THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY

No. CCLXX-AUGUST 1899

THE EXCESSIVE ARMIES OF RUSSIA

I HAVE received a circular letter dated from London, under the signature of E. D. Bernhardt, who describes himself as Editor of the St. Petersburg Herald, inviting me to give my opinion on the military system of England with a view to its reform. The opinions expressed in foreign as well as in British publications as to our system are quoted at considerable length, and the letter concludes with the hope that I will excuse him for troubling me so much, but the great interest taken everywhere in Imperial Defence has induced him to his entreaty, which he hopes I will kindly fulfil if my precious time should allow it.'

It strikes me as somewhat curious and absurd that the Editor of a Russian journal should thus interest himself in the military system of the British Empire, and that he should ask British officers for information with reference thereto, when he could with so much greater propriety apply his studies to the military system of his own country and the necessities for its defence, as to which I propose to make a few observations.

It is well known that Russia is adding to her military forces by levies in Finland and elsewhere, and has only lately devoted 9,000,000l. for the increase of her navy, and that she is hard at work making military lines of railway, especially that through Siberia to Vladivostok, and through Manchuria to Port Arthur and Niu-chwang, with the intention of extending them to Pekin.

The great Trans-Siberian line, which was originally intended only to complete the land route between Vladivostok and the railways in existence in 1893 connecting Siberia with European Russia,

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required for its construction 4,695 miles of new railway at an estimated cost for a single line of 56,000,000l., including 'sufficient rolling stock,' according to the official report, 'to be able to form three sets of army trains per twenty-four hours,' and upwards of 2,000,000l. more for subsidiary works. When the inclemency of the climate and the paucity of the population are considered, as well as the enormous rivers to be crossed and the very serious engineering difficulties known to exist in some parts of this line, especially in the neighbourhood of Lake Baikal, it is certain that this estimate will be greatly exceeded; and after all this vast expenditure has been incurred, the report says that on account of the importance of the water supply to the traffic of the line and the difficulty of increasing it ultimately, it has been decided to arrange it only at the stations, that is, at distances of fifty versts (thirty-three miles), but to provide for the passage of seven sets of trains.'

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The lines since projected through Manchuria to connect the Trans-Siberian railway with Port Arthur and Niu-chwang will involve a further expenditure of several millions, and if extended to Pekin, probably not less than 20,000,000l. more.

M. de Witte, the Finance Minister of Russia, finding it difficult to obtain money from France and other Continental countries, is most anxious to get the assistance of British capital, nominally in the interest and for the development of commerce, when in reality the demand for capital is due to the extreme efforts Russia is now devoting to get these and other military railways completed and her navy augmented with the least possible delay.

This increase of the navy is not for defence, as it is well known that no naval Power could prevail in war against Russia or injure her so seriously by naval operations against her European possessions as to compel her to sue for peace; and as to Vladivostok or Port Arthur, although ships within them may be injured by bombardment from the sea, they could not be captured without the co-operation of a much larger military force than any European Power could maintain at such a distance from its own shores and arsenals. For Japan this would be too serious an adventure to undertake, especially when the severity of the winter is such that operations in the field would generally be limited to a few short months in the

summer.

The Editor of the St. Petersburg Herald might, after a careful study of the Russian system, suggest to the Finance Minister that he might apply the 9,000,000l. allotted for the increase of the navy of Russia far more profitably for the improvement of commercial enterprise or for alleviating the distress of the wretched inhabitants of the several large provinces in European Russia in which famine has prevailed more or less for several years, and where the people are now dying by thousands from its effects.

He might also point out with perfect truth that Russia is so vast, the distances so great to important places such as Moscow, by occupying which alone peace could be imposed upon her; that her resources are so scattered and climate so severe that no Power will attack her, and, by following the example of Napoleon, subject her armies to similar risks of destruction, and that therefore a comparatively moderate military force would make her absolutely secure against attack by land. This truth applies to all the States adjoining her in Europe (Sweden, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Roumania) as well as to those in Asia (Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and the British possessions in India). Russia, therefore, is exceptionally fortunate as regards her powers of defence, having less to fear from hostile attack within her own dominions than any other Power in the world. And, without doubt, if the means required for her defence were strictly gauged by the probabilities and possibilities of attack, Russia is the only one of the Great Powers which could reduce her military forces to a vast extent without the slightest risk.

