bility form no part of the faith, and therefore never will be so settled. The number of such points is probably practically greater for us than it is for you. The fixing of the fundamental principles, or indeed the determination. of any of the laws of any science, always opens up a number of questions which otherwise would not be thought of; and what is true of sciences in general is true of theology in particular. If one is always worrying about first principles, which necessarily are comparatively few, one never gets any further, and has his mental range much restricted.

Neither should you imagine, as is plain from what has been said, that Catholics have to be always struggling to stifle their doubts about those matters which do not belong to faith, and have been definitely settled. They do not have to do so, any more than you have to about the matter of some science with which you may be somewhat imperfectly acquainted. They know that they can study up the matter of religion in correct and profound treatises, if they like, just as matters of science can be studied. But they feel quite confident of their faith without doing so, just as you do, though you may not be a man of science, about the determined laws of astronomy or chemistry. And they feel no more need to study the works of Protestants or infidels to obtain information about religion

than you do to read the pamphlet of some would-be astronomer who thinks he has smashed gravitation to pieces, and refuted Newton or Laplace; non-Catholic speculations about religion are to an intelligent Catholic simply unscientific trash.

That is to say, they feel and act in this way unless they have some private reason for hoping that the faith might not be true. They know, of course, that it is a restraint, not on their intellect but on their passions; for any religion coming from God must necessarily be this. And this restraint, indeed, may cause some chafing and fretting. It is our unvarying experience that Catholics do not look out for arguments against their religion unless they wish to escape from its control in this respect; or, what comes to the same thing, unless they want to enjoy some temporal good which cannot be gained without renouncing their faith. Of course I can hardly expect you to believe that I am right in this; but it is true, all the same. It is not merely a conclusion of theory; it is a result of observation.

It may be noticed that the charges discussed in these two chapters are, strangely enough, directly opposed to each other. The charge that the Church is opposed to science is really that she is opposed to that which itself prevents liberty of thought by giving us certain informa

tion. It may be said, however, that she desires liberty of thought on some matters, but forbids it on others. This is true, but not in the sense in which it is intended. She forbids, as against reason, common sense, and the welfare of man, liberty of thought on matters, whether in the material or spiritual order, which have been clearly demonstrated and definitely ascertained; she refuses to abandon it on those which are still open to reasonable question, as is the case with certain scientific hypotheses not as yet proved. You may disagree with her in your judgment of what is certain and what is doubtful; but except for this, there is no difference between her action and your own.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OPPOSED TO FREE

INSTITUTIONS.

T is a charge very commonly made against

I the Church, that she is only made against

stitutions. This charge, the truth of which is usually simply taken for granted, is one which naturally prejudices Americans more against her than any other which could be made. For Americans, as a rule, are most profoundly attached to the free institutions under which they live, and most absolutely convinced that democracy is better than monarchy or aristocracy in any form.

Now, I say the truth of this most injurious charge against the Church is usually simply taken for granted. But surely such a proceeding is far from being fair. I should like to have a reason given for it; and shall try, therefore, to find out what reasons there are likely to be.

The most obvious one seems to be that the government of the Church is itself monarchical. This statement is true, in a certain sense, no doubt. The Pope is unquestionably the supreme authority in matters of

faith and morals; that is, his consent is necessary and sufficient to establish the truth in controverted questions on these subjects. This authority is, however, rarely exercised; and when it is, it is usually merely to place beyond controversy a point already very nearly settled by the popular voice. So that here, after all, we very rarely have any strain put on our minds by obedience to his infallible decision.

Then again, it is true that in matters of discipline the Pope is the supreme legislator. He has absolute control over all inferior legislators in the Church; he can reform or abrogate laws made by bishops in their dioceses, if it seems to him expedient to do so; and he can make laws for the universal Church which are binding without the consent of his inferiors. But here again, such action on his part is very rare. Outside of the matter of the rubrics-that is, of the prayers or ceremonies of public worship— legislation of this kind is unusual, as is also interference with the action of his subordinates. The fact is, that both their action and his are usually simply in accordance with fixed traditional principles, modified more or less according to the circumstances of particular times or places; with which those living on the spot are generally supposed to be best acquainted.

In point of fact, then, Rome legislates very