Hence in all such attempts, extravagances such as those of Anaxagoras are sure to come to view.1 The accuracy of this description of Socrates has, however, not passed unchallenged by modern writers.2 Granting, it is said, that Socrates really expressed these and similar sentiments, can they be rightfully so understood as though he would altogether deprecate speculative enquiry into nature? Would not such an assertion too manifestly contradict his own fundamental view, the idea of the oneness of all knowledge? Would it not lead, if propounded as Xenophon has done, to consequences manifestly unreasonable? Even Plato bears testimony to the fact that Socrates did not attack natural science initself, but only the ordinary treatment of it; nor can Xenophon himself conceal the fact that he did devote his attention to nature, hoping by considering the 1 Mem. iv. 7, 6: öλws de Twv οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηXavaTaι, OPOVTIOTHν yiyνeodai ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. Such subtleties only lead to absurdities, oùdèv ἧττον ἢ ̓Αναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν δ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι — which is then supported by various remarks proving the extravagance of the notion that the sun is a fiery stone. 2 Schleiermacher, Werke, iii. 2, 305-307; Gesch. d. Phil., p. 83; Brandis, Rhein. Mus. i. 2, 130; Gr.-Röm. Phil. ii. a, 34; Ritter, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 48, 64; Süvern, Ueber die Wolken 11; Aristophanes, p. Krische, Forsch. 105; Alberti, Sokr. 93, 98, likewise gives a partial adherence to this view : it might have been expected to go further after what has been said, p. 49, 2. 3 Phædo, 96, A.; 97, B.; Rep. vii. 529, A.; Phileb. 28, D.; Leg. xii. 966, Ε. 4 Mem. i. 4; iv. 3. No argument can be drawn from Mem. i. 6, 14: Toùs enσaupoùs Tŵv πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις diépxoμai, for these σopol need not necessarily be the earlier natural philosophers. Zopol is also used of poets, chroniclers, СНАР. VII. CHAP. VII. relations of means to ends in nature to gain an insight into its reasonable arrangement. Allowing, therefore, that Socrates, as was the fact, had no special talent for natural science, and hence did not study it to any great extent, at least the germ of a new form of this science may be discovered in him. In his notion of the relation of means to ends in nature must have lain 'the thought of a universal diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature,' 'the theory of an absolute harmony of man and nature, and of man's occupying such a position in nature as to be a microcosm of the world.' If he stopped at the germ, confining his study of nature to mere practical requirements, this must have been, according to his own opinion, only as a preliminary step. He must have only intended that man ought not to reach into the distance until a critical foundation has been securely laid in the depths of his own inner life; or else it must have reference to popular and not to philosophical study.2 Unfortunately this view of modern writers rests on assumptions which cannot be supported. In the first place, not only Xenophon, but Aristotle also,3 not to mention later writers, asserts that Socrates never &c., and it is expressly stated Schleiermacher and Ritter. man. 3 Met. i. 6 (987, b, 1): Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν. xiii. 4; De Part. Anim. i. 1 (642, a, 28): ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν [τὸ ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν] ηὐξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε. Conf. Eth. Eud. i. 5; 1216, b, 2. 4 Cic. Tus. v. 4, 10; Acad. i. 4, 15; iv. 29, 123; De Fin. pursued the study of nature. Aristotle is, however, the very authority called in to arbitrate when Xenophon and Plato differ. What right have we, then, to stand aghast at his testimony as soon as he declares against Plato? Even Plato, however, indirectly admits in the Timæus that natural science was foreign to Socrates. If he elsewhere puts in his mouth sayings referring to nature, there is still no evidence that these utterances are historically true. Not even in the passage in the Phædo can such evidence be found, unless what follows-that Socrates had fallen back on the theory of Ideas— can be taken to be historical. In one respect Xenophon fully agrees with Plato, in saying that Socrates demanded a consideration of the relation of means to ends in nature. If it is further required that the relation of means to ends should not be understood in the lower sense of a later age, in which it was indeed understood by Xenophon, but that higher speculative ideas should be sought therein, where, we ask, is the historical justification of this view? Lastly, if an appeal is made to the logical consequences of the Socratic theory, do they not prove that Socrates must have been quite in earnest in disparaging a speculative study of nature, and in his popular notion of the relation of means to ends? Had he indeed placed at the head of his system, in this explicit form, the idea of the mutual dependence of all knowledge, it v. 29, 87; Rep. i. 10; Senec. Ep. 71, 7; Sext. Math. vii. 8; Gell. N. A. xiv. 6, 5, and, ac cording to Demetrius of By- CHAP. VII. СНАР. VII. would be impossible to account for his low estimate of physics. If, on the contrary, he was concerned, not about knowledge in general, but about the education and training of men by means of knowledge, is it not very natural that his enquiries should be exclusively directed to the conditions and activities of man,1 nature being only taken into account in as far as it was useful to man? Doubtless this view of the relation of means to ends was, for natural and scientific enquiries, like a seed sown broadcast, which sprang up and bore fruit in the systems of Plato and Aristotle; but to Socrates himself this new department of natural science presented itself only as a subsidiary branch of ethical enquiry, without his 1 In this respect Socrates is like Kant, Kant's position in history being also not unlike his. As Kant, after destroying the older Metaphysics, only retained Ethics, so Socrates, after setting aside natural science, turned his attention exclusively to morals. In the one case, as in the other, the one-sidedness with which the founder begins has been supplemented by the disciples, and the treatment at first adopted for Ethics has been extended to the whole of philosophy. Just as it may be said of Socrates, that, despite his so definitely attested declining of all cosmical and theological speculation on principle, he nevertheless, whilst actually refraining from such enquiries, could not conceal from himself that they were involved, as a necessary consequence, in his intellectual principles; with the same justice may it be said of Kant, that, notwithstanding his critic of pure reason, he must, whilst disputing the Metaphysics of Wolff, have necessarily seen that his principles would lead him consistently to the Idealism of Fichte and the natural philosophy of Schelling; both of whom, and the first-named even against Kant's own protests, appealed to these consequences. For all that, it is a dangerous business, from a consideration of logical consequences and the historical results of a principle, to correct the clearest statements as to the doctrine of its originator, the question really being, whether and to what extent the founder realised these consequences. 1 being conscious of its range. His conscious interest applies only to Ethics. Even the study of the relation of means to ends in nature was, according to his view, subservient to a moral purpose-that of urging his friends to piety. It cannot be altogether neglected in considering his teaching; nor yet can we allow it, in the sense in which it was used by Socrates, an independent value, nor for this reason prefer it to Ethics. The same remark applies to theology, which here still coincides with natural science. The motives which deterred him from the one must have deterred him from the other also. If, notwithstanding, he expressed definite views as to the Gods and the worship of the Gods, these views were the outcome of a practical love of piety. Theology then can only be treated by him as an appendix to Ethics. Even then, there are comparatively very few definite opinions in theology which can be brought home to Socrates with certainty. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, considering that a systematic treatment of Ethics is impossible without a basis either in metaphysics or psychology for it to rest upon? The chief service which Socrates here 1 Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1 and 18; iv. 3, 2 and 17. they had fully mastered human things, as having advanced to 2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 11; nothing such enquiries, rà μèv àv0pwimpious was ever heard from πινὰ παρέντες τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ Socrates; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήπάντων φύσεως διελέγετο κοντα πράττειν and 16: αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέτὰ τοιαῦτα [or, as it is said,§15 : γετο, σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβὲς τί ἀσεβές, οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες] μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε. He asked whether &c. CHAP. |