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(4) Love for enemies.
Sophists at one by means of which it might be governed.
The aristocratic tone of this view of the state appears to be contradicted by the ease with which Socrates rose above the social prejudices of his nation, meeting the ruling contempt for trade by the maxim that no useful activity, be it what it may, but only idleness and activity need call forth shame. Still both come from a common source. For just as Socrates will have the position of the individual in the state settled according to his achievements, so conversely he will have every action appreciated which leads to any good result.' Here, as elsewhere, the conception of good is his highest standard.
One consequence of the political character of Greek morality was that the problem proposed to the virtuous man was customarily summed up as doing good to friends and harm to foes. This very definition is put into the mouth of Socrates 2 by Xenophon, who likewise considers it most natural to feel pain at the success of enemies.3 On the other hand, in one of the earliest and most historical of Plato's dia
1 Mem. i. 2, 56. In keeping with this, he urges a friend (ii. 7) to employ the maids of his house in wool work, and another (ii. 8) to seek for occupation as a steward, refuting in both cases the objection, that such an occupation was unbecoming for free men. Xenophon held a different view (see Ec. 4. 2, and 6, 5), and it is well known that Plato did also. Socrates speaks
as the son of a poor labourer. Xenophon and Plato as men of rank and property.
2 Mem. ii. 6, 35 : καὶ ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾷν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.
s Mem. iii. 9, 8: φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν ὅ,τι εἴη, λύπην μέν τινα, ἐξεύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τὴν ἐπ ̓ ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην.
logues,' Socrates declares it to be wrong to injure another injury is the same thing as wrong-doing, and wrong-doing may never be permitted, not even towards one from whom wrong-doing has been suffered. The contradiction of these two accounts is hard to get over: 2 for assuming it to be granted that the Socrates of Xenophon is only speaking from a popular point of view, still the fact would remain that Xenophon cannot have been conversant with explanations such as those given by Plato. No doubt Plato's account even in the Crito cannot be regarded as strictly conformable to truth; still it may well be questioned whether he can be credited with such a flagrant deviation from his master's teaching 3 as this would be. That there is such a possibility cannot be denied; we must then be content to leave it in uncertainty as to which were the real principles of Socrates on this subject.4
1 Crito 49, A. Also Rep. i. 334, B.
2 The remark of Meiners (Gesch. der Wissenschaft. ii. 456) will not pass muster that Socrates considered it allowable to do harm (bodily) to enemies, but not to injure them in respect of their true well-being, Xenophon expressly allowing кaк@s TоLeiv while Plato as expressly forbids it.
3 See p. 153.
4 Still less are we justified in asserting as Hildebrand appears inclined to do (Xenophont. et Arist. de Economia publica Doctrina, part i. Marb. 1845) that Socrates was in
principle opposed to slavery.
A. Subor dination of means to ends in nature.
CONTINUATION. ON NATURE. GOD AND MAN.
ENQUIRIES into nature, we have seen, did not form part of the scheme of Socrates. Nevertheless, the line of his speculations led him to a peculiar view of nature and its design. One who so thoughtfully turned over the problem of human life from all sides as he did, could not leave unnoticed its countless relations to the outer world; and judging them by the standard which was his highest type-the standard of utility for man-could not but come to the conviction that the whole arrangement of nature was subservient to the well-being of the human race, in short that it was adapted to a purpose and good.1 To his mind, however, all that is good and expedient appears of necessity to be the work of reason; for just as man cannot do what is useful without intelligence, no more is it possible for what is useful to exist without intelligence. His view of nature,
1 For Socrates, as has been already shown, understands by the good what is useful for
2 See Mem. i. 4, 2, in which the argument from analogy is most clearly brought out. So
crates is desirous of convincing a friend of the existence of the Gods, and hence proposes the question: Whether more intelligence is not required to produce living beings than to produce paintings like those of
therefore, was essentially that of a relation of means to ends, and that not a deeper relation going into the inner bearings of the several parts, and the purpose of its existence and growth inherent in every natural being. On the contrary, all things are referred as a matter of experience to the well-being of man as their highest end, and that they serve this purpose is also set forth simply as a matter of fact, and as due to a reason which, like an artificer, has endued them with this accidental reference to purpose. As in the Socratic ethics, the wisdom regulating human actions becomes a superficial reflection as to the use of particular acts, so, too, Socrates can only conceive of the wisdom which formed the world in a manner equally superficial. He shows what care has been taken to provide for man, in that he has light, water, fire, and air, in that not only the sun shines by day, but also the moon and the stars by night; in that the heavenly bodies serve for divisions of seasons, that the earth brings forth food and other necessaries, and that the change of seasons prevents excessive heat or cold. He reminds of the advantages which are derived from cattle, from oxen, from pigs, horses, and other
Polycletus and Zeuxis? Aristodemus will only allow this conditionally, and in one special case, elteρ ye un túx? Tivì ảλx' ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γεγένηται, but he is immediately met by Socrates with the question: Tv δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκά ἐστι καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπ ̓ ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης, καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις ; Πρέπει μὲν,
he is obliged to confess, Tà è'
1 Mem, i. 4; iv. 3.
animals. To prove the wisdom of the Craftsman who made man,' he refers to the organism of the humen body, to the structure of the organs of sense, to the erect posture of man, to the priceless dexterity of his hands. He sees a proof of a divine Providence in the natural impulse for propagation and self-preservation, in the love for children, in the fear of death. He never wearies of exalting the intellectual advantages of man, his ingenuity, his memory, his intelligence, his language, his religious disposition. He considers it incredible that a belief in God and in Providence should be naturally inborn in all men, and have maintained itself from time immemorial, clinging not to individuals only in the ripest years of their age, but to whole nations and communities, unless it were true. He appeals also to special revelations vouchsafed to men for their good, either by prophecy or portent. Unscientific, doubtless, these arguments may appear, still they became in the sequel of importance for philosophy.
As Socrates by his moral enquiries, notwithstanding all their defects, is the founder of a scientific doctrine of morals, so by his theory of the relation of means to ends, notwithstanding its popular character, he is the founder of that ideal view of nature which ever after reigned supreme in the natural philosophy of the Greeks, and which with all its abuses has proved itself of so much value
1 In Mem. i. 4, 12, a remark is found indicative of the popular character of these general considerations : τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς
τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν.