CHAP.
XII.

same view Stilpo expressed, when he refused to allow the general conception to apply to individual things, on the ground that a general conception implies something quite different from every individual thing, and not like these only existing from a definite time. In this respect the Megarians again agree with Plato. Whilst Plato, however, regarded species as living spiritual forces, Euclid, following in the steps of Parmenides, denied every kind of motion to being. He, therefore, reduced action and passion to the sphere of the becoming. Of being, he asserted, you can neither predicate action, nor passion, nor yet motion.3

We may

· Diog. ii. 119, says of him: sal and different from any έλεγε, τον λέγοντα άνθρωπος είναι particular man. He denies undéva (in which we suggest that what is shown to him is είπείν instead of είναι), ούτε γάρ cabbage, because there was tóvde dégelv ĎTE Tóvde. Il gàp. cabbage 10,000 years ago; in μάλλον τόνδε και τόνδε, ούτε άρα other words, because the geneτόνδε. και πάλιν το λάχανον ούκ ral Conception of cabbage εστι το δεικνύμενον. λάχανον means Something unchangeμεν γαρ ήν προ μυρίων ετών: ουκ able, not something which has άρα εστί τούτο λάχανον. Dio- come into being. genes introduces this with the then believe with

Hegel, Gesch. remark : delvds dè đyav wv év toîs d. Phil. ii. 123, and Stallbaum, plotikoîs åvýpel kal tà elon, and Plat. Parm. 65, that either Dioit would in itself be possible, genes or his authority must that Stilpo and others had have made some mistake here. derived their hostility to gene- ? Probably expressions like ral conceptions, and especially “Hi quoque multa in Platone,' to the Platonic ideas, from the said of the Megarians by Cic. Cynic School. But the above Acad. iv. 42, 129, refer to such examples not directed points of similarity. against the reality of groups 3 Plato, Soph. 248, C.: dé. expressed by a general con- γουσιν, ότι γενέσει μέν μέτεστι ception, but against the reality του πάσχειν και ποιείν δυνάμεως, of particular things. Stilpo προς δε ουσίαν τούτων ουδετέρου denies that the individual is a την δύναμιν αρμόττειν φασίν. It man, because the expression is accordingly afterwards reman means something univer- peatedly stated as their view :

are

CHAP.
XII.

Connected with this denial of the becoming is the assertion, probably coming from Euclid, certainly from his school, that capacity does not exist beyond the time of its exercise; and that thus what is actual is alone possible. What is simply possible but not actual, would at the same time be and not be. Here would be the very contradiction which Parmenides thought to discover in the becoming, and the change from the possible to the actual would be one of those changes which Euclid could not harmonise with the conception of being. Hence, only what is imma[το παντελώς δν] ακίνητον εστός ticulars on this point will be είναι. ακίνητον το παράπαν εσ- quoted from Diodorus in the tával, and in opposition to this sequel. The passage in the view Plato requires: val and Sophistes, 248, C., which Kivoúpevov on kał klunoi OuyXw- Henne, p. 133, connects with ρητέον ως όντα . unte TW that of Aristotle, refers to έν ή και πολλά είδη λεγόντων το something different. παν εστηκός αποδέχεσθαι.--Aris- -2 Hartenstein, p. 205, is of tocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1. opinion that the above stateThe proofs by which the Me- ment is made in direct contragarians denied motion will be diction to Aristotle. It would described hereafter. It does in this case belong to Eubu. not, however, seem likely that lides. But the Aristotelian the objections raised to the technical terms δύνασθαι, ενερtheory of ideas in the first part yeiv, do not prove much. of Plato's Parmenides are of Aristotle often expressed the Megarian origin, as Stallbaum, statements of others in his Pl. Parm. 57 and 65, supposes.

terminology On the · Arist. Metaph. ix. 3: ciod other hand, no very great imδέ τινες οί φασιν, οίον οι Μεγαρικοί, portance for the system of όταν ενεργή μόνον δύνασθαι, όταν Aristotle must be attached to δε μη ενεργή ου δύνασθαι. οίον the Megarian doctrine already τον μη οικοδομούντα ου δύνασθαι quoted, even if it comes from οικοδομείν, αλλά τον οικοδομούντα Euclid. It is only a peculiar όταν οικοδομή: ομοίως δε και επί way of understanding the των άλλων. . In refuting this Eleatic doctrine against bestatement Aristotle observes coming and motion. Still less that it would make all motion

can we here support the Meand becoming impossible; garians against Aristotle as which was just what the Me- Grote, Plato, iii. 491, does : begarians wanted. Further par- cause a builder without ma

own

terial and unchangeable is allowed by him to be
terial
actual, and regarded as the subject matter of science.

