punishments, at that time dispensed by a particular providence; when these considerations are laid together, much of the difficulty, and much of the objection, which our own minds may have raised against this commandment, will, I hope, be removed.

SERMON XIV.

HOW VIRTUE PRODUCES BELIEF, AND VICE

UNBELIEF.

If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.-John vii. 17.

It does not. I think, at first sight appear, why our behaviour should influence our belief, or how any particular course of action, good or bad, should affect our assent to any particular propositions, which are offered to us; for truth or probability can never depend upon our conduct; the credibility or incredibility of religion is the same, whether we act well or ill, whether we obey its laws or disobey them. Nor is it very manifest, how even our perception of evidence or credibility should be affected by our virtues or vices; because conduct is immediately voluntary, belief is not one is an act of the will, under the power of motives; the other is an act of the understanding upon which motives do not, primarily at least, operate, nor ought to operate at all. Yet our Lord, in the text, affirms this to be the case, namely, that our behaviour does influence our belief, and to have been the case from the beginning, that is, even during his own ministry upon earth. "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." It becomes, therefore, a subject of serious and religious inquiry, how, why, and to what extent, the declaration of the text may be maintained.

Now the first and most striking observation is, that it corresponds with experience. The fact, so far as can be observed, is as the text represents it to be. I speak of the general course of human

conduct, which is the thing to be considered. Good men are generally believers: bad men are generally unbelievers. This is the general state of the case: not without exceptions; for, on the one hand, there may be men of regular and external morals, who are yet unbelievers, because, though immorality be one cause of unbelief, it is not the only cause; and, on the other hand, there are undoubtedly many, who, although they believe and tremble, yet go on in their sins, because their faith doth not regulate their practice. But, having respect to the ordinary course and state of human conduct, what our Saviour hath declared is verified by experience. He, that doeth the will of God, cometh to believe, that Jesus Christ is of God, namely, a messenger from God. A process, some how or other, takes place in the understanding, which brings the mind of him, who acts rightly, to this conclusion. A conviction is formed, and every day made stronger and stronger. No man ever comprehended the value of Christian precepts, but by conducting his life according to them. When, by so doing, he is brought to know their excellency, their perfection, I had almost said, their divinity, he is necessarily also brought to think well of the religion itself. Hear St. Paul:-"The night is far spent: the day is at hand: let us, therefore, cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light : let us walk honestly as in the day, not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ; and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof."* It is recorded of this text, that it was the means of conversion of a very eminent father of the church, St. Austin; for which reason I quote it as an instance to my present purpose, since I apprehend, it must have wrought with him in the manner here represented. I have no doubt but that others have been

*Rom. xiii. 11.

affected in like manner by this or other particular portions of Scripture; and that still greater numbers have been drawn down to Christianity by the general impression, which our Lord's discourses, and the speeches and letters of his apostles, have left upon their minds. This is sometimes called the internal evidence of our religion; and it is very strong. But, inasmuch as it is a species of evidence, which applies itself to the knowledge, love, and practice of virtue, it will operate most powerfully where it finds these qualities, or even these tendencies and dispositions subsisting. If this be the effect of virtuous conduct, and, in some proportion, the effect also of each separate act of virtue, the contrary effect must necessarily follow from a contrary course of behaviour. And perhaps it may assist us in unfolding the subject, to take up the inquiry in this order; because, if it can be shown, why, and in what manner, vice tends to obstruct, impair, and, at length, destroy our faith, it will not be difficult to allow, that virtue must facilitate, support, and confirm it: that, at least, it will deliver us, or keep us free, from that weight of prejudice and resistance, which is produced in the mind by vice, and which acts against the reception of religious truth.

Now the case appears to me to be no other than this: A great many persons, before they proceed upon an act of known transgression, do expressly state to themselves the question, whether religion be true or not; and, in order to get at the object of their desire (for the real matter to be determined is, whether they shall have their desire gratified or not,) in order, I say, to get at the pleasure in some cases; or, in other cases, the point of interest, upon which they have set their hearts, they choose to decide, and they do in fact decide with themselves, that these things are not so certain, as to be a reason for them to give up the pleasure which lies before them, or the advantage, which is now, and which may never be again, in their power to compass. This conclu

sion does actually take place, and, at various times, must almost necessarily take place, in the minds of men of bad morals. And now remark the effect, which it has upon their thoughts afterward. When they come at another future time to reflect upon religion, they reflect upon it, as upon what they had before adjudged to be unfounded, and too uncertain to be acted upon, or to be depended upon: and reflections, accompanied with this adverse and unfavourable impression, naturally lead to infidelity. Herein, therefore, is seen the fallacious operation of sin first, in the circumstances under which men form their opinion and their conclusions concerning religion; and, secondly, in the effect, which conclusions, which doubts so formed, have upon their judgment afterward. First, what is the situation of mind in which they decide concerning religion? and what can be expected from such a situation? Some magnified and alluring pleasure has stirred their desires and passions. It cannot be enjoyed without sin. Here is religion denouncing and forbidding it on one side: there is opportunity drawing and pulling on the other. With this drag and bias upon their thoughts, they pronounce and decide concerning the most important of all subjects, and of all questions. If they should determine for the truth and reality of religion, they must sit down disappointed of a gratification, upon which they had set their hearts, and of using an opportunity, which may never come again. Nevertheless they must determine one way or other. And this process, viz. a similar deliberation and a similar conclusion, is renewed and repeated, as often as occasions of sin offer. The effect, at length, is a settled persuasion against religion; for what is it, in persons who proceed in this manner, which rests and dwells upon their memories? What is it which gives to their judgment its turn and bias! It is these occasional decisions often repeated; which decisions have the same power and influence over the man's after-opinion, as if they had

been made ever so impartially, or ever so correctly whereas, in fact, they are made under circumstances, which exclude, almost, the possibility of their being made with fairness, and with sufficient inquiry. Men decide under the power and influence of sinful temptation; but, having decided, the decision is afterward remembered by them, and grows into a settled and habitual opinion, as much as if they had proceeded in it without any bias or prejudice whatever.

The extent, to which this cause acts, that is, the members who are included in its influence, will be farther known by the following observation. I have said, that sinners oftentimes expressly state to themselves the question, whether religion be true or not; and that they state to themselves this question at the time when they are about to enter upon some act of sin, which religion condemns; and I believe the case so to be. I believe that this statement is often expressly made, and in the manner which I have represented. But there is also a tacit rejection of religion, which has nearly the same effect. Whenever a man deliberately ventures upon an action, which he knows that religion prohibits, he tacitly rejects religion. There may not pass in his thoughts every step which we have described, nor may he come expressly to the conclusion; but he acts upon the conclusion, he practically adopts it. And the doing so will alienate his mind from religion, as surely, almost, as if he had formally argued himself into an opinion of its untruth. The effect of sin is necessarily, and highly, and in all cases, adverse to the production and existence of religious faith. Real difficulties are doubled and trebled, when they fall in with vicious propensities, imaginary difficulties are readily started. Vice is wonderfully acute in discovering reasons on its own side. This may be said of all kinds of vice; but, I think it more particularly holds good of what are called licentious vices, that is, of vices of debauchery; for sins of debauchery have a ten