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quence of action and of satisfying essential wants, it XIII.

is a thing to be avoided.

From these considerations followed the conclusion, that everything else excepting virtue and vice is indifferent for us, and that we in turn ought to be indifferent thereto. Only those who soar above poverty and wealth, shame and honour, ease and fatigue, life and death, and who are prepared to submit to any work and state in life, who fear no one, troubling themselves about nothing-only such as these offer no exposed places to fortune, and can

therefore be free and happy." (1) Virtue.

As yet, here are only the negative conditions of happiness. What is the positive side corresponding thereto ? Virtue alone bringing happiness, and thegoods of the soul being alone worth possessing, in what does virtue consist ? Virtue, replies Antisthenes, herein following Socrates and Euclid, consists in wisdom or prudence; 2 and Reason is the only

Diog. in Stob. Floril. 86, sophy was θέρμων τε χοίνιξ και 19 (89, 4), says the noblest το μηδενός μέλειν. Antis. in men are οι καταφρονούντες πλού- Stob. Floril. 8, 14: όστις δε του δόξης ηδονής ζωής, των δε ετέρους δέδοικε δούλος ών λέληθεν εναντίων υπεράνω όντες, πενίας εαυτόν. Diogenes in Diog. 75 : άδοξίας πόνου θανάτου. Diog. δούλου το φοβείσθαι. 29 says of the same: επήνει 302, 2; 303, 2 and 3; 305, 4. τους μέλλοντας γαμείν και μη 2 This follows from Diog.. γαμείν, και τους μέλλοντας κατα- 13: τείχος ασφαλέστατον φρόπλείν και μη καταπλεϊν, και τους νησιν. τείχη κατασκευαστέον μέλλοντας πολιτεύεσθαι και μη εν τοις αυτών αναλώτοις λογιπολιτεύεσθαι, και τους παιδοτρο- σμούς, if we connect with it his φείν και μη παιδοτροφεϊν, και τους maxims about the oneness and παρασκευαζομένους συμβιούν τους the teachableness of virtue, δυνάσταις και μη προσιόντας. and his doctrine of the wise Crates, Ibid. 86, says that what he had gained by philo

See pp



thing which gives a value to life. Hence, as his teacher had done before him, he concludes that virtue is one and indivisible, that the same moral problem is presented to every class of