matters of doctrine has a more intimate connection with right principles of public and private life than is generally supposed; and that, for want of thorough Christian knowledge and instruction, the temporal welfare and happiness of the people is not so effectually secured as it might be. But she does not wish to secure for the American people the advantages of the truth which she possesses by force, trickery, or conspiracy; but only by the legitimate means which American citizenship places in the hands of all. She regards these means and this citizenship as the best hope which any country can have for its future.

Catholics desire the conversion of this country to the Catholic faith; that is a matter of course. So Methodists, Baptists, or Presbyterians must necessarily desire its conversion to their own respective ways of thinking. No charge should, therefore, be made against us on this head. But should we be successful in this, we do not desire to tyrannize over those who may still differ from us. We do not wish to change our form of government, or to establish the Catholic religion, making nonconformity with it an offence. But no one could rightly blame a Catholic majority for making laws by which, for instance, the proper respect for the Divine institution of marriage should be more fully secured.

If infidels are not considered

disloyal to our free institutions for trying to break this down, how can Catholics be so considered for endeavoring to build it up? Or if a Catholic majority should believe that some special measures needed to be taken for suppressing the evils of intemperance, and should vote such measures, as Catholics would do now if they followed the direction of their pastors, could such a proceeding be considered as bigoted, intolerant, or contrary to the principles of American liberty?

I know that many, perhaps most non-Catholics, will say: "This all sounds well enough; but organizations, as well as individuals, must be judged, not by their professions, but by their actions. History shows that Catholics have always persecuted those opposed to them, and persecuted them simply as such, whenever it was in their power to do so. And what they have done we believe they will do again."

This charge is a very common and a very weighty one in the minds of most Protestants. It deserves a special examination.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PERSECUTION.

PERSECUTION is considered by the aver

age Protestant as something specially

He con

characteristic of the Catholic Church. siders it so obvious that the Catholic Church always persecutes heretics when she gets a chance, that it is hardly worth while to make any attempt to prove it. But if proof is called for, surely Bloody Mary" and the Spanish Inquisition are quite sufficient to settle the question.

Be

But in fact the question is one which cannot be settled in any such summary manner. fore we can arrive at any sound conclusions, or even think or talk reasonably on the subject, we must understand just what is meant by persecution, and how far or in what cases we can reasonably object to it.

No one, I presume, objects to the persecution of burglars or murderers except those who are, or are likely to be, the objects of such persecution. Society has well-formed and settled views, not only as to the immorality of burglary and murder, but also as to their inconsistency with the peace and welfare of the state. As a

rule, it contents itself with the persecution or punishment of the overt act, and it accomplishes its end sufficiently well by so doing; for burglars or assassins are not inclined to make profession openly of their purposes, or to incite others publicly to imitate their example.

But even in this may we not have, in a certain sense, persecution for opinion's sake? Suppose that a man holds that, according to his religion or conscience, the sacrifice of human life is necessary. That such doctrines are held as religious creeds by considerable numbers of men, is well known. Would not a civilized government acquiring control of a country where such views were held be obliged to put them down by the strong hand-to persecute and severely punish those who should act out their convictions in this respect? And yet the victim of such persecution might truly allege that, according to his creed, the taking of life in the case in which he was punished for it was a matter of the highest obligation, most necessary not only for his own salvation but for that also of the one whose life he had taken.

It cannot be said that holding such doctrines is a mark of insanity, and that insane persons form an exception to ordinary rules; for one cannot believe whole nations to be insane.

But we will take a more practical case; one nearer home. Surely there are plenty of peo

ple, not considered insane, who hold that a man, at least if no one is depending on him for support, has a right to take his own life. It is hard to prove that this conviction is unreasonable, or that this view is a mistaken one, unless by the aid of religion; and if the would-be suicide does not admit the teachings of your religion, it is practically impossible to persuade him of his error, which may amount to a religious conviction with him. Nevertheless, laws have been passed, and now exist, making attempted suicide a punishable offence; and we do not find that such laws are considered to savor of intolerance or persecution. And yet clearly by them we punish men for acting out their conscientious convictions, or what may be presumed to be such; as in the case of the Mormons.

But you say, What we mean by persecution is persecution, not for action's but for opinion's sake. As you have said, the civilized state contents itself with punishing the overt act.”’

Had you not better wait a minute, and see if you are not going too far in this definition of persecution which you have given? For my part, I do not see very well how any one can be persecuted merely for an opinion, unless we bring a mind-reader as witness against him. What is meant by the loose phrase "persecution for opinion's sake," means really persecu