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CHAP.

VII.

D. Particular

moral relations.

stance,' that among the Socratic schools side by side with the morals of the Cynics and the criticism of the Megarians, a place was found too for the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure; and that the founders of these schools to all appearance were firmly persuaded that they reproduced the true spirit of the Socratic teaching. Had that teaching afforded them no foothold, this phenomenon would be hard to understand. In its essence the Socratic morality is anything but selfish. That fact does not, however, prevent its assuming the form of Eudæmonism in its theoretical explanation. We do not complain of it as wanting in moral content, but as wanting in philosophic precision.

To give a systematic account of moral actions was not a part of the intention of Socrates. His views

1 To which Hermann, Plat. i. 257, rightly draws attention. When, however, this writer finds in the principle of utility (Ibid. p. 254 Ges. Abh. 232) or as he prefers to call it in the predominence of relative value not merely a weak point in the philosophy of Socrates, but at the same time an instance of Socratic modesty, one feels inclined to ask, wherein does this modesty consist? And when he connects herewith the more general doctrine, constituting in his view the main difference between the So⚫cratic dialectic and the Sophistic, and also the foundation of the Socratic teaching on the truth of universal conceptions, he appears to advocate a doc

trine neither to be found in
the Memorabilia (iii. 8, 4-7;
10, 12; iv. 6, 9; 2, 13), nor in
the Hippias Major of Plato (p.
288)-the latter by the way a
very doubtful authority. It is
indeed stated in these passages,
that the good and the beauti-
ful are only good and beautiful
for certain purposes by virtue
of their use, but not that every
application of these attributes
to a subject has only a relative
validity. Under no circum-
stances would
the passage
authorise a distinction between
the Socratic and the So-
phistic philosophy; one of the
characteristics of the Sophists
consisting in their allowing
only a relative value to all
scientific and moral principles.

were from time to time expanded as occasion required. Chance has, to a certain extent, decided which of his dialogues should come down to us. Still it may be assumed that Socrates kept those objects more especially in view, to which he is constantly reverting by preference according to Xenophon. Here in addition to the general demand for moral knowledge, and for knowledge of self, three points are particularly prominent-1. The independence of the individual as secured by the control of his wants and desires; 2. The nobler side of social life, as seen in friendship; 3. The furtherance of the public weal by a regulated commonwealth. To these may be added the question, 4. Whether, and In how far, Socrates exceeded the range of the ordinary morality of the Greeks by requiring love for enemies ?

Not only was Socrates himself a model of selfdenial and abstemiousness, but he endeavoured to foster the same virtues in his friends. What other subject was more often the topic of conversation than abstemiousness in the dialogues of Xenophon ? 1 And did not Socrates distinctly call moderation the corner-stone of all virtue ?2 On this point the ground he occupied was nearly the same as that which afterwards gained such importance for the schools of

1 See the authorities p. 150,

4, 5.

2 Mem. i. 5, 4: apά ye où Xpǹh πάντα ἄνδρα, ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα, ταύτην πρώτην ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατα σκευάσασθαι ; This does not contradict the assertion that all virtue consists in knowledge.

M

If Socrates had at all reflected,
he would have explained mode-
ration as a kind of knowledge.
The above quoted passage
might then be taken to mean,
that the conviction of the
worthlessness of sensual enjoy-
ments must precede every other
moral knowledge.

CHAP.

VII.

(1) Indivi

dual independence.

CHAP.
VII.

the Cynics and Stoics; man can only become master of himself by being independent of wants, and by the exercise of his powers; while depending on the conditions and pleasures of the body, he resembles a slave. A philosopher who considers knowledge to be the highest good, will naturally insist upon the mind's devoting itself, uninterrupted by the desires and appetites of the senses,2 to the pursuit of truth in preference to every other thing; and the less value he attaches to external things as such and the more exclusively he conceives happiness to be bound up with the intellectual condition of man,3 the more will he feel the call to carry these principles into practice, by really making himself independent of the external world. Other motives, however, which served as a standard for moralists of a later epoch, were unknown to Socrates. He was not only an ascetic in relation to the pleasures of the senses, but displayed less strictness than might have been anticipated, neither shrinking from enjoyment, nor yet feeling it needful. To continue master of himself in the midst of enjoyment, by the lucid clearness of his thought that was the aim which his moderation proposed to itself.4

Xen. Mem. i. 5, 3; i. 6, 5; ii. 1, 11; i. 2, 29; iii. 13, 3 ; and, in particular, iv. 5, 2 ; Symp. 8,

23.

2 This connection appears clearly Mem. iv. 5, 6. When Socrates had shown that want of moderation makes man a slave, whilst moderation makes him free, he continues: σopíav

δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ
σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ
ἀκρασία εἰς τοὐναντίον αὐτοὺς ἐμ-
βάλλειν ; for how can any one
recognise and choose what is
good and useful, if he is
ruled by the desire of what is
pleasant?

3 See pp. 141, 2; 151.
• See p. 74.

Strongest appears this character of the Socratic abstinence in the language he uses in reference to sensual impulses. However exemplary his own conduct in this respect may have been, yet, in theory, he does not object to the gratification of these impulses out of wedlock, only requiring that it be not carried so far as to exceed the requirements of the body, nor prove a hindrance to higher ends. The leading thought of his moral teaching is not so much strict purity as freedom of mind.

This in itself purely negative condition of morality receives its positive supplement when the individual places himself in connection with others. The simplest form of this connection is friendship. Socrates, as we have already remarked, can only defend this relation on the ground of its advantages; still there can be no mistaking the fact that it possessed both for himself and for his philosophy a deeper meaning. For this, if for no other reason, it was cultivated by preference, and discussed in all the Socratic schools. When knowledge and morality so fully coincide as they do from Socrates' point of view, an intellectual association of individuals is

1 Mem. i. 3, 14: ovтw dǹ ka ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδίσια ᾤετο χρῆναι πρὸς τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνυ μὲν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτοἡ ψυχὴ, δεομένου δὲ οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρεχοι. The last remark applies partly to the prejudicial workings of passion, which makes a slave of man, and deters him from what is good, and partly to

the harm it does to property,
honour, and personal security.
Socrates considers it ridiculous
to incur danger and trouble
for the sake of an enjoyment,
which could be procured in a
so much simpler manner from
any common girl. Mem. ii. 1,
5; 2, 4. The use which the
Cynics made of these principles
will be seen hereafter.

СНАР.

VII.

(2) Friend

ship.

CHAP.
VII.

inconceivable without a more extended community of life. These personal relations become, too, all the more necessary in proportion as the thinker fails to be satisfied with his own thinking, and feels a need for investigation in common with others and for mutual interchange of ideas. Just as in the case of the Pythagorean league, from a common pursuit of morality and religion, a lively feeling of clanship, a fondness for friendship and brotherhood was developed, as in other cases, too, like causes produced like results, so, in the Socratic school the blending of moral and intellectual interests was the ground of a more intimate connection of the pupils with the teacher, and amongst themselves, than could have resulted from an association of a purely intellectual character. The question can hardly be asked, which came first with him, which afterwards; whether the need of friendship determined Socrates to a continuous dialogue, or the need of a common enquiry drew him towards all having a natural turn this way. His peculiarity rather consists in this-and this it is which makes him the philosophic lover drawn by Plato-that he could neither in his research dispense with association with others, nor in his intercourse with research.

Accordingly in Socrates are found impressive discussions as to the value and nature of friendship.1 In these he always comes back to the point, that true friendship can only exist amongst virtuous men, being for them altogether natural and necessary;

1 Mem. ii. 4-6.

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