CHAP. (1) Virtue. quence of action and of satisfying essential wants, it is a thing to be avoided. From these considerations followed the conclusion, that everything else excepting virtue and vice is indifferent for us, and that we in turn ought to be indifferent thereto. Only those who soar above poverty and wealth, shame and honour, ease and fatigue, life and death, and who are prepared to submit to any work and state in life, who fear no one, troubling themselves about nothing-only such as these offer no exposed places to fortune, and can therefore be free and happy.1 As yet, here are only the negative conditions of happiness. What is the positive side corresponding thereto ? Virtue alone bringing happiness, and the goods of the soul being alone worth possessing, in what does virtue consist? Virtue, replies Antisthenes, herein following Socrates and Euclid, consists in wisdom or prudence; 2 and Reason is the only Diog. in Stob. Floril. 86, 19 (89, 4), says the noblest men are of karapрovoûνтES TλOúτου δόξης ἡδονῆς ζωῆς, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων ὑπεράνω ὄντες, πενίας ἀδοξίας πόνου θανάτου. Diog. 29 says of the same: vel τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμεῖν καὶ μὴ γαμεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας καταπλεῖν καὶ μὴ καταπλεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς παιδοτροφεῖν καὶ μὴ παιδοτροφεῖν, καὶ τοὺς παρασκευαζομένους συμβιοῦν τοῖς δυνάσταις καὶ μὴ προσιόντας. Crates, Ibid. 86, says that what he had gained by philo sophy was dépμwv TE XOîvię kai 2 This follows from Diog.. 13: τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν. τείχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὑτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς, if we connect with it his maxims about the oneness and the teachableness of virtue, and his doctrine of the wise. man. thing which gives a value to life. Hence, as his teacher had done before him, he concludes that virtue is one and indivisible,2 that the same moral problem is presented to every class of men,3 and that virtue is the result of teaching. He further maintains that virtue is an inalienable possession; for what is once known can never be forgotten.5 He thus bridges over a gulf in the teaching of Socrates by a system in which Sophistical views contributed no less than practical interests to make virtue in itself independent of everything external.8 1 Compare the saying attributed to Antisthenes in Plut. Sto. Rep. 14, 7, p. 1040, and to Diogenes in Diog. 24: εἰς τὸν βίον παρεσκευάζεσθαι δεῖν λόγον ἢ βρόχον. Also Diog. 3. 2 Schol. Lips. on Пl. O. 123 (Winckelmann, p. 28): Αντισθένης φησὶν, ὡς εἴ τι πράττει ὁ σοφὸς κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ. 3 Dig. 12 according to Diocles: ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή. 4 Diog. 10 : διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε (Αντισθένης) τὴν ἀρετήν. 105: ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθὰ φησὶν ̓Αντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ηρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν. Without doubt the reference in Isocr. Hel. i. 1 is also to Antisthenes. Isocrates quotes the passages just given, with the sentence of Antisthenes which was discussed p. 300, 2, added : καταγεγηράκασιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψευδή λέγειν οὐδ ̓ ἀντιλέγειν. . . . οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστι· καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη Wherein, however, καθ ̓ ἁπάντων ἐστιν· ἄλλοι δὲ 5 Diog. 12: ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον The maxim that prudence is insuperable. See p. 142, 3. 7 The maxim that you cannot forget what you know is only the converse of the Sophistic maxim that you cannot learn what you do not know. It is only independent of external circumstances, when it cannot be lost for since the wise and virtuous man will never, as long as he continues wise and virtuous, forego his wisdom and virtue, and since, according to the teaching of Socrates, no one intentionally CHAP. XIII. CHAP. true prudence consisted the Cynics could not say more precisely. If it were described as knowledge concerning the good,' this, as Plato justly observed,2 was simply a tautology. If, on the contrary, it were said to consist in unlearning what is bad,3 neither does this negative expression lead a single step further. So much only is clear, that the prudence of Antisthenes and his School invariably coincides with a right state of will, of firmness, of self-control and of uprightness, thus bringing us back to the Socratic doctrine of the oneness of virtue and knowledge. Hence by learning virtue, they understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research.5 They would not have recognised