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tiful in relation to the special needs which it subserves, and therefore one and the same thing may be good for one and bad for another. He declared in a manner most pronounced, that the good is nothing else but the advantageous, the beautiful nothing else but the useful; everything therefore is good and beautiful in relation to the objects for which it is advantageous and useful;' confirming bis doctrine of the involuntary nature of evil-one of the leading principles of his ethics—by the remark that everyone does that wbich he thinks advantageous for himself.?
There is, therefore, according to his view no absolute, but only a relative good ; advantage and disadvantage are the measures of good and evil. Hence in the dialogues of Xenophon he almost always bases his moral precepts on the motive of utility. We should aim at abstinence, because the abstinent man has a more pleasant life than the incontinent: 4 we should inure ouselves to hardships, because the hardy man is more healthy, and because he can more easily avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory : 5 we
| Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 8, con- thing similar is found in Plato's. cluding : To épa wpéripov ågađóv Protagoras, 358, B. έστιν ότι αν ωφέλιμον ή . το 3 On the other hand, little χρήσιμον άρα καλόν εστι πρός 8 importance can be attached to av xphomuov; conf. iv. 1, 5; the treatment of happiness as 5, 6; Symp. 5, 3 ; Plato, Prot. the highest end of life in Mem. 333, D.; 353, C., where So- iii. 2, 4. All Greek philosocrates meets Protagoras with phers do the same, including the statement : ταυτ' cotly Plato, Aristotle, and even the αγαθά & εστιν ωφέλιμα τους ανθρώ- Stoics. TOLS, and afterwards explains 4 Mem. i. 5, 6; ii, 1, 1; conf. good to be that which affords iv. 5, 9. pleasure or averts pain.
5 Mem. iii. 12; ii. 1, 18; 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4: some- conf. i. 6.
should be modest, because boasting does harm and CHAP.
VII. brings disgrace. We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm what has been given us for our good ;? we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession : 3 we should not withdraw from public affairs, since the well-being of the community is the well-being of the individual ;4 we should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the state; and we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always punished in the end. We should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both from God and man. To argue that all such-like expressions do not contain the personal conviction of the philosopher, but are intended to bring those to virtue by meeting them on their own ground, who cannot be got at by higher motives, is evidently laboured, considering the definiteness with which Socrates expresses himself. Unless, therefore, Xenophon is misleading on essential points, we must allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the good as the useful, and consequently in the corresponding derivation of moral duties. True it is that in the mouth of Socrates other (3) In
consisutterances are met with, leading us beyond this super- teney of
Socratic 1 Mem. i. 7.
6 Mem. ii. i, 27, gives an ex. Morality. ? Ibid. ii. 3, 19.
tract from a writing of Pro3 Ibid. ii. 4, 5; ii. 6, 4 and dicus, the substance of which 10.
Socrates appropriates. Conf. i. 4 Ibid. iii. 7, 9; ii. 1, 14. 4, 18; iv. 3, 17. 5 Ibid. iv. 4, 16 and 20; iii. ? This point will be subse
ficial ground of moral duties, by placing the essential advantage of virtue, the purpose which it serves and because of which it is good and beautiful in its influence on the intellectual life of man.'
Most undoubtedly and decidedly would this be the view of Socrates could we attribute to him the maxim so familiar to the Socrates of Plato, that righteousness is health, unrighteousness disease of the soul, and consequently that all wrong-doing invariably injures him who does it, whereas the right is necessarily and always useful. Language of this kind occurring in the Republic and Gorgias does not justify our believing it. In these dialogues much is put into the mouth of Socrates, which he never said and never can have said. Nor can it be pleaded that Plato would never have held such pure moral conceptions, unless he had had them from his teacher. Otherwise the theory of ideas and much besides which is found in Plato would have to be attributed to Socrates. We cannot even vouch for it that everything contained in the Crito comes from Socrates, its author not having been present at the conversation which it describes. Having apparently, however, been committed to writing no long time after the death of Socrates, and not going beyond his point of view, it is noteworthy that this dialogue contains the same principles : 3 a
1 On what follows compare 3 Crito 47, D: as in the Ribbing, p. 83, 91, 105, whose treatment of the body, the researches are here thankfully physician's advice must be acknowledged, whilst all his followed, so in questions of conclusions are not accepted. right and wrong the advice of
2 See Zeller's Phil. d. Griech. him ♡ ei uns å Kolovonoouev, p. 561 of second edition. διαφθερούμεν εκείνο και λωβησό
circumstance which at least shows that they have a support in the teaching of Socrates. To the same effect likewise the Apology expresses itself, Socrates therein summing up the purpose of his life as that of convincing his fellow-citizens that the education of the soul is more important than money or property, honour or glory;? declaring at the same time in plainest terms, that whether death is an ill or not he knows not, but that injustice is, he knows well.?
