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to fools); 71, 16 (truth and intelligence is the only good, virtue are identical); in Plut. ignorance the only evil, and Ed. Pu. c. 7, p. 4, on education that riches and noble birth do (the passage in c. 9 is an inac- more harm than good; in Diog. curate reference to Plato, Gorg. ii. 32, that to marry or to ab470, D.); Cons. ad Apoll. c. stain from marriage is equally p. 106, that if all sufferings bad ; in Gell. xix. 2, 7 (Athen. had to be equally divided, iv. 158; Plut. And. Poet. 4, every one would gladly pre- p. 21), that most men live to serve his own; Conj. Præc. eat, whilst he eats to live; in C. 25, p. 140 (Diog. ii. 33; Stob. Ekl. i. 54, giving a definiExc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. tion of God; Ibid. ii. 356, B. 98; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. Floril. 48, 26 (conf. Plato, iv., 202), on the moral use of Legg. i. 626, E.), that selfthe looking glass; Ser. Num. restraint is the best form of Vind. c. 5, p. 550, deprecating government; in Teles. apud anger; in. Demet. Byz. quoted Stob. Floril. 40, 8, blaming the by Diog. ii. 21, (Gell. N. A. xiv. Athenians for banishing their 6, 5), Muson. in the Exc. e best, and honouring their worst Floril. Jo. Dam. ii. 13, 126, men, and the apophthegmata p. 221, Mein, that philosophy in Valer. Max. vii. 2, Ext. 1. ought to confine itself to 8, T1 A large number of sayings τοι εν μεγάροισι, κακόν τ' αγαθόν purporting to come from SoTE TÉTUKTAI; (others attribute crates are quoted by Plutarch the words to Diogenes or Aris in his treatises and by Stobæus tippus) Cic. de Orat. i. 47, 204: in his Florilegium ; some, too, Socrates said that his only wish by Seneca. Most of them, howwas to stimulate to virtue ; ever, are colourless, or else where this succeeded, the rest they aim at being epigramfollowed of itself (a statement matic, which is a poor substithoroughly agreeing with the tute for being genuine. Altoviews of the Stoic Aristo, and gether their number makes probably coming from him. them very suspicious. Probably Conf. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, they were taken from a collec&c., p. 60; in Diog. ii. 30, blaming tion of proverbs which some the sophistry of Euclid; in Diog. later writer published under ii. 31 (undoubtedly from some the name of Socratic proverbs. Cynic or Stoic treatise) that
XENOPHON AND PLATO.
AND THE SOPHISTS.
LOOKING back from the point now reached to the CHAP. question raised before, as to which of his biographers we must look to for a historically accurate account A. Truthof Socrates and his teaching, we must indeed admit, Xeno
fulness of that no one of them is so satisfactory an authority as phon's de
scription. any original writings or verbal reports of the utterances of the great teacher would have been. So much, however, is patent at once, that the personal character of Socrates, as pourtrayed by both Xenophon and Plato, is in all essential points, one and the same. Their descriptions supplement one another in some few points, contradicting each other in none. Nay more, the supplementary portions may be easily inserted in the general picture, present before the eyes (1) Xenoof both. Moreover the philosophy of Socrates is not phon’s
view in in the main represented by Plato and Aristotle in a
harmony a different light from what it is by Xenophon, pro- with that vided those parts only in the writings of Plato be and Aristaken into account which undoubtedly belong to So- totle.
i Conf. p. 98.
crates, and in the Socrates of Xenophon a distinction be drawn between the thought underlying his utterances and the commonplace language in which it was clothed. Even in Xenophon, Socrates expresses the opinion that true knowledge is the highest thing, and that this knowledge consists in a knowledge of conceptions only. In Xenophon, too, may be observed all the characteristics of that method by means of which Socrates strove to produce knowledge. In his pages likewise, virtue is reduced to knowledge, and this position is supported by the same arguments, and therefrom are deduced the same conclusions, as in Aristotle and Plato. In short, all the leading features of the philosophy of Socrates are preserved by Xenophon; granting as we always must that he did not understand the deeper meaning of many a saying, and therefore failed to give it the prominence it deserved. Now and then for the same reason he used a commonplace expression instead of a philosophical one ; for instance, substituting for, “All virtue is a knowing,' with less accuracy, All virtue is knowledge.' Nor need we feel surprise that the defects of the Socratic philosophy, its popular and prosaic way of treating things, the want of system in its method, the utilitarian basis of its moral teaching should appear more prominently in Xenophon than in Plato and Aristotle, considering the brevity with which Aristotle speaks of Socrates, and the liberty with which Plato expands the Socratic teaching both in point of substance and form. On the other hand, Xenophon's description is confirmed partly by individual admissions of Plato, partly by its inward CHAP.
