all, conscience cannot be a single faculty, but consists of all those faculties which in any case have power to direct the mind in moral actions and since no faculty can be excepted, as incapable of directing the mind in some case which might arise, it follows that, in proportion to the perfectness of the mental formation, the more or less perfect is the individual conscience, and more or less is it a proper standard of correct moral principle. One faculty, only, cannot be applicable to every case, and is inadequate to produce the power of conscience at all times and in every case; for it cannot be available for every case. When the exercise of a particular moral faculty, and that faculty only, is required for the right action and judgment of the mind, the conscience might appear to be properly constituted and yet it would be possible that-so wretchedly was the mind formed-no other moral faculty existed, but that particular one exercised. But the same mind acting, when right moral judgment required the exercise of a different moral faculty, the result would then be faulty, for the moral power being defective, could not be adapted to that particular case.

Again, it may happen that several moral qualities are requisite to cause a right decision; and if the mind has them not, that is, is not under the guidance and control of those moral powers, the conscience for that particular judgment is incomplete, and inca

pable of arriving at a true and just conclusion. The same reasoning applies to every case that can occur. From this it appears that if conscience is a combination of faculties, it cannot be perfect, unless all the faculties which can in any way direct moral conduct are included in that combination. These faculties not being always required for every conscientious operation of mind, are yet necessary, that conscience may be perfect, and equally adapted to every case that can occur: every and all the faculties which can conduce to moral government by influencing the mental actions, must form part of that combination. Conscience, in this view of the question, is a combination of qualities, and not any thing

per se.

But what is not sufficiently inculcated in this treatise, is the necessity of a first mover, an initial impulse. This, it might be shown, is given by admitting a mental disposition to form a judgment. This again, it may be shown, is a reasonable assumption, because the existence of a power must be supposed always accompanied by the propensity of exercise. Of what utility would be the greatest power of digestion, even to an alderman, if unaccompanied by the desire to eat. So also the desire without the power, is but an element of destruction. The desire to eat, without digestive power, would have a no less fatal tendency, than poison of the most deadly kind. It is impossible to suppose a case of conscience, in which some mental power is not exercised: indeed an act of thought does itself imply such exercise: the intellect is requisite to a right conclusion respecting data. A man endued with a small intellect, may assume, as data, facts and opinions which another man, enjoying a more happy dispensation of parts, may at once perceive to be fallacious. Obviously the conclusion of each is different; and yet we should say of the stupid man, that he acted conscientiously, if no selfish motive was apparently influencing the determination he arrived at. The power of discerning truth from falsehood, and weighing the difference of probabilities, is indispensable in a trustworthy conscience: yet the illjudging person is nevertheless conscientious, for he may have decided to the best of his ability.

This variation in the moral judgment, shows how necessary is a standard of moral truth. Commerce requires a standard of value, without which trade could advance but slowly. To barter for a railroad ticket, in parts of sheep and oxen, or even in wheat, would be out of the question; and yet a standard of morality is needful in a greater degree, when in one country we find the stranger clothed and fed by those among whom he is a wanderer, and in another, devoured, as a matter of conscience.

In one

country, a man may marry only one wife, and she must not be either his late wife's sister or his grandmother; while, in another country, he is compelled, if he marry at all, to marry four wives, but without limitation as to relationship.

"Though each person's moral judgments are much influenced by the moral judgments of the community to which he belongs, and still more by those of the family of which he was a child, they are not entirely derived from those sources. Each person has also something individual in his moral sentiments and opinions.”—(p. 373.)

In some few instances, the reasoning faculties alone appear to constitute the acting conscience, and an act to a mind so framed, will appear right simply because it approves itself to the reason, as in conformity to principles of utility and expediency. In other instances the mind of each, judges of right and wrong, on the ground of preconceived opinions, without reference to reason, and thus arises the self-denial and devotion of fanaticism. An enthusiast seldom reasons, but takes for right and true, certain doctrines, and applies them without further consideration, and sometimes indiscriminately, to any event which requires a moral judgment. Truth (that is moral truth) may be perceived by a moral and an intellectual sight; but that alone is the sure vision which sees both morally and intellectually. Yet it is evident that, on this theory, a proper conclusion may be arrived at in many cases, with one only of these mental perceptions. It might be supposed, since every quality of mind may be required and brought to bear on a question of conscience, that whenever mind is present and thought possible, there some portion of the power of conscience is present. Weak and idiotic as such mind may be, still some question of right and wrong shall be found, not beyond the limited comprehension of that shallow intellect. It is a singular instance of the adaptation of the intelligence of man, moral and intellectual, that the feeble mind, in questions so important, should have power, though slight, to form a judgment and discriminate between right and wrong. Truth in the abstract, is the foundation of all morality, and this must ever be remembered as the only certain foundation for the moral standard.

