tions of those Therapeutic monks. This is called the "demonstration of a certainty, than which history hath nothing more certain," founded on the "valid" testimony of Eusebius. With the numerous absurdities the statement involves, and which are too gross to impose on any but the most ignorant minds, we have now nothing to do. We are only concerned with the use which the writer, and others of the same stamp, make of what they imposingly call the testimony of Eusebius. The truth is, Eusebius affords, strictly speaking, no testimony at all in the case. He only indulges a train of reasoning, futile enough, to be sure, starting from some facts stated by Philo.

Philo, in his treatise on the "Contemplative Life," describes the Therapeutæ, a gloomy and ascetic sect, which existed in his time, and were found chiefly in retired situations in the vicinity of the Lake Mareotis, in Egypt. From this treatise Eusebius gives extracts, from which he deduces the inference, that these same Therapeutæ were Christian monks, who, as he supposed, had been converted to the faith of the cross, by the preaching of Mark, the Evangelist, who, according to an ancient tradition, first conveyed the Gospel to Egypt.* The inference, as the learned have abundantly shown, is wholly unfounded. The Therapeuta were not Christians, nor could the writings in their possession have been Christian writings. But what then? We do not set aside the testimony of Eusebius, but only his reasoning, his inference from certain given facts. He does not pretend, in this instance, to be relating a matter of history, he attempts to argue, and he argues badly enough, and proves himself but a sorry logician. But neither does his reputation as a narrator, which is all we are anxious to defend, suffer, nor are the evidences for the genuineness and authenticity of the Christian Scriptures impaired in con

sequence.

Eusebius reasoned weakly on other occasions, and was, in fact, as we have said, but a poor critic. In regard to the case in question, however, we would observe, he is not quite so absurd, as the statement, which has called forth our present remarks, would seem to imply; for he says that the treatise of Philo, from which he quotes, was written "a long time after" his reputed journey to Rome in the time of Claudius. If so, Eusebius might very reasonably suppose that the writings of

* Lib. ii. c. 16, 17.

"ancient men," (he does not say ancient writings as the writer in question makes him say) by whom he supposed were meant the first Christian Apostles, were known in Egypt in his day; and the supposition, that the Therapeute described by him might have been acquainted with them, certainly involved no anachronism, nor was inconsistent with the views generally entertained of the origin of our present Gospels and Epistles.

The new version, the title of which stands at the head of the present article, is executed, we believe, so far as the sense is concerned, with a degree of fidelity to the original, highly creditable to the translator. Whatever may be his theological opinions, he has not suffered them often to interfere with his duty to his author. He has correctly rendered some passages of which the prejudices or ignorance of former translators led them to give a faulty version. Thus Hanmer* Thus Hanmer* represents Pliny as saying, in his Letter to Trajan, a part of which Eusebius has quoted at second hand, † that the early Christians were accustomed to meet and "celebrate Christ as God," and Shorting has "singing hymns to Christ as unto God," instead of "as to a God," as Mr. Cruse gives it, and which is all the expression could mean in the mouth of a Roman. I

* Meredith Hanmer, the author of the oldest English version of Eusebius. The Epistle Dedicatory to his first edition bears date the 15th of December, 1584. The translation went through five editions, the last of which was published in 1650. Nearly a century after the first edition of Hanmer (not "more than a century afterwards," as Mr. Cruse states) a new translation appeared, the second edition of which we have before us, published at London in 1709. The translator has suppressed his name, but is generally understood to have been T. Shorting. Parker's abridgment appeared afterwards,

Eusebius quotes immediately from Tertullian. Lib. iii. ; c. 30, Hanmer; c. 33, Shorting.

One word, however, of very frequent occurrence in Eusebius, Mr. Cruse, whether inadvertently or by design, we do not undertake to say, has, we believe, uniformly mistranslated — #agunía, parish, not church, as he has erroneously rendered it, the latter word having now acquired a technical signification entirely foreign from its primitive meaning. In one instance, he has rendered the word in its plural form, strangely enough, places. Eusebius says, at the commencement of his history, (Lib. i. c. 1.) that he shall speak of those who presided over the principal parishes. There is no reason why places should be substituted, as by Mr. Cruse, or Provinces, as by Christophorson and Hanmer, or Sees, as by Shorting, except a desire to get rid of the necessary inference, that the ancient bishops were simply Parochial bishops. 41

VOL. XVIII.

