CHAP., B. The leading thought of Ethics : All virtue is knowledge. rendered was a formal one-that of generally referring moral action to knowledge: no sooner, however, is it a question of deducing particular moral acts and relations from knowledge, than he contents himself partly with falling back upon prevailing custom, or else there intervenes an accidental reference to purposes, the defects of which are certainly partially corrected in the sequel. The leading thought of the ethics of Socrates may be expressed in the sentence-All virtue is knowledge.1 This assertion is most closely connected with his whole view of things. His efforts aim from the first at re-establishing morality and rooting it more deeply by means of knowledge. The experiences of his time have convinced him that the conventional probity of moral conduct, resting as it does on custom and authority, cannot hold its ground. His sifting of men 'iscovered, even in the most celebrated of his contemporaries,2 a pretended in place 1 Arist. Eth. N. vi. 13; 1144, b, 17, 28 : Σωκράτης φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι, ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, Ibid. iii. 11; 1116, b, 4; Eth. Eud. i. 5 ; 1216, b, 6: ἐπιστήμας ᾤετ ̓ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ ̓ ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἴδεναί τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. Conf. Ibid. iii. 1; 1229, a, 14; vii. 13; M. Mor. i. 1; 1182, 2, 15 ; i. 35; 1198, a, 10; Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5: ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ την ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι· τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ ̓ ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἁμαρτάνειν. i. 1, 16: he always conversed of justice, piety, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι. The latter iv. 2, 22. Plato, Lach. 194, D.: πολλάκις ακήκοα σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ταῦτα δὲ κακός. Euthyd. 278, Ε. 2 Plato, Apol. 21, C.; 29, E. of a genuine virtue. To attain true morality man must seek the standard of action in clear and certain knowledge. The principle which has thus dawned upon him is, however, only understood in a narrow and exclusive spirit. Knowledge is for him not only an indispensable condition and a means to true morality, but it is the whole of morality. Where knowledge is wanting, there not only is virtue imperfect, but there is absolutely no virtue at all. Plato was the first, and after him more completely Aristotle, to improve upon the Socratic doctrine of virtue. In support of his position, Socrates established the point that without right knowledge right action is impossible, and conversely, that where knowledge exists, right action follows as a matter of course; the former, because no action or possession is of any use, unless it be directed by intelligence to a proper object; 2 the latter, because everyone only does what 1 See p. 113. 2 It is only in Plato (Euth. 280, B.; Meno, 87, C.), that Socrates expressly takes this ground. Hence the Moralia Magna (i. 35; 1198, a, 10) appear to have derived the corresponding view; but it not only sounds very like Socrates, but it is also implied in Xenophon; Socrates there (Mem. iv. 2, 26) explaining more immediately in connection with selfknowledge, that it alone can tell us what we need and what we can do, placing us so in a position to judge others correctly, and qualifying us for a expedient and successful action. CHAP. VII. CHAP. he believes he must do, what is of use to himself: I no one intentionally does wrong; for this would be the same thing as making oneself intentionally unhappy:2 knowledge is, therefore, always the strongest power in man, and cannot be overcome by passion.3 identical therewith, also does. What is said, iii. 9, 14, respecting εὐπραξία in contrast to εὐτυχία, that it is κράτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα, also refers to know ledge. For εὐπραξία consists in μαθόντα τι καὶ μελετήσαντα εὖ ποιείν, or as Plato's Euthydemus 281, A, explains it: ἐπιστήμη teaches to make a right use of all goods, and as κατορθοῦσα τὴν πρᾶξιν it produces εὐπραγία and εὐτυχία. Xenophon, i. 1, 7; 6, 4, expresses this view more definitely. Æschines, too, in Demetrius de Elocu. 297, Rhet. Gr. ix. 122, puts the question into the mouth of Socrates when speaking of the rich inheritance of Alcibiades: Did he inherit the knowledge how to use it? 1 Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4; see above, p. 140, 1; iv. 6, 6: εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἴει τινὰς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα; Οὐκ οἴομαι, ἔφη. Οἶδας δέ τινας ἄλλα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἃ οἴονται δεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ibid. 3, 11; Plato, Prot. 358, C. w 2 Arist. M. Mor. i. 9: κράτης ἔφη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους εἰ γάρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσειεν δντιναοῦν, πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. More indefinite are the remarks in Eth. Nic. iii. 7; 1113, b, 14; conf. Eth. Eud. ii. 7 ; 1223, b, 3, on the statement is ovdels ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ ̓ ἄκων μάκαρ. Brandis remarks with justice (Gr.