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The utterances of Antisthenes on logic, so far as they CHAP. are known to us, consist in a polemic against the philosophy of conceptions, the object of which is to prove the impossibility of speculative knowledge. Likewise his remarks upon nature have for their object to show, what is natural for man. For this no deep research seemed necessary to him or his followers;a healthy intelligence can tell everyone what he ought to know; anything further is only useless subtlety.
In support of these views Antisthenes put forward (2) Logic. a theory, based it is true on a leading position of Socrates, but one, nevertheless, which in its expanded form and in its sceptical results plainly shows the disciple of Gorgias. Socrates having required the essence and conception of every object to be investigated before anything further could be predicated of it, Antisthenes likewise required the conception of things what they are or were to be determined. 3
on Physics, it is not known Even Cicero ad Attic. xii
. + whether they treat of other 38, calls Antisthenes homo than those natural subjects, acutus magis quam eruditus.' which Antisthenes required im- % Compare the relation of mediately for his Ethics, in this theory to the doctrine of order to bring out the differ- ideas, and what Diog. 39, Simpl. ence between nature and cus- 236, b, m, 278, b, a, says of tom and the conditions of a Diogenes, with what the Scholife of nature. Even the liast on Arist. Categor. p. 22, b, treatise nepi Ców púrews may 40 says of Antisthenes. Sext. have had this object. Pro- Pyrrh. iii. 66, only asserts of a bably Plato, Phileb. 44, C., Cynic in general that he rereckoned Antisthenes among futes the arguments against the μάλα δείνους λεγομένους τα motion by walking up and Tepl púoiv, only because in all down. Similarly Diogenes in questions about morals and Diog. 38. prevailing customs, he invari. 3 Diog. vi. 3: apôtós te apiably referred to the require- σατο λόγον είπών· λόγος εστίν ο ments of nature.
το τί ήν ή έστι δηλών. Alexander
Confining himself, however, exclusively to this point of view, he arrived at the conclusion of the Sophists, that every object can only be called by its own peculiar name, and consequently that no subject can admit à predicate differing from the conception of the subject. Thus it cannot be said that a man is good, but only that a man is human, or that the Good is good.2 Every explanation, moreover, of a conception consisting in making one conception clearer by means of another, he rejected all definitions, on the ground
in Top. 24, m, Schol. in Arist. a great progress as proving 256, b, 12, on the Aristotelian that Antisthenes recognised all Tí tv elvai says that the simple analytical judgments a priori pí hv, which Antisthenes want- as such to be true, but has ed, is not sufficient.
since been obliged to modify ! See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. his opinion (Plat. i. 217, Ges. 904.
Abh. 239), on being reminded 2 Arist. Metaph. v. 29; 1024, by Ritter (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. b, 33 : 'Avrlo dévns Þeto e'ñows 133) that "Antisthenes could μηδέν αξιών λέγεσθαι πλήν τω only be speaking of identical οικείω λόγω εν εφ' ενός· εξ ών judgments. Still he adheres συνέβαινε, μή είναι αντιλέγειν, to it so far as to state that by oxeddy Sè undè yeúdeolau. Alex- the teaching of Antisthenes, ander on the passage. Plato, philosophy for the first time Soph. 251, B.: 88€v ye, oluai, gave to identical judgments an τοις τε νέους και των γερόντων independent value. . In what τους όψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσχήκα- this value consists, it is hard μεν ευθύς γάρ αντιλαβέσθαι παντί to say, for nothing is gained πρόχειρον ως αδύνατον τα te by recognising identical judgπολλά εν και το εν πολλά είναι, ments, nor has it ever occurred και δή που χαίρουσιν ουκ έώντες to any philosopher to deny å yaddy Néyelv åvopwtov, and to them, as Hermann, Ges. Abh. μεν αγαθών αγαθόν, τον δε άνθρω- asserted though without quotTrov ăv@pwntov.—Cf. Philebus 14, ing a single instance in support C.; Arist. Soph. El. c. 17, 175, of it. Still less can it be a b, 15; Phys. i. 2, 185, b, 25; forward step in philosophy to Simpl. in loc. p. 20; Isokr. Hel. deny all but identical judgi. 1, and particularly what is ments. On the contrary, such said p. 276, 1, respecting Stilpo. a denial is the result of an Hermann, Sokr. Syst. p. 30, imperfect view of things, and once thought to discern in is destructive of all knowthese sentences of Antisthenes, ledge.
that they are language which does not touch the thing itself. .