N. S. VOL. XIII. NO. III.

The present publication, however, is not a scholarlike performance. In breaking up some of Eusebius's long periods, the translator has occasionally made imperfect sentences. The first sentence, as it stands in the new translation, is fragmentary and ungrammatical. We think too that Mr. Cruse has not done wisely in omitting entirely the notes of former translators and editors, especially those of Valesius (De Valois), many of which are preserved by Shorting, and which we cannot agree with the present translator in pronouncing "mostly verbal criticisms," referring to "various readings of the Greek text," and "such as can have but little interest for the general reader." A judicious selection from them, to which others might have been added, would have greatly enhanced the value of the present publication. The want of notes, and of an index, which too is omitted, we esteem a capital defect in it; and this is fully sufficient, we think, to counterbalance all the advantages the version may possess over that of Shorting. The latter exhibits a specimen of good old idiomatic English; and the very air of quaintness and antiquity which is spread over it, we confess, does not displease us. Taken all in all, we must say, that we should have preferred a republication of Shorting's, with all its faults, which are certainly great, to the present translation. Yet we sincerely thank Mr. Cruse for what he has done. He is entitled to the praise of good intentions, and to the gratitude of the public for having presented, in an accessible form, an old and valued work, which was before to be found only in our public libraries, and a very few private collections.

ART. III. The Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation. Treatise III. On Astronomy and General Physics. By the Rev. W. WHEWELL. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, & Blanchard. 1833. 12mo. pp. 234.

THE unceasing agency of the Creator throughout his material works is one of the most prominent doctrines of the Bible. It is early impressed on most readers of the sacred volume in consequence of its sublimely striking representations of the infinite presence, power, and majesty of the Most High.

The prayers and hymns of the sanctuary abound in phraseology of similar import. The hearts of worshippers respond to the language that leads their devotions. But we would ask if this impression of the Divine presence and agency is not, with very many, a vague sentiment rather than a clearly apprehended truth, a profound conviction of the understanding. We infer this to be the fact from the language we often hear respecting nature and its operations. The Laws of Nature is a phrase that falls from almost every tongue. Teachers of philosophy especially are in the habit of representing the Creator as having ordained certain permanent laws in the beginning, by which all the revolutions of the worlds, and all the processes and appearances of matter, take place. They seemingly speak of creation as a mighty machinery, which, once set in motion, continues to go on without any further impulse from the original contriver and mover. The text-books of youth on Natural Science, and a thousand books beside, are fraught with language conveying such an impression. The term "Laws of Nature" has been personified, indued with a life and a will. Indeed it has almost grown from a mere figure of speech to be an actual person, a very entity, even the Creator's conscious vicegerent, carrying on his works, while he might be away or inactive, almost as if the Omnipresent might be absent, the Omnipotent weary or delighting in rest.

We propose in the following article to show, that the Deity operates directly upon and through the material universe without the intervention of what philosophers call Laws,— that all the changes of nature proceed from the instantaneous impulses of his Almighty will. The subject is one of exceeding importance. It is of the highest practical tendency in respect to faith, filial love, and resignation towards the paternal Creator. And still further, it has a particular bearing on the probability and truth of the Miracles connected with our Religion.

In the first place, we must dispose of the often uttered and blindly used term, "Laws of Nature.' Whence came it, and what does it mean? The word law was primarily applied to human conduct. It was prescribed to men by those in authority to do, or forbear to do, certain things. The language used on the occasion was denominated a law. The definition of the term is, a rule of action. All know that it is not the rule of action which causes action. The origin of conduct,

properly speaking, is the living energies seated in the constitution of man. The law indeed may furnish a motive to conduct, but it is that centre of the inner man, the will, which is the source of movement. From this primary use of the term, it was transferred, with a figurative application, to the works and operations of nature. One of the distinguishing characteristics of matter is regularity of appearance and of motion. Under given circumstances its elements always combine in a certain proportion, its particles or masses tend in a certain direction, for the accomplishment of some important end; just as if it possessed consciousness, and was obeying a mandate imposed by some superior power, to whom it felt constrained to submit. Hence matter was said to obey certain laws, or acted according to a rule, as man does; but it is evident, that it is not the rule that causes the action in the one case any more than in the other. For instance, an apple drops from its tree by a law of nature; all that is really meant is this, that matter of a due density, and undisturbed by any external force, uniformly tends toward the centre of the sphere to which it belongs, as if following a known rule previously prescribed. The term gravitation is often used as if it were a real property of matter, or an individual agent operating upon it. But gravitation is nothing but a word,- a word expressive of the fact that matter tends toward matter with a force proportionate to distance. This word does not explain the cause of the tendency or the ratio of force. To say that gravitation makes the apple fall or bodies tend toward each other, is, strictly speaking, the same as saying that a fall makes a fall and a tendency makes a tendency. Take another instance. By a law of nature water freezes at a specific temperature. All that the phrase really conveys is, that, on condition that a certain portion of caloric leaves the fluid, it becomes solid. The cause of the departure of caloric or of the consequent change is not in the least explained by the terms by which the phenomenon is expressed.

Let us suppose ourselves to have been born deaf and dumb, and moreover never to have been taught the use of language by sight. We will also suppose ourselves to possess acute perceptions, a proneness to reflection, and an ardent curiosity. We are placed in the midst of nature, with all the elements of a philosophic mind, by which we may observe, compare, and infer, with not a single word of language either to aid or to