IX. truth and conformity to that picture which we must make to ourselves of the first appearance of Socrates' newly discovered principle. All then that can be conceded to the detractors of Xenophon is, that not fully understanding the philosophical importance of his teacher, he kept it in the background in his description, and that in so far Plato and Aristotle are most welcome as supplementary authorities. But it cannot be allowed for one moment that Xenophon has in any respect given a false account of Socrates, or that it is impossible to gather from his description the true character and importance of the doctrine of his master. It may indeed be said that this estimate of Xeno- (2) Schlei
ermacher's phon is at variance with the position which Socrates objection is known to have held in history. As Schleiermacher answered. observes ; 2 · Had Socrates done nothing but discourse on subjects beyond which the Memorabilia of Xenophon never go, albeit in finer and more brilliant language, it is hard to understand how it was, that in so many years he did not empty the marketplace and the workshop, the public walks and the schools, by the fear of his presence ; how he so long satisfied an Alcibiades and a Critias, a Plato, and a Euclid; how he played the part assigned to him in the dialogues of Plato; in short, how he became the founder and type of the philosophy of Athens.' Fortunately in Plato himself we have a valuable testimony to the
I See above, pp. 80; 150, 1.
2 Werke, iii. 2, 259, 287.
accuracy of Xenophon's description. To what does his Alcibiades appeal when anxious to disclose the divine element concealed under the Silenus-like appearance of the Socratic discourses ? To what does his admirable description of the impression produced on him by Socrates go back? What is it which to his mind has been the cause of the revolution and change in the inner life of Greece? What but the moral observations which in Xenophon form
1 Symp. 215, Ε. : όταν γαρ ιδών άν τις και εντός αυτών γιγνόακούω [Σωκράτους πολύ μοι μάλ- μενος πρώτον μεν νούν έχοντας λον και των κορυβαντιώντων και τε ένδον μούνους ευρήσει των λόγων, καρδία πηδά και δάκρυα εκχείται έπειτα θειοτάτους και πλείστ' υπό των λόγων των τούτου. δρώ αγάλματ’ αρετής εν αυτοίς έχοντας, δε και άλλους παμπόλλους τα και επί πλείστον τείνοντας, μάλ. αυτά πάσχοντας : this was not λον δε επί παν όσον προσήκει the case with other speakers, σκοπεϊν το μέλλοντι καλό καουδέ τεθορύβητό μου η ψυχή ουδ' γαθώ έσεσθαι. Alberti's (p. 78) ήγανάκτει ως ανδραποδωδώς δια- objections to the above use of κειμένου, (similarly Euthydemus these passages resolve themin Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39) αλλ' selves into this, that those eleυπό τουτου του Μαρσύου πολλάκις ments of conversation which δή ούτω διετέθην, ώστε μοι δόξαι rivet the soul, which are not μη βιωτών είναι έχοντι ως έχω altogether wanting in Xeno
αναγκάζει γάρ με ομολογείν phon, are more frequent and ότι πολλού ενδεής ών αυτός έτι noticeable in Plato, that thereέμαυτού μεν αμελώ τα δ' Αθηναίων fore the spirit of the Socratic πράττω (conf. Mem. iv. philosophy comes out more 2; iii. 6) πέπονθα δε προς τούτον clearly in Plato. Far from μόνον ανθρώπων, και ουκ άν τις denying this, we grant it οίοιτο εν εμοί ενείναι, το αισχύ- readily. The above remarks νεσθαι δντινούν δραπετεύω are not directed against the ουν αυτόν και φεύγω, και όταν statement that Ρlato gives a ίδω αισχύνομαι τα ώμολογημένα deeper insight than Xenophon και πολλάκις μεν ηδέως αν ίδοιμι into the spirit of the Socratic αυτόν μη όντα εν ανθρώποις· ει δ' teaching, but against Schleierαυ τούτο γένοιτο, ευ οίδ' ότι πολύ macher's statement that the μείζον αν αχθοίμην, ώστε ουκ έχω, discourses of Socrates και τι χρήσομαι τούτο το ανθρώπω. essentially diferent in subIb. 221, D. : και οι λόγοι αυτού stance and subject matter from ομοιότατοί είσι τοις Σειληνοϊς τοϊς those reported by Xenophon. διοιγομένοις ... διοιγομένους δε