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THE SCRIPTURES AND THE FATHERS.

In most cases it would be unnatural for a Review to lay aside its own proper feature, and prolong a discussion with correspondents, incidentally raised." But when two such men as Mr. Faber and Mr. M'Neile (not to speak of Y. Z., whose real name might rank with theirs on this subject) claim our attention at once, it seems better to depart from the usual course, and adopt one, perhaps more courteous, and certainly more in harmony with our feelings, by a separate notice of their communications. The importance of the subject, and the cloud which plainly rests on it in many minds, are a further motive for continuing the discussion, even in this unusual form.

It arose in the following manner. Mr. M'Neile, in his excellent work, "The Church and the Churches," had made some strictures on the line of reasoning in Mr. Faber's treatise, on "the Primitive Doctrine of Election." These related, in part, to the scriptural view of the doctrine itself, but still more, to the relative place of Scripture and the Fathers in such inquiries. In our May number we ventured to give our judgment, that Mr. M.'s remarks on these topics were" clear, forcible, and conclusive." We did not enter into the subject, but merely referred to the work itself. Mr. Faber, however, somewhat too rapidly, and without waiting to read the chapter in question, wrote a letter in reply; and, like the Syrian archer, drew his bow at a venture, against both the reviewer and the author. The sum of his reply was this, that Mr. M.'s argument rested solely on his private exposition of Scripture, which he assumed to be true. This was a paralogism; it was not to argue, but to dogmatize. The question was not of the authority, but of the meaning of Scripture, and Mr. M.'s was merely his own gratuitous interpretation; whereas Mr. F.'s own work was a strictly evidential treatise, to show which was the true sense of Scripture, by the uniform voice of the Fathers before Augustine. He especially insisted on the fact that Augustine was challenged to produce authorities in favour of his view of election, and after various evasions, only ventured to quote a few passages " from Cyprian, Nazianzen, and Ambrose," the oldest of whom was in the middle of the third century. He infers that Augustine must have thought Ignatius and Hermas either neuter or adverse, or he would surely have cited such very ancient witnesses.

Our reply to our honoured friend was to this effect:-Every judgment of an individual must be, in one important sense, a pri

vate judgment, because it is his judgment, and liable to all the errors of his individual mind. Whether it be an inference from the text of Scripture, or from sentences of the Fathers, or a blind submission to the dictum of a priest, still it is that person's own judgment that such is the meaning of the Scriptures, or such is the voice of the Fathers, or that such a priest or pope is an infal lible guide. The man must cease to exist, and to be a fallible being, before this avenue of possible error can be closed; and all pretences to get rid of it, by an appeal to Catholic consent, or other high-sounding phrases, are as worthless as the attempts to procure a perpetual motion. The great question is really, What are the most effectual means of attaining a sound judgment? We affirm, that the surest and best help is the direct study of Scripture, comparing text with text, and statement with statement; that this alone should be decisive in all revealed doctrines, though more plainly so with some doctrines than others; that where Scripture lends no sure and certain evidence, the doctrine is not revealed, and no opinion of twenty or a hundred Fathers can turn it into a matter of revelation. Yet, on the other hand, the consent of early writers may be very useful to strengthen our faith in a particular doctrine, when that faith has solid ground in the Scriptures themselves, but in this case alone. In every other, such an appeal is fallacious. Those who really adhere to it will only fulfil the description of our poet :

Pervert heaven's sacred mysteries, and the truth
With superstitions and traditions taint,

Left only in those written records pure,

Though not but by the Spirit understood.

Y. Z. lent us his aid, in a few pithy remarks on the difference between Mr. Faber's opinion and Augustine's, on the meaning of Cyprian, Gregory, and Ambrose; with the natural inquiry, where we must look for "a purely evidential treatise," to fix the true sense of the fathers themselves.

Mr. Faber, in our last number, complains that he cannot understand Y. Z.'s question, and that we have unconsciously mistaken the very principle of his reasoning. He does not believe that the Scriptures are ambiguous, and the Fathers free from ambiguity. "On all essential points," he believes, "the Scriptures are abundantly clear to an honest inquirer. Still, as the naked fact exists that very different interpretations are put upon them, what is to be done? We must resort to external evidence, wherever we can find it, and ascertain from the Fathers, what they jointly testified the Catholic Church to have held from the beginning, as the true sense of Holy Scripture. A determined quibbler may set aside

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any testimony, whether of the Scripture or the Fathers; but unless we would bring in universal scepticism, there is no reason why Antiquity may not be our umpire touching the disputed sense of doctrinal Scripture." The challenge made to Augustine is then stated again at greater length, and an answer to it is required from the Reviewer or Mr. M'Neile.

Last of all, Mr. M'Neile has stept in to defend his own statement. He naturally complains that Mr. Faber should have assailed his work before he had read it, and then shows that, by merely substituting Antiquity for Scripture, Mr. F.'s own words will completely abolish Mr. F.'s argument. He next refers to his work itself, and reminds us that he had reasoned there from Mr. Faber's own witnesses, to show that three of them affirmed the very doctrine, which the consent of Antiquity was to overthrow. He then narrows the question about them to this one point, whetheres av should be translated, to ecclesiastical privileges, as Mr. F.'s argument requires, or simply, to glory, as Mr. M'Neile himself affirms.

We must now sum up, as briefly as we may, the whole discussion. It has arisen chiefly from the haste of our excellent friend, Mr. Faber, in censuring Mr. M'Neile's work in the dark, before he had seen it, and from a real inconsistency--he must forgive us for saying-in his own views and statements on the subject in debate. We agree with Mr. M'Neile in his assertion of the doctrine itself, but on this point we have no wish to enter at present. We shall merely repeat our opinion, that his statement, with regard to the true laws of evidence, by which we are to ascertain Divine truth, is " clear, forcible, and conclusive."