Similar language is found in Xenophon. In his pages too Socrates declares the soul to be the most valuable thing in man, the divine part of his being, because it is the seat of reason and only the Reasonable is of value. He requires, therefore, that the first care should be for the soul. He is convinced
μεθα, και το μεν δικαίω βέλτιον ελαχίστου ποιείται, τα δε φαυλό-
life in a diseased 2 Ιbid. 29, Β.
| Apol. 29, D.: as long as he body as soon as the soul év lived, he would not cease φιλο- μόνη γίνεται φρόνησις has left it, σοφών και υμίν παρακελευόμενος iv. 3, 14: ανθρώπου γε ψυχή,
λέγων οδάπερ είωθα, ότι, και είπερ τι και άλλο των ανθρωπίνων άριστε ανδρών, χρημάτων του θείου μετέχει. μεν ουκ αισχύνει επιμελούμενος, 4 Mem. i. 2, 4: Socrates
και δόξης και τιμής, φρονή- recommends bodily exercise σεως δε και αληθείας και της within certain limits : ταύτην ψυχής, όπως ώς βελτίστη έσται, γαρ τήν έξιν υγιεινήν τε ικανώς ουκ επιμελεί ουδε φροντίζεις ; he είναι και την της ψυχής επιμέλειαν would rather blame a man in (which accordingly regulates every case where it was neces- the care of the body) OÚK sary ότι τα πλείστου άξια περί εμποδίζειν έφη.
that conduct is better, the more you aim at the education of the soul, and more enjoyable, the more you are conscious thereof." The intellectual perfection of man depending in the first place on his knowledge, wisdom is the highest good, without compare more valuable than ought besides. Learning is. recommended not only on account of its utility, but far more because of the enjoyment which it directly confers.3 These expressions fully agree with what has been quoted from Plato; they also appear quite consistent in a philosopher who bases the whole of moral conduct so decidedly upon knowledge, and so expressly leads man to knowledge of and to dealing with self, as Socrates does.4
What then must be made of accounts in which Socrates recommends moral duties entirely on grounds of outward adaptation to a purpose, such as we frequently find in Xenophon ? Are we to assume that all such explanations are only intended for those who were too unripe to understand the sage's real meaning, to show that even on the hypothesis of the ordinary unsatisfactory definition of purpose, virtuous
1 Mem. iv. 8, 6: άριστα μέν mended by Socrates for preγάρ οίμαι ζήν τους άριστα επιμε- ferring treasures of wisdom to λουμένους του ως βελτίστους γίγ- treasures of gold and silver ;. νεσθαι, ήδιστα δε τους μάλιστα for the latter do not make αισθανομένους, ότι βελτίoυς γίγ- men better, τας δε των σοφών νονται. i. 6, 9: οίει ούν από ανδρών γνώμας άρετη πλουτίζειν πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ηδονήν τους κεκτημένους. είναι, όσην από του εαυτόν τε 3 Mem. iv. 5, 10: αλλά μην ηγείσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι και από του μαθείν τι καλόν και φίλους αμείνους κτασθαι ;
αγαθόν ου μόνον ωφέλειαι 2 Mem. iv. 5, 6: σοφίαν δε το αλλά και ηδοναι μέγισται γίγνον-μέγιστον αγαθών κ. τ. λ.; iv. 2, Conf. ii. 1. 19. 9, where Euthydemus is com- 4 Conf. pp. 65, 121, 140.