Socrates had described the good as the highest
object of knowledge. In this he was followed by
Euclid. Regarding, however, that which is most
essentially real as the highest object of knowledge
in accordance with his principles, Euclid thought
himself justified in transferring to the good all the
attributes which Parmenides had assigned to real
being. One only real good is there, unchangeable,
ever the same, of which our highest conceptions are
only different names. Whether we speak of God, or
of Intelligence, or of Reason, we always mean one
terials, tools and intentions, tions, p. 230, 2. Grote to defend
cannot build, and when these the Megarians attributes to
and other conditions are there, them reflections, which we have
must build. For this is not at no right to attribute to them.
all the point on which the See p. 133 and 147.
dispute between Aristotle and 2 That his assertions about
the Megarians turns. Aris- the good should have nothing
totle on the contrary says in to do with the Socratic know-
the connection of the above ledge (Hermann, Ges. Abhand-
enquiry (Metaph, iv. 5, c. 7; lung, 242) could only be ac-
1049, a. 5), that if the neces- cepted on the supposition that
sary conditions for the exercise that knowledge was not know-
of a capacity are given (among ledge about the good, and that
which besides the δυνάμεις λο- Euclid was not a pupil of So-
γικαί the intention must be crates. Nor can it be readily
included), its exercise always conceded that a pure Eleatic
follows. This, according to philosopher, if he had only
Grote, is likewise the meaning moved in an ethical sphere of
of the Megarian sentence, ideas, would have treated this
which he disputes. Its real part of philosophy in the same ·
meaning—that a capacity until way as Euclid. As long as he
it shows itself by action is not remained a pure Eleatic philo-
only kept in abeyance by the sopher, he could not have
absence of the necessary means taken this ethical direction
and conditions, but is not even and have placed the conception
existing-may be gathered from of the good at the head of his
the objections urged by Aris- system.
totle, c. 3, and from the quota-

CHAP.
XII.

and the same thing, the Good. For the same reason the moral aim, as Socrates had already shown, is always one—the knowledge of the Good, and if we speak of many virtues, all these are but varying names for one and the same virtue.2

What, however, is the relation of other things to this one Good ? Even Euclid, as accounts tell us, denied any existence to what is not good ;3 from which it follows immediately, that besides the Good nothing real exists. This statement is on better authority attributed to the later Megarian School. Therewith many conceptions, the reality of which had been originally assumed, were destroyed as such, and reduced, in as far as any reality was admitted about them, to mere names of the Good. Here,

1 Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129 : Me- mentis acie, qua verum cernegarici qui id bonum solum esse retur. Illi (the, Megarians) dicebant, quod esset unum et similia, sed, opinor, explicata simile et idem semper (olov, uberius et ornatius. Conf. όμοιον ταυτόν). Diog. ii. 106, Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B., in says of Euclid : ούτος εν το which Antisthenes is mentionαγαθόν απεφαίνετο πολλοίς ονό- ed in addition to Euclid.

. μασι καλούμενον· ότε μεν γαρ 3 Diog. ii. 106: tà dè årtiφρόνησιν, ότε δε θεόν, και άλλοτε κείμενα των αγαθώ ανήρει μή είναι νούν και τα λοιπά.

φάσκων.

. 2 Diog. vii. 161, says of the 4 Arist. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. Stoic Aristo: αρετάς τ’ ούτε 17, 1: όθεν ήξίουν ουτοί γε [οι πολλάς εισήγεν, ώς ο Ζήνων, ούτε περί Στίλπωνα και τους Μεγαριμίαν πολλοίς «νόμασι καλουμένην. κους] το όν εν είναι και το μή ον ως οι Μεγαρικοί. That this one έτερον είναι, μηδέ γεννάσθαι τι virtue was the knowledge of μηδε φθείρεσθαι μηδέ κινείσθαι the good, appears not only Totapámav. Arist. Metaph. xiv. from the internal connection 4; 1091, b, 13, refers to Plato, of the system and its external and can hardly be applied to relation to Socrates, but also the Megarians. from Cicero l. c. who asserts : 5 Prantl's view, p. 35, that a Menedemo autem ... Ere- the conceptions of the Metriaci appellati; quorum omne garians must invariably have bonum in mente positum et à nominalistic meaning, does

CHAP.

probably, traces of gradual development in the MegaXII.

rian doctrine are to be found. Euclid apparently first spoke of a plurality of essential conceptions in contrast to objects of sense, and this form of teaching belongs primarily to a time in which his system was being developed out of this contrast. At a later period the Megarians appear to have used the manifoldness of conceptions for the purpose of attacking popular notions, otherwise keeping it in the background, and confining themselves to the essential oneness of being and the Good. Inconsistent, no doubt, they were; yet we can understand how they became involved in this contradiction by gradually pushing the Socratic theory of conceptions to the

abstract doctrine of the Eleatic One.3 C. Eristic. The sharper the contrast which they presented

not agree with the statements over the difficulty in another of Plato. If the Megarians way. The Megarians, he bedeclared conceptions and only lieves, attributed being to each conceptions to be åanovih ovola, particular idea, in as far as it surely they were Realists, not was a unity, and various conNominalists. Not even Stilpo ceptions were used by them to can, accordingly, be called a

express various kinds of the Nominalist. He had, more- good. But this very pointover, absorbed too much of the being of various kinds of the Cynic doctrines for us to good-was what the Megarians be able to form from him any denied. Starting with the oneconclusion respecting the ori- ness of being they cannot have ginal Megarian views.

arrived at the notion of a mani. 1 Plato, at least in the pas- foldness of conceptions, since sage before quoted, does not this oneness excludes in its abmention a good which is One. stract form any development On the contrary, he speaks of or subordinate distinction. But his philosophers of conceptions it is quite possible that the differing from the Eleatics in Socratic conceptions may assuming many conceptions. gradually have been lost in ? See p. 260, 1.

the Eleatic unity. 3 Henne, p. 121, tries to get