the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between a conventional and a philosophical, an ethical and an intellectual virtue; 4 ἔφη, τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν. The same is found in Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 34 (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193). does wrong, it follows that σις . καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ ̓ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτώντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. If the Cynics are not here exclusively meant, the passage at any rate refers to them. 2 1. c. 3 Diog. S, according to Phanias : ('Αντισθένης) ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τί ποιῶν καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσοιτο, ἔφη· εἰ τὰ κακὰ ἃ ἔχεις ὅτι φευκτά ἐστι μάθοις παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων. Ibid. 7: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιότατον, 5 Here it may suffice to call to mind what has been said p. 292, 1, and what Diogenes in Diog. 70 says: διττὴν δ ̓ ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ἄσκησιν, τὴν μὲν ψυχικὴν, τὴν δὲ σωματικήν· ταύτην (the text here appears faulty) καθ' ἣν ἐν γυμνασίᾳ συνεχεῖς [συνεχεῖ]? γινόμεναι [αἱ] φαντασίαι εὐλυσίαν πρὸς τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα παρέχονται· εἶναι δ' ἀτελῆ τὴν ἑτέραν χωρὶς τῆς ἑτέρας ... παρετίθετο δὲ τεκμήρια τοῦ ῥᾳδίως ἀπὸ τῆς γυμνασίας ἐν τῇ ἀρετῇ καταγίνεσθαι (to be at home in); for in every art practice makes perfect ; 71: οὐδέν γε μὴν ἔλεγε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ 1 Everyone else is XIII. (2) Wis dom and Folly. and in answer to Meno's question, whether virtue CHAP. was produced by exercise or instruction, they would have replied, that practice was the best instruction. He who has attained to virtue by the help of the Cynic teaching, is a wise man. lacking in wisdom. To tell the advantages of the one, and the misery of the other, no words are too strong for the Cynics. The wise man never suffers want, for all things are his. He is at home everywhere, and can accommodate himself to any circumstances. Faultless and love-inspiring, fortune cannot touch him.2 An image of the divinity, he lives with the Gods. His whole life is a festival, and the Gods, whose friend he is, bestow on him everything.3 The reverse is the case with the great bulk of mankind. Most of them are mentally crippled, slaves of fancy, severed only by a finger's breadth from madness. To find a real man, you must look for him with a lantern in broad daylight. Misery and stupidity are χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι. Plato, Meno, init. 2 Diog. 11: αὐτάρκη τ ̓ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. Ibid. 12 (according to Diocles): τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ ̓ ἄπορον. ἀξιέραστος ὁ ἀγαθός. Ibid. 105 : ἀξιέραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τύχη τε μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. See p. 303, 2. The passage in Arist. Eth. N. vii. 14, 1053, b, 19, probably also refers to the Cynics : οἱ δὲ τὸν τρολιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλοις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθὸς, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν • Diogenes, in Diog. 51 : τοὺς ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν. Diog. in Plut. Tran. An. 20: ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς οὐ πᾶσαν ἡμερὰν ἑορτὴν ἡγεῖται; Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 76: 'Αντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος τί διδάξει τὸν υἱὸν, εἶπεν· εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μάλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα. СНАР. D. The their teaching. the universal fate of mortals. Accordingly all mankind are divided into two classes. Innumerable fools stand opposite to a small number of wise men. Only a very few are happy through prudence and virtue. All the rest live in misfortune and folly, only the fewest of all being aware of their deplorable state. Following out these principles, the Cynics conpractical ceived it to be their special mission to set an example effects of themselves of strict morality, of abstemiousness, of the independence of the wise man, and also to exercise a beneficial and strengthening influence on others. To this mission they devoted themselves with extra 4-ordinary self-denial, not, however, without falling into such extravagances and absurdities, such offensive coarseness, utter shamelessness, overbearing self-conceit, and empty boasting, that it is hard to say whether their strength of mind rather calls for admiration, or their eccentricities for ridicule; and 1 Diog. 33: avaπýpous ěλeye στους ἔλεγε παρὰ δάκτυλον μαίνε- had found nowhere, but boys. |