"A knowledge of truth is necessary as the foundation of morality. And although the aspect of the truths which are the foundations of morality, may vary according to the various intellectual culture which those who contemplate them have received; there is one general truth, which must always form a part of those foundations, namely, the truth that duty is the way to happiness. The identification of happiness with duty on merely philosophical grounds, is a line of thought and reasoning full of difficulty, and this difficulty is effectually removed only by religious education." "We are thus led to religion as the next step of our progress, and to that we now proceed."(p. 374.)

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The term happiness it is philosophically difficult to analyze-to define strictly what is implied by that word. Perhaps it may be explained as being the unrestrained exercise of the motive powers of mind. A vicious man may be said to be happy in vice, and a virtuous man happy in the performance of a good action. Now as the mind is more or less a compound of good and bad, (even the most abandoned having some little good quality, which glimmers every now and then when it has an opportunity, and occasion offers)--happiness, as defined, is of a very questionable character; the dispositions which instigate the thoughts should be good, that the co-existing happiness should be of the right kind. But even then the term is difficult to analyze, and it may be said, Why is one species of happiness better than another.

"The identification of happiness with duty on merely philosophical grounds is a question of great difficulty. It is difficult even for the philosopher to keep this identity steadily fixed in his mind, as an operative principle; and it does not appear to be possible to make such an identity effective and evident in the minds of men in general: but religion presents to us this truth of the identity of happiness and duty in connection with other truths, by means of which it may be made fully evident and convincing to minds of every degree of intellectual culture; and the minds of men, for the most part, receive the conviction of the truth from their religious education."—(p. 360.)

Certain truths are the foundation of morality, and the moral state is maintained by the individual conviction of each person of the certainty of these truths.

One of the most important is this, that the course of action which is his duty is also his happiness, when considered with reference to the whole of his being. This conviction, men for the most part derive from religion, that is, from their belief respecting God and his government of man. To some persons the truths of natural religion may seem to be self-evident; to other persons, they may become more evident, when connected by various steps of analogy and reasoning.

"Human action may be contemplated, not only as governed by rules successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately by a supreme rule; but also, as directed to objects successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately to a supreme object. The supreme object of human action is happiness. Happiness is the object of human action contemplated in its most general form, and approved by the reason.' "The rules of human action approved by the reason may be considered as laws given to man by God; and the objects of human action, which are foreseen and obtained by conforming to such rules, may be considered as promises to man, made and fulfilled by God. The general declaration of God to man through his reason, may be considered as conditional promises. If you are temperate, you shall be healthy. If you conform to the laws of society, you shall enjoy the benefits of society.' In like manner there is a conditional promise made to man through his reason; that conformity to the supreme rule will be attended with the supreme good of his nature. If you are virtuous, you shall be happy. And as the promises thus made in the other cases are verified by

the result, we are led to believe by analogy, that the promise in the last case will be also verified by the result."-(vol. ii. p. 6.)

We are thus led to look for happiness, as a reward for virtue; and to unhappiness, as the punishment of vice.

6

Religion presents to us the supreme law of our being, as the will of God; and hence, if we now inquire what is the supreme rule of conscience, the answer can only be, that it is the will of God,' which is to be the rule of our conscience. Religion is to aid us to instruct and enlighten our conscience, and we are led to inquire in what forms this instruction, and this light, are to be obtained."—(vol. ii. p. 52.)

If we admit-and it cannot but be admitted-that there is design and purpose in the creation, at what point are we to place a limit? and if there be no limit, we must believe that the course of the world,-of human action,-of events,-of happiness and of suffering, have also a purpose, and that purpose must be in harmony with the moral government of God.

"The course of the world, we cannot but believe, is directed by God's providence. It is a Divine dispensation."-" So far as we borrow our light from natural religion, we assume these ideas of moral government and Providence, to be realized in the world to come; and we regard this world as the prelude and preparation to that. But we cannot reasonably be satisfied with a mere idea of the course of this world-we must attend to the fact also; that is, to the history of the world: and thus we are led to revealed religion." -(vol. ii. p. 11.)

The idea of the course of the world is the extension of the idea of purpose and design. The fact is that supplied by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. We learn that, " In the history of the world, revelations of the commands and promises of God, and of the methods by which men are to be enabled to obey these commands, and to receive the benefit of these promises,' have taken place, and that they are historical facts, to be believed as past events. "Christian morality is the will of God, as revealed to us by the coming of Christ;" of which revelation the authoritative account is contained in the Scriptures. "Hence, it may perhaps be thought by some, that Christian morality supersedes the morality of reason." But a little consideration will show, that we cannot look upon the Scriptures as the sole rule of human

action.

"The precepts of Scripture cannot be a rule to those who have not received the Scripture; and such persons have for their proper guide the suggestions of reason' the law written in their hearts.' "—(vol. ii. p. 54.)

The history of heathen life clearly shows the knowledge possessed of this inward guide, and of the guilt of non-compliance with its dictates. Thus the

"Precepts of Scripture are not the sole rule of action for mankind." "The will of God, in whatever manner made known to us, whether by Scriptures