The question then naturally arises: Why is Russia increasing her army and navy so prodigiously at the very time that the Tsar is so earnest in impressing upon all the Powers of the world the advantages of peace and the necessity of not adding to their military forces, the support of which is an almost unbearable burden upon their peoples? The answer is that although the Tsar is the

nominal head of the Government of Russia, and no doubt sincere in his aspirations for peace, he is in reality in the hands of those who, holding him in leading strings, have designs for enlarging the Empire in several directions by conquest, and, generally speaking, to their own advantage. China, in consequence of her decrepitude, is the immediate and main object of their attentions. Russia's power in China depends, at the present moment, upon a military force of about 120,000 men, who have all been brought there by sea, and who are entirely dependent upon the sea for all reinforcements and for guns, ammunition and stores, which are being transported thither in great quantities as fast as can be done, in the hope and with the intention of establishing her position in sufficient strength to enable her to hold her own until the Trans-Siberian railway shall be completed. When this shall have been done and the military base of operations in Manchuria firmly established, China, unless in the meantime she shall have organised a military force capable of meeting Russian soldiers in the field, will become a vassal, if not to a great extent a part, of the Russian Empire. Neither Great Britain nor any other European Power can prevent this consummation of Russia's efforts. The distance of China from Europe is too great to permit of either of the large Powers undertaking the military operations that would be required to arrest the progress of the Russian army advancing from Manchuria to Pekin and thence to the Yangtse Valley. China alone

can prevent it by organising an army upon European principles; but it behoves her to lose no time in strengthening her Empire by so doing, because, when the great Trans-Siberian railway shall have been completed and is in working order to Manchuria, the Russian army, now 120,000 strong, most of whom are in occupation of that province, will have thus become independent of all communication by sea with its base and arsenals in Europe.

This line of communication by railway with the European provinces of Russia will be very long, and not particularly well adapted for sustaining a large army during active operations in the field, but from all accounts the province of Manchuria is so rich in its productions that it will suffice in great measure for this purpose, especially when under an improved administration.

The position of Japan, as a naval and military Power capable of acting on the rear or flank of the Russian army, must to a great extent neutralise that army so long as it is based, as at present, upon the sea, and cause Russia to hesitate before undertaking operations in the direction of Pekin. If Japan landed a large force in a northern port in Corea, which would be very difficult to prevent, the Russian forces might find themselves seriously embarrassed if engaged in operations in China in the direction of Pekin at a distance from Port Arthur and Talienwan.

With a view, however, to arriving at some conclusion as to the time China has at her disposal for organisation whilst Russia is still dependent on the sea for reinforcements and stores, it may be well to consider briefly the nature of the great railway for the completion of which she is making her utmost efforts.

According to a Russian official report published in 1893, the length of new line to be constructed from Tcheliabinsk, the then extreme eastern limit of 'the internal network of railways,' in 30°, to Vladivostok in 132° of East longitude, her only port at that time on the China seas, was 4,695 miles. This undertaking, by which Russia will possess a railway entirely within her own dominions and absolutely secure from attack by any Power other than China, will connect the western shores of Russia bordering the Atlantic with her eastern shores on the Pacific. In itself it is a magnificent and prodigious work, which will command a high position among the great engineering works of the age, but it must not be imagined for a moment that it is being constructed or is required for the development of commerce. It will be a single line between the parallels of 52° and 57° of North latitude, passing through a difficult and mountainous country with a very severe climate, which over some parts is rarely free from frost and snow, large sections of which are desert, and with an eternally frozen subsoil. It will cross numerous large rivers requiring bridges up to 3,000 feet in length, and for a distance of several hundred miles the temperature on an average of three

years was above zero for only a few months in each year. In this inhospitable region, the climate of which is described in the Russian official report as 'purely continental,' the mean annual temperature over a great part of its length is 5° below freezing, and in many parts the sun's rays penetrate only a few inches below the surface in the warmest season of the year.

The total population within reach of the railway over an extent of about 3,500 miles (nearly seven times the distance from London to Wick) amounts only to 1,520,000 souls, which is not quite equal to the populations of Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester taken together (the largest town between Irkutsk and Vladivostok, a distance of more than 3,000 miles, has only 13,000 inhabitants), and the vast territory in which they live, as may naturally be supposed, is totally devoid of any important manufacture. These facts, derived from official Russian sources, illustrate the commercial prospects of the railway along which the garrison of Port Arthur and the army for the occupation of Manchuria are to be carried, as also the force destined to occupy Pekin whenever the convenient time may arrive (after the completion of the railway) for Russia to throw off the mask and take possession of Pekin and a great part of China, unless in the meanwhile some other Power has trained and organised an army in China for its defence, the material for which is not to be despised, as shown by the performances of the Chinese soldiers under the leadership of General Gordon. This great railway is expected to be completed in 1904, or in five years from the present time, although probably, from the nature of the works and of the country, especially around Lake Baikal, it may not be completed so soon. This, therefore, is the breathing time which China has for her defensive preparations, and for the organisation of an army for her defence.

If the object of Russia in China were not aggressive, but purely commercial, the vast expenditure incurred in the construction of this great railway would be altogether unnecessary; her trade with China could be carried on by sea with much greater ease and economy than by land; and even when the railroad shall have been completed it is doubtful whether the trade between Western Russia and Manchuria will bear the expense of transport by rail over a distance of several thousand miles, through one of the most barren regions in the world, where the difficulties and expense of maintaining and working the line will be abnormally great. Whether this be so or not, it is selfevident that no dividend can ever be earned and no return expected from this vast expenditure, which has been incurred for purely military purposes, and will be a permanent charge upon the finances of the Government, whose object is clearly shown when it is stated in the official report that the millions required are estimated to provide 'sufficient rolling stock to be able to form three sets of army trains per twenty-four hours.'