Allowing with regard to composite things, that their component parts could be enumerated, and that they could in this way be themselves explained, with regard to simple ones, he insisted all the more strongly that this was impossible. Compared these might be with others, but not de
fined. Names there might be of them, but not con1
ceptions of qualities, a correct notion but no knowledge. The characteristic of a thing, however, the
1 Artist. Metaph. viii. 3; τάλλα, λόγoν ουκ έχοι. αυτό γάρ 1043, b, 23: ώστε η απορία, ήν καθ' αυτό έκαστον ονομάσαι μόνον οι 'Αντισθένειοι και οι ούτως απαί- είη, προσειπείν δε ουδέν άλλο δευτοι πόροιν, έχει τινά καιρών, δυνατόν, ούθ' ώς έστιν ούθ' ώς ουκ ότι ουκ έστι το τί έστιν ορίσασθαι, έστιν έπει ουδε το αυτο τον γάρ όρον λόγον είναι μακρόν – ουδε το εκείνο ουδέ τό έκαστον see Metaph. xiv. 3; 1091, 4, 7; ουδε το μόνον προσoιστέον, ουδ' and Schwegler on this pas- άλλα πολλά τοιαύτα ταύτα μεν sage-- αλλά ποιον μέν τι εστιν γάρ περιτρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεενδέχεται και διδάξαι, ώσπερ άρ- σθαι, έτερα όντα εκείνων οίς προστίγυρον τι μέν έστιν, ού, ότι δ' οίον
θεται. δείν δε, είπερ ήν δυνατόν καττίτερος. ώστ' ουσίας έστι μεν αυτό λέγεσθαι και είχεν οικείον ής ενδέχεται είναι όρον και λόγον, αυτού λόγον, άνευ των άλλων cίον της συνθέτου, εάν τε αισθητή απάντων λέγεσθαι. νύν δε αδύναεάν τε νοητή η· εξ ών δ' αύτη τον είναι οτιούν των πρώτων πρώτων ουκ έστιν. That this, ρηθήναι λόγω: ου γάρ είναι αυτό too, belongs to the description αλλ' ή ονομάζεσθαι μόνον· όνομα of the teaching of Antisthenes, γάρ μόνον έχειν' τα δε εκ τούτων appears from Plato, Theaetet. ήδη συγκείμενα, ώσπερ αυτά πέπ201, E., and is wrongly denied λεκται, ούτω και τα ονόματα αυτών by Brandis, ii. b, 503; the ex- συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι : pressions are indeed Aristo- ονομάτων γάρ συμπλοκήν είναι telian. Alexander, on the pas- λόγου ουσίαν. And 201, C: έφη Sage, explains it more fully, δέ τήν μεν μετά λόγον δόξαν αληθή but without adding anything επιστήμην είναι, την δε άλογον fresh. That this view was not εκτός επιστήμης και ών μεν μη tirst put forward by the dis- εστι λόγος, ουκ επιστητα είναι, ciples of Antisthenes, appears ούτωσι και ονομάζων, & δ' έχει, from Plato's Theaetet. 201, Ε.: επιστητά. This whole descripεγώ γαρ αν έδόκουν ακούειν τινών tion agrees with what has been ότι τα μεν πρώτα ώσπερεί στοιχεία, quoted from Aristotle s0 enεξ ών ημείς τε συγκείμεθα και tirely, trait for trait, that we
name which can never be defined, the conception of the subject which is borrowed from nothing else, and therefore can never be a predicate, consists only in its proper name. By this it is known when it can be explained by nothing else. All that is real is strictly individual. General conceptions do not express the nature of things, but they express men's thoughts about them. Plato having derived from the Socratic demand for a knowledge of conceptions a system of the most decided Realism, Antisthenes derives therefrom a Nominalism quite as decided. General conceptions are only fictions of thought. Horses and
cannot possibly refer it to any agrees most fully with the one else but Antisthenes. It statements of Aristotle touchis all the more remarkable ing Antisthenes, whereas no that Plato repeatedly (201, C.; such principle is known of the 202, C.) affirms the truth of his School of Megara. We may, description. In modern times, therefore, endorse SchleierSchleiermacher, Pl. W. ii. 1 and macher's conjecture (Pl. W. ii. 184, was the first to recognise b, 19) that the Cratylus was the reference to Antisthenes. in great part directed against His opinion is shared by Bran- Antisthenes conjecture dis, Gr.-Röm. Phil. ii. a, 202, f; which appears to harmonise Susemihl, Genet. Entw. d. Plat. with the view that Antisthenes Phil. i. 200 ; Schwegler and was the expounder of HeracliBonitz on Arist., 1. c., but con
It is opposed by Brandis, tradicted by Hermann (Plat. ii. a, 285, f. Nor yet would 499, 659) and Stallbaum (De we venture to attribute to AnArg. Theætet. ii. f). Steinhart tisthenes a theory of monads (Plat. W. iii. 16, 204, 20) finds connecting it with the theory that the explanation of know- of ideas (Susemihl, i. 202, in ledge, as here given, corre- connection with Hermann, Ges. sponds with the mind of Antis. Abh. 240). What we know of thenes, but refuses notwith him does not go beyond the standing to deduce it from him. principle, that the simple eleSchleiermacher (as Brandis, ii. ments of things cannot be a, 203; Susemihl, pp. 200, 341, defined; what he understood remark) has not the slightest by simple elements may be right to think the reference is gathered from the example
to the Megarians in Theætquoted from Arist. Metaph. vii.
