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(Η ΑΡ. XIII.

it is only natural that Antisthenes should have attached the greatest importance to enquiries respecting names. Stopping at names and refusing to allow any further utterances respecting things, he in truth made all scientific enquiry impossible. This fact be partially admitted, drawing from his premises the r' conclusion that it is impossible to contradict yourself.2 Taken strictly the inference from these pre

same illustration in the

person γειν επείρατο ότι μη έστιν αντιof Dionysodorus. Steinhart λέγειν τους μεν γαρ αντιλέγοντας (Plato's Leben, 14, 266) con- περί τινος διάφορα λέγειν οφείλειν, siders the Σάθων spurious. He μη δύνασθαι δε περί αυτού διαφόwill not credit Antisthenes ρους τους λόγους φέρεσθαι το ένα with such a scarrilous produc- τον οικείον εκάστον είναι ένα γάρ tion.

ενός είναι και τον λέγοντα περί 1 Antisth. in Εpict. Diss. i. αυτου λέγειν μόνον· ώστε ει μεν 17, 12: αρχή παιδεύσεως και των περί του πράγματος του αυτού ονομάτων επίσκεψις. It is a pity λέγοιεν, τα αυτά αν λέγοιεν that we do not know more accu- αλλήλοις (είς γαρ και περί ενός rately the sense and the con- λόγος) λέγοντες δε ταύτα ουκ αν nection of this saying. As it αντιλέγοιεν αλλήλοις· ει δε διαis, we cannot judge whether it φέροντα λέγοιεν, ουκέτι λέξεις required an individual enquiry αυτούς περί του αυτού. Ρranti, into the most important names, Gesch. d. Log. i. 33, mentions or only a general enquiry into later writers, who, however, nature and the meaning of only repeat Aristotle's sayings. names, which the principles In exactly the same way Plato's contained in the above should Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 285, develope. Respecting the E.) establishes his assertion, theory that Antisthenes held that it is impossible to contrato the etymologies of Heracli- dict : εισίν εκάστω των όντων tus, see p. 297, 1.

λόγοι; Πάνυ γε. Ουκούν ώς έστιν 2 Arist. Metaph. V. 29; see έκαστον ή ως ουκ έστιν; Ως έστιν. 296, 1; Top. i. 11; 104, b, 20: Ει γάρ μέμνησαι, έφη, ώ Κτήσιππε, ουκ έστιν αντιλέγειν, καθάπερ και άρτι επεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγονέφη 'Αντισθένης, which Alear. τα ως ουκ έστι. το γάρ μη ον (Schol. in Arist. 732, 4, 30; ουδείς εφάνη λέγων. Πότερον ούν similarly as the passage in the αντιλέγουμεν άν του αυτού topics, Ibid. 259, b, 13) thus πράγματος λόγον αμφότεροι λέexplains : ώετο δε ο 'Αντισθένης γοντες, και ούτω μεν άν δήπου έκαστον των όντων λέγεσθαι τώ ταυτά λέγοιμεν ; Συνεχώρει. 'Αλλ' οικείω λόγω μόνο και ένα εκάστον όταν μηδέτερος, έφη, τον του λόγον είναι .

εξ ών και συνά- πράγματος λόγον λέγη, τότε αντι

CHAP.
XIII.

mises is not only that drawn by Aristotle' that no false propositions, but also that no propositions of any kind are possible. The doctrine of Antisthenes was logically destructive of all knowledge and every kind of judgment. . Not that the Cynics were themselves disposed to C. Theory

of Morals. renounce knowledge in consequence. Four books

Good and came from the pen of Antisthenes, respecting the evil. difference between knowledge and opinion.2 Indeed, , the whole School prided itself in no small degree on having advanced beyond the deceptive sphere of opinions, and being in full possession of truth.

3

λέγοιμεν άν ; και ούτω γε το παρά- 1 See p. 296, 1, Procl. in
παν ουδ' άν μεμνημένος είη του Crat. 37: Αντισθένης έλεγεν μη
πράγματος ουδέτερος ημών ; Και δεν αντιλέγειν· πας γάρ, φησί,
τούτο συνωμολόγει. 'Αλλ' άρα, λόγος αληθεύει» ο γάρ λέγων τι
όταν εγώ λέγω μεν το πράγμα, λέγει· δ δέ τι λέγων το ον λέ-
συ δε ουδέ λέγεις το παράπαν: ο γει· δ δε το ον λέγων αληθεύει.
δε μη λέγων τω λέγοντι πώς άν Conf. Plato, Crat. 429, D.
αντιλέγοι; Ρlato probably had 2 Περί δόξης και επιστήμης,
Antisthenes in his eye, although Diog. 17. Doubtless this trea-
this line of argument had not tise contained the explanation
originated with him. Conf. given p. 253, 1.
Zeller, 1. c. i. 905, and Diog. ix. Diog. 83 says of Monimus :-
53: τον Αντισθένους λόγον τον ουτος μέν εμβριθέστατος εγένετο,
πειρώμενον αποδεικνύειν ώς ουκ ώστε δόξης μεν καταφρονείν, προς
έστιν αντιλέγειν, ούτος (Prota- δ' αλήθειαν παρορμάν. Menan-
goras) πρώτος διείλεκται κατά der», Ιbid. says of the same
φησι Πλάτων εν Ευθυδήμω (286, Cynic: το γαρ υποληφθέν τυφον
c). Here, too, belongs the είναι παν έφη, and Seat. Math.
saying of Antisthenes in Stob. viii. 5: Μόνιμος και κύων τυφον
Flor. 82, 8, that contradiction είπών τα πάντα, όπερ οίησις εστί
ought never to be used, but των ουκ όντων ως όντων. Conf.
only persuasion. A madman M. Aurel. πρ. εαυτ. ii. 15: ότι
will not be brought to his πάν υπόληψις: δηλα μεν γαρ τα