-röm. Phil. ii. a, 39) that this refers in the first place to the arguments of the Platonic Socrates (see Meno, 77, B.; Prot. 345, D. ; 353, C.), but that the same is asserted by Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9, 4; iv. 6, 6 and 11; and by Plato, Apol. 25, Ε.: ἐγὼ δὲ .. τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε . . . εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω δῆλον ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. Conf. Dial. de justo, Schl. Diog. Laert. ii. 31. 3 Plato, Prot. 352, C.: ap' ouv καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς [τῆς ἐπιστήμης] δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν; ἢ & ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ ̓ ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; The latter is then affirmed with the consent of Socrates. (The further reasoning is probably only Platonic.) Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 3: ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι [ἀκρατεύεσθαι]. δεινὸν γάρ, ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς μετα Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν. Eth. Eud. vii. 13: ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατι κόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονή As regards that virtue which appears to be furthest removed from knowledge, the virtue of bravery, he more especially insisted upon it, that in all cases, he who knows the true nature of an apparent danger and the means of avoiding it, is braver than he who has not such knowledge. Hence he concludes that virtue is entirely dependent upon knowledge; and accordingly he defines all the particular virtues in such a way, as to make them consist in knowledge of some kind, their difference being determined by the difference of their objects. He is pious who knows what is right towards God; just who knows what is right towards men.2 JEWS. ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. If, therefore, anyone seems to act contrary to his better judgment, Socrates does not allow that is really the case. He rather infers the contrary. His conduct being opposed to right reason, he concludes that he is wanting in this quality; Mem. iii. 9, 4: προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦν τας δὲ τἀναντία, σοφούς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι· οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς. In Xenophon, indeed, this is so put, as if Socrates had admitted the possibility of a case of knowing right and doing wrong. The real meaning of the answer, however, can only be the one given above. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 2; Symp. 2, 12: Socrates remarks, in reference to a dancing girl who is deliberating about sword he is He is points: οὔτοι τούς γε θεωμένους 2 εὐσεβὴς = ὁ τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς СНАР. VII. CHAP. VII. brave who knows how to treat dangers properly; I he is prudent and wise who knows how to use what is good and noble, and how to avoid what is evil.2 In a word, all virtues are referred to wisdom or knowledge, which are one and the same.3 The ordinary notion that there are many kinds of virtue is incorrect. Virtue is in truth but one. Nor does the pose it, his observation is contradicted by appearances. It does not, however, follow herefrom that Socrates wished the Gods to be honoured νόμῳ πόλεως. Why could he not have said, piety or holiness consists in the knowledge of that which is right towards the Gods, and to this belongs, in respect of the honouring of God, that each one pray to them after the custom of his country. A pious mind is not the same thing as worship. That may remain the same when the forms of worship are different. 1 Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 11: oi μèv ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες TOÚTOV DEIXOí. Plato, Prot. 360, D.: ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεῖνων καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν. The same thing is conveyed by the definition in Laches, 194, E. (which is not much imperilled by the objections raised thereto from a Socratic point of view). Courage is tŵv deivŵv kral θαῤῥαλέων ἐπιστήμη; only θαῤῥαλέος must not be rendered 'bold' (as Schaarschmidl, Samml. d. plat. Schr. 409, does). It means rather, according to 198, B., as it so often does, & un δέος παρέχει. Conf. Bonitz, Plat. Stud. iii. 441. 2 Mem. iii. 9, 4: σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. 3 Mem. iv. 6, 7 : ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν ; Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ. Νο man can know everything, & ǎpa ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος τοῦτο καὶ σοφός σtiv. 4 Plato developes this thought in his earlier writings, Prot. 329, B.; 349, B.; 360, E.: which, however, kept much more closely to the platform of Socrates; it is also evidently contained in Xenophon. His meaning, as may be gathered from Mem. iii. 9, 4, is certainly not some one may possess the knowledge in which one virtue consists, whilst lacking the knowledge in which another consists; but he assumes, just as Plato's Socrates does in the Protagoras, that where one virtue is, all must be there, all depending on the knowledge of the good. From this doctrine of Socrates the Cynic and Megarian notions of the oneness of virtue arose. |