What is there stated 3, of the silver and the tin.
men are seen, not, however, the conception of a horse or a man. From this position he opened a campaign against his fellow pupil, with whom he was for other reasons not on good terms, but his fire was met with corresponding spirit.3 Holding these views
| Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in 2 The character and position Arist. 66, b, 45, says : Twv dè in life of the two men παλαιών οι μεν ανήρουν τάς ποιότη- widely different. . Plato must τας τελέως, το ποιον συγχωρούντες have felt himself as much reeivai (the terminology of course pelled by the plebeian roughness belongs to the Stoics) HOTEP of a proletarian philosopher 'Αντισθένης, ός Πλάτωνα as Antisthenes would have διαμφισβητών, “& Πλάτων,’ έφη, been annoyed by the refined “ ίππον μεν δρώ, ιππότητα δε ουχ delicacy of Plato. op@,' to which Plato gave the 3 Compare (besides what is excellent answer : True, for said, p. 292, 2) Plato, Soph. 251, you have the eye with which C., and the anecdotes in Diog. you see a horse, but you are iii. 35, vi. 7; also the corredeficient in the eye with which sponding ones about Plato and you see the idea of horse. Diogenes, which are partially Ibid. 67, b, 18; Ibid. 68, b, 26 : fictions, in vi. 25; 40; 54 ; 58 ; 'Aytio 0 évnu kai toùs tepi aŭtdy Ælian, V. H. xiv. 33; Theo. Réyovtas, šv@pwrov Epã åv@pwa6- Progym. p. 205 ; Stob. Floril. 13, τητα δε ουχ δρώ. . Quite the 37. As to the picked fowt same, Ibid. 20, 2, a. Diog. vi. story in Diog. 40, compare 53, tells the same story of Plato, Polit. 266, B.; Göttling, Diogenes and Plato, with this p. 264. For the Cynical attack difference, that he uses īpane- which Antisthenes made on (ότης and κυαθότης instead of Plato in his Σάθων, see Diog. iii. àv@pwa bans. Ammon. in Porph. 35, vi. 16; Athen. v. 220, d, Isag. 22, b, says: ’Artiodévns xi. 507, a. A trace of Ant'sέλεγε τα γένη και τα είδη έν thenes' polemic against the είλαις επινοίαις είναι, and then doctrine of ideas is found in he mentions år@pwrórns and the Euthydemus of Plato, 301, in Tóns as examples. The same A. Plato there meets the aslanguage, almost word for sertion of the Sophist that the word, is found in Tzetz. Chil. beautiful is only beautiful by vii. 605, f. Plato is no doubt the presence of beauty, by sayreferring to this assertion of ing: εάν ούν παραγένηταί σοι Antisthenes, when in the Parm. βούς, βούς εί, και ότι νύν εγώ σοι 132, B., he quotes an objection Tápellel Alovvo odapos el; We may to the theory of ideas, us suppose that Antisthenes really ειδών έκαστον ή τούτων νόημα και made use of the illustration of ουδαμου αυτή προσήκη έγγίγνεσθαι the OX, to which Plato then άλλοθι ή εν ψυχαίς.
replied by making use of the