1. The πрwTo evos of Mr. Faber's argument lies, we thought and still think, in a secret assumption that the Scriptures are quite ambiguous, and the Fathers comparatively free from ambiguity. Our friend renounces the sentiment, and we rejoice in his hearty disclaimer. But then he ought, at the same time, to retract the statements of his former letter, which have no meaning on any other view. Mr. M'Neile had reasoned from Scripture in favour of the doctrine of personal election. He had shown forcibly that if such reasonings may be set aside without inquiry, as private opinions, all appeals to Antiquity may be set aside on the very same ground. Mr. Faber, however, before he has read a sentence of the work, affirms that the whole must be a mere paralogism; that this is not to argue, but to dogmatize; that Mr. M. builds on his own "gratuitous interpretation of Scripture," while his, Mr. F.'s, work is" a strictly evidential treatise on the testimony of Antiquity.' The facts here speak for themselves. Direct reasonings on Scrip

ture, to fix its sense, even before their particular nature is known, are declared to be quite worthless, a gratuitous private opinion, which can never determine its true meaning. On the contrary, the passages from the Fathers are so plain, that they prove, not Mr. F.'s private opinion on their meaning, but the meaning itself; and, by a further consequence, decide the true sense of Scripture also. This implies clearly just what we said, that the Scriptures are quite ambiguous, the Fathers nearly, or quite, free from ambiguity. No proposition in Euclid, we think, can well be plainer. Since our friend rejects the principle, he must surely admit that his charge of paralogism against Mr. M'Neile was entirely groundless. Mr. M. may have reasoned on Scripture amiss; but no one could have a right to assume that those reasonings must be worthless, before he had read them, unless the word of God be hopelessly obscure. And, unless the Fathers are free from all ambiguity, no one may assume it for self-evident that Mr. McNeile is wrong in his construction of Clement, Ignatius, and Hermas, or Augustine in his construction of Cyprian, Gregory, and Ambrose. If Mr. Faber had not tried to set aside Scriptural reasoning entirely, as beside the question, and worthless, the discussion would not have arisen. He has now denied the only principle on which that assertion can ever be justified, and thus retreated from the dangerous position taken up in his first letter, to more defensible ground.

2. What now is the new position of the argument? Mr. M'Neile has reasoned from the texts of various Scriptures, and Mr. Faber from the texts of various Fathers. Each line of argument, we believe, is lawful in its own place; unless we yield to the scepticism of "determined quibblers," and deny that words have commonly a definite meaning. We believe, with Mr. M'Neile and Mr. Faber, that the Scriptures have a fixed sense, which may commonly be ascertained; and, with Mr. Faber and Mr. McNeile, that the Fathers have the same character, only in a lower degree. So far both authors are in the right. But here is the great difference. Mr. M'Neile goes at once to the fountainhead. His arguments are drawn from the word of God itself. In our opinion they prove what is the true sense of Scripture; and if so, since the Scripture is inspired truth, they decide the question at once. Mr. Faber prefers the lower maxim-" rivulos consectari." He would prove, by quotations, the consent of the early Fathers before Augustine to a different view. If this were proved, it would be only a strong presumption, and not like the other, a real proof. Here also it would be only a negative presumption. Mr. M. holds the very doctrine of ecclesiastical election, which Mr. Faber proves most of the Fathers to have held. That they positively rejected a further doctrine, quite consistent,

in Mr. M.'s view, with the former, can never be proved merely from their silence. Finally, we agree with Mr. M'Neile that even this negative presumption fails, and that Clemens, Ignatius, and Hermas, on the only natural construction of their words, assert the very doctrine, which the silence of all the Fathers is said to disprove. And thus the reasonings, which Mr. Faber would set aside as worthless, are, in three respects, better and more forcible than his own. They appeal to Scripture itself, and not to fallible writers. They are direct arguments, that the doctrine is affirmed by inspired apostles; and not indirect presumptions, from the mere silence of a few uninspired men. And, finally, they leave to words their natural sense, while our friend, to sustain his negative presumption, must interpret doğa in Ignatius, and wŋ awvios in Hermas, by the weak paraphrase-ecclesiastical privileges; or an election into the pale of Christ's Church."-(Vide p. 715.) 3. Let us now meet the difficulty which our correspondent lays in our path, and which he seems to think insurmountable. "On all essential points the Scriptures are abundantly clear to a really honest inquirer. Still the naked fact is plain, that very different interpretations are put upon them. What then is to be done in

this case?"

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Surely no Edipus is needed here to find an answer. once every "really honest inquirer" to that abundantly clear evidence which Scripture supplies. Even where doctrines are less plainly revealed, still refer the honest inquirer to the same source of truth, and place its evidence in the clearest light its nature allows of. Reason from the context, compare Scripture with Scripture, and passage with passage. If you convince him, you have gained your brother. If not, exercise mutual forbearance. Remember our common blindness, and wait for the hour, when we shall see eye to eye, and know even as we are known. Whereunto you have attained unity of judgment, walk by the same rule, mind the same things; and perhaps in due time, where you are variously-minded, God will reveal even this unto you. But, above all, do not deceive yourself with the fancy that differences of judgment, which the word of God cannot cure, will be healed at once by an appeal to the Fathers.

But what is to be done with dishonest inquirers? The first thing to be done, we answer, is to get rid of the vain hope that we can cure their dishonesty, or silence their quibbles, by changing the venue from the Bible to the early Fathers. Dishonest minds have thus only a wider jungle in which they can play at hide and seek with the truth. The next step must be, to awaken their conscience, by a sense of their sin and danger in the sight of God.

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