by another's raving. προς του κυνικού Μονίμου λεγόContradiction is madness ; for μενα. On this ground the later he who contradicts, does what Sceptics wished to reckon Mois in the nature of things impos- nimus one of themselves, but sible. Of this subject the Σάθων wrongly S0. What he says has και περί του ανπλέγειν treated. only reference to the worthless

senses

CHAP.
XIII.

With them, however, knowledge is directed entirely to a practical end, that of making men virtuous, and happy in being virtuous. As the highest object in life the Cynics, herein agreeing with all other moral philosophers, regarded happiness. Happiness being in general distinguished from virtue, or, at least, not united to virtue, they regard the two as absolutely identical. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice; what is neither the one nor the

other is for man indifferent. For each thing that tonly can be a good which belongs to it. The only real

ness of common opinion and δόγματα ταϊς ιεραϊς ενθέμενοι what it considers a good. In

σελίσιν· Lucian v. Auct. 8, Diogenes ταν αρετάν ψυχάς αγαθών μόνον: calls himself a prophet of truth άδε γαρ ανδρών and freedom. .

μούνα και βιοταν δύσατο και 1 See p. 292.

πολιάς. 2 Diog. ii. : αυτάρκη την αρε- According to Diogenes it would την προς ευδαιμονίαν, so that happiness is the end, and doctrine that virtue is the only

appear as though the Stoic virtue the means. Stob. Ecl.

good were therein attributed 103, 20, 21.

to the Cynics. 3 Diog. vi. 104 : αρέσκει δ'

4 This maxim follows from αυτούς και τέλος είναι το κατ' Diog. 12, who states as the αρετήν ζήν ώς 'Αντισθένης φησίν εν teaching of Antisthenes : τα τη Ηρακλεί, ομοίως τους στωικούς.

πονηρά νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά. Ibid. 105 : τα δε μεταξύ αρετής Compare Plato, Symp. 205, Ε. : και κακίας αδιάφορα λέγουσιν ου γάρ το εαυτών, οίμαι έκαστοι ομοίως 'Αρίστωνε τη Χίω. Dio- ασπάζονται, ει μή εί τις το μεν cles. in Diog. vi. 12 says of An- αγαθον οικείον καλοί και εαυτού, το tisthenes : ταγαθά καλά τα κακά δε κακόν αλλότριον. In the αισχρά. Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, Charm. 163, C. Critias says, C: έφησε [Diogenes] το αγαθόν οnly the useful and good is οιστον τοικείον παντί σοφά είναι, οικείον. Although Antisthenes τα δ' άλλα πάντα ουδέν ή φλυαρίας is not here mentioned by name, υπάρχειν. Whether the

epi

yet the passage in Diogenes gram of Athen. in Diog. vi. 14, makes it probable that the refers to the Cynics or the antithesis of dyaddy and oikelok Stoics is not quite clear.

belongs to him, even if he was Ω στοϊκών μύθων ειδήμονες, & not the first to introduce it.

πανάριστα

CHAP.
XIII.

thing which belongs to man is mind.' Everything else is a matter of chance. Only in his mental and moral powers is he independent. Intelligence and virtue constitute the only armour from which all the attacks of fortune recoil ;2 that man only is free who is the servant of no external ties and no desires for things without.3 3

Thus man requires nothing to make him happy but virtue. All else he may learn to despise, in order to content himself with virtue alone. For

