CHAP. 1 it is only natural that Antisthenes should have attached the greatest importance to enquiries respecting names. Stopping at names and refusing to allow any further utterances respecting things, he in truth made all scientific enquiry impossible. This fact he partially admitted, drawing from his premises they' conclusion that it is impossible to contradict yourself. Taken strictly the inference from these pre same illustration in the person of Dionysodorus. Steinhart (Plato's Leben, 14, 266) considers the Σάθων spurious. He will not credit Antisthenes with such a scurrilous production. 1 Antisth. in Εpict. Diss. i. 17, 12: ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις. It is a pity that we do not know more accurately the sense and the connection of this saying. As it is, we cannot judge whether it required an individual enquiry into the most important names, or only a general enquiry into nature and the meaning of names, which the principles contained in the above should develope. Respecting the theory that Antisthenes held to the etymologies of Heraclitus, see p. 297, 1. 2 Arist. Metaph. v. 29; see 296, 1; Top. i. 11; 104, b, 20: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ · ἔφη ̓Αντισθένης, which Alex. (Schol. in Arist. 732, a, 30; similarly as the passage in the topics, Ibid. 259, b, 13) thus explains : ᾤετο δὲ ὁ ̓Αντισθένης ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων λέγεσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἕνα ἑκάστον λόγον εἶναι ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνά γειν ἐπείρατο ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας περί τινος διάφορα λέγειν ὀφείλειν, μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους φέρεσθαι τῷ ἕνα τὸν οἰκεῖον ἐκάστον εἶναι· ἕνα γὰρ ἑνὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον· ὥστε εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγοιεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν λέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις εἷς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἑνὸς λόγος) λέγοντες δὲ ταὐτὰ οὐκ ἂν ἀντιλέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις· εἰ δὲ δια φέροντα λέγοιεν, οὐκέτι λέξειν αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 33, mentions later writers, who, however, only repeat Aristotle's sayings. In exactly the same way Plato's Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 285 E.) establishes his assertion, that it is impossible to contradiet: εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν; Ὡς ἔστιν. Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφῃ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγον τα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. Πότερον οὖν ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες, ή οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταὐτὰ λέγοιμεν ; Συνεχώρει. Αλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντι mises is not only that drawn by Aristotle' that no CHAP. XIII. false propositions, but any kind are possible. also that no propositions of was logically destructive of all knowledge and every kind of judgment. Good and Not that the Cynics were themselves disposed to C. Theory renounce knowledge in consequence. Four books of Morals. came from the pen of Antisthenes, respecting the evil. difference between knowledge and opinion.2 Indeed, the whole School prided itself in no small degree on having advanced beyond the deceptive sphere of opinions, and being in full possession of truth. λέγοιμεν ἄν ; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδ ̓ ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει. Αλλ ̓ ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις τὸ παράπαν· ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς ἂν ἀντιλέγοι; Plato probably had Antisthenes in his eye, although this line of argument had not originated with him. Conf. Zeller, 1. c. i. 905, and Diog. ix. 53: τὸν ̓Αντισθένους λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος (Protagoras) πρῶτος διείλεκται κατά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ (286, c). Here, too, belongs the saying of Antisthenes in Stob. Flor. 82, 8, that contradiction ought never to be used, but only persuasion. A madman will not be brought to his senses by another's raving. Contradiction is madness; for he who contradicts, does what is in the nature of things impossible. Of this subject the Σάθων ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀνπλέγειν treated. 1 See p. 296, 1, Procl. in Crat. 37 : Αντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γὰρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὶ λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὶ λέγων τὸ ὂν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγων ἀληθεύει. Conf. Plato, Crat. 429, D. 2 Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης, Diog. 17. Doubtless this treatise contained the explanation given p. 253, 1. 3 Diog. 83 says of Monimus: οὗτος μὲν ἐμβριθέστατος ἐγένετο, ὥστε δόξης μὲν καταφρονεῖν, πρὸς δ' ἀλήθειαν παρορμᾷν. Menander, Ibid. says of the same Cynic: τὸ γὰρ ὑποληφθὲν τύφον εἶναι πᾶν ἔφη, and Seat. Math. viii. 5: Μόνιμος ὁ κύων τύφον εἰπὼν τὰ πάντα, ὅπερ οἴησις ἐστὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς ὄντων. Conf. M. Aurel. πρ. ἑαυτ. ii. 15 : ὅτι πᾶν ὑπόληψις· δῆλα μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τοῦ κυνικοῦ Μονίμου λεγόμενα. On this ground the later Sceptics wished to reckon Monimus one of themselves, but wrongly so. What he says has only reference to the worthless CHAP. With them, however, knowledge is directed entirely to a practical end, that of making men virtuous, and happy in being virtuous. As the highest object in life the Cynics, herein agreeing with all other moral philosophers, regarded happiness.2 Happiness being in general distinguished from virtue, or, at least, not united to virtue, they regard the two as absolutely identical. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice; what is neither the one nor the other is for man indifferent. For each thing that only can be a good which belongs to it. The only real s Diog. vi. 104: ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν ὡς Αντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, ὁμοίως τοῖς στωικοῖς. Ivid. 105: τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν ὁμοίως Αρίστωνι τῷ Χίῳ. Diocles. in Diog. vi. 12 says of Antisthenes: τἀγαθὰ καλὰ τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά. Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1989, C: ἔφησε [Diogenes] τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἰστὸν τοἰκεῖον παντὶ σοφῷ εἶναι, τὰ δ ̓ ἄλλα πάντα οὐδὲν ἢ φλυαρίας ὑπάρχειν. Whether the epigram of Athen. in Diog. vi. 14, refers to the Cynics or the Stoics is not quite clear. δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι σελίσιν· τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον ἅδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν μούνα καὶ βιοτὰν ῥύσατο καὶ πολιάς. According to Diogenes it would doctrine that virtue is the only appear as though the Stoic good were therein attributed to the Cynics. 4 This maxim follows from Diog. 12, who states as the teaching of Antisthenes: τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά. Compare Plato, Symp. 205, Ε. : οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτῶν, οἶμαι ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλοῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον. In the Charm. 163, C. Critias says, only the useful and good is οἰκεῖον. Although Antisthenes is not here mentioned by name, yet the passage in Diogenes makes it probable that the antithesis of ἀγαθὸν and οἰκεῖον belongs to him, even if he was Ω στοϊκῶν μύθων ειδήμονες, ὦ not the first to introduce it. πανάριστα thing which belongs to man is mind.' Everything else is a matter of chance. Only in his mental and moral powers is he independent. Intelligence and virtue constitute the only armour from which all the attacks of fortune recoil;2 that man only is free who is the servant of no external ties and no desires for things without.3 Thus man requires nothing to make him happy but virtue.4 All else he may learn to despise, in order to content himself with virtue alone. For 1 Compare p. 293, 6; Xen. Symp. 4, 34, puts words to the same effect in the mouth of Antisthenes: νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς· this is then further expanded ; and Epictet. Diss. iii. 24, 68, makes Diogenes say of Antisthenes: ἐδίδαξέ με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμά· κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις, τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι ἀλλότρια. σὸν οὖν τί; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ταύτην ἔδειξέ μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον, κ.τ.λ. We have, however, certainly not got the very words of Diogenes or Antisthenes. 2 Diog. 12 (teaching of Antisthenes): ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον ἀρετή . . . τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταῤῥεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. The same is a little differently expressed by Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C. Diog. 63 says of Diogenes : ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη· εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τὸ γοῦν πρὸς πᾶσαν τύχην παρεσκεύασθαι—and 105 : ἀρέσκει αὐτ τοῖς τύχῃ μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. Stob. Ekl. ii. 348 : Διογένης ἔφη ὁρᾷν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορῶσαν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν· τοῦτον δ ̓ οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητῆρα. (The same verse is applied by David, Schol. in Arist. 23, to Antisthenes.) Conf. Stob. Floril. 108, 71. 3 This is what Diogenes says of himself in Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 67: ἐξ οὗ μ' Αν τισθένης ἠλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα, and he also asserts in Diog. 71 that he led the life of X a Hercules, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων, Crates in Clem. Strom. ii. 413, Α. (Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 49, p. 172) praises the Cynics : ἡδονῇ ἀνδραποδώδει ἀδούλωτοι and he exhorts his Hipparchia οὔθ ̓ ὑπὸ χρυσίων δουλουμένη 5 See Diog. 105 : ἀρέσκει δ' CHAP. XIII. CHAP. what is wealth without virtue? A prey for flatterers and venal menials, a temptation for avarice, this root of all evil, a fountain of untold crimes and deeds of shame, a possession for ants and dung-beetles, a thing bringing neither glory nor enjoyment.1 Indeed what else can wealth be, if it be true that wealth and virtue can never dwell together,2 the Cynic's beggar-life being the only straight way to wisdom?3 What are honour and shame? The talk of fools, about which no child of reason will trouble himself? For in truth facts are the very opposite of what we think. Honour amongst men is an evil. To be despised by them is a good, since it keeps us back from vain attempts. Glory only falls to his lot, who seeks it not.4 What αὐτοῖς καὶ λιτῶς βιοῦν, πλούτου Antisth. in Stob. Floril. i. * Stob. Floril. 93, 35 : Διογένης ἔλεγε, μήτε ἐν πόλει πλουσίᾳ μήτε ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἀρετὴν οἰκεῖν δύνασθαι. Crates therefore disposed of his property, and is said to have settled that it should only be restored to his children when they ceased to be philosophers (Diog. 88, on the authority of Demetrius Magnes). Unfortunately, however, Crates can at that time have neither had a wife nor children. 3 Diog. 104; Diog. in Stob. Floril. 95, 11; 19. See Lucian V. Auct. 11; Crates in Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, Ο.: ἐλευθερίας εἶναι τὴν ἀκτημοσύνην. Epict. Diss. i. 24, 6: (AoYévns) λÉYEL, ÖTI evdoğía (Winckelmann, p. 47, suggests àdožía, which certainly might be expected from what preceded) Yópos èorì μaivoμévwv `àv0púπwv. Diog. 11 says of Antisth.: Thu τ ̓ ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ, and 72: εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέπαιζε (Diogenes), προκοσμήματα κακίας εἶναι λέγων. In 41 he speaks of δόξης ἐξανθήματα. In 92: λeye dè (Crates) μÉXPI TOÚδου δεῖν φιλοσοφεῖν, μέχρι ἂν δόξωσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἶναι ὀνηλára. Compare also 93. Doxopater in Aphthon. c. 2, Rhet. Gr. i. 192, says that Diogenes, in answer to the question, How is honour to be gained? replied By not troubling yourself at all about honour.' |