1 Compare p. 293, 6; Χen. τοίς τύχη μηδεν επιτρέπειν. Stob. | symp. 4, 34, puts words to the Ekl. Η 348: Διογένης έφη δράν

same efect in the mouth of την Τύχην ενορώσαν αυτό και λέ-
Antisthenes : νομίζω, ώ άνδρες, γουσαν τούτον δ' ου δύναμαι
τους ανθρώπους ουκ εν τω οίκω βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητήρα. (The
τον πλούτον και την πενίαν έχειν, same verse is applied by David,
αλλ' εν ταις ψυχαίς• this is then Schol. in Arist. 23, to Antis-
further expanded ; and Epictet. thenes.) Conf. Stob. Floril.
Diss. iii. 24, 68, makes Diogenes 108, 71.
say of Antisthenes : εδίδαξέ με 3 This is what Diogenes
τα εμα και τα ουκ εμά: κτήσεις says of himself in Εpict.
ουκ έμή: συγγενείς, οικείοι, φίλοι, Diss. iii. 24, 67 : εξ ου μ' 'Aν-
φήμη, συνήθεις, τόποι, διατριβή, τισθένης ήλευθέρωσεν, ουκέτι εδού-
πάντα ταύτα ότι αλλότρια. σον λευσα, and he als asserts
ούν τις χρήσεις φαντασιών. ταύ- Diog. 71 that he led the life ofX
την έδειξέ μοι ότι ακώλυτον έχω, a Hercules, μηδέν ελευθερίας
ανανάγκαστον, κ.τ.λ. We have, προκρίνων. Crates in Clem.
however, certainly not got the Strom. ii. 413, A. (Theod. Cur.
very words of Diogenes or Gr. Aff. xii. 49, p. 172) praises
Antisthenes.

the Cynics :
2 Diog. 12 (teaching of An. ηδονή ανδραποδώσει αδούλωτοι
tisthenes): αναφαίρετον όπλων και άκαμπτοι
αρετή τείχος ασφαλέστατον αθάνατον βασιλείαν ελευθερίαν
φρόνησιν μήτε γάρ καταρρείν τ' αγαπώσιν,
μήτε προδίδοσθαι. The same is and he exhorts his Hipparchia
a little differently expressed
by Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C.

τωνδε κράτει ψυχής ήθει άγαλ. Diog. 63 says of Diogenes :

λομένη, ερωτηθείς τί αυτή περιγέγονεν εκ

ούθ' υπό χρυσίων δουλουμένη φιλοσοφίας, έφη· ει και μηδέν άλλο,

ούθ' υπ' ερώτων θηξιπόθων. το γούν προς πάσαν τύχην παρε

4 See note 2. σκεύασθαι---and 105 : αρέσκει αυ- 5 See Diog. 105 : αρέσκει δ'

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CHAP.
XIII.

what is wealth without virtue? A prey for flatterers and venal menials, a temptation for avarice, this root of all evil, a fountain of untold crimes and deeds of shame, a possession for ants and dung-beetles, a thing bringing neither glory nor enjoyment. Indeed what else can wealth be, if it be true that wealth and virtue can never dwell together, the Cynic's beggar-life being the only straight way to wisdom ? 3 What are honour and shame? The talk of fools, about which no child of reason will trouble himself? For in truth facts are the very opposite of what we think. Honour amongst men is an evil. To be despised by them is a good, since it keeps us back from vain attempts. Glory only falls to his lot, who seeks it not. What

αυτούς και λιτως βιούν, πλούτου V. Auct. 11; Crates in Epiph.
και δόξης και ευγενείας καταφρο- Exp. Fid. 1089, C.: ελευθερίας
voûol. Diog. 24. Epict. Diss. elvai Tiv åktnuogúvnu.
i. 24, 6.

4 Epict. Diss. i. 24, 6 : (0101 Antisth. in Stob. Floril. i. névns) néyel, őti eúdočia (Winck. 30; 10, 42; Xen. Sym. 4, 35; elmann, p. 47, suggests ådočia, Diog. in Diog. 47; 50; 60; which certainly might be exGalen. Exhort. c. 7, i. 10, K. pected from what preceded) Metrocles in Diog. 95; Crates tópos ļoti palvouévwv åv@pórwv. in Stob. 97, 27; 15, 10; the Diog. 11 says of Antisth.: Thy same in Julian, Or, vi. 199, D. τ' άδοξίαν αγαθών και ίσον το

2 Stob. Floril. 93, 35 : Διογέ- πόνω, and 72 : ευγενείας δε και νης έλεγε, μήτε εν πόλει πλουσία δόξας και τα τοιαύτα πάντα διέμήτε εν οικία αρετήν οικείν δύνα- παιζε (Diogenes), προκοσμήματα σθαι. Crates therefore disposed κακίας είναι λέγων. In 41 he of his property, and is said to speaks of sófns égavohuata. In have settled that it should 92: _reye dè (Crates) uéxpl toúonly be restored to his children δου δείν φιλοσοφείν, μέχρι αν when they ceased to be philo- δόξωσιν οι στρατηγοί είναι όνηsophers (Diog. 88, on the autho- átal. Compare also 93. Doxority of Demetrius Magnes). pater in Aphthon. c. 2, Rhet. Unfortunately, however, Crates Gr. i. 192, says that Diogenes, can at that time have neither in answer to the question, How had a wife nor children,

is honour to be gained ? re3 Diog. 104; Diog. in Stob. plied By not troubling yourFloril. 95, 11 ; 19. See Lucian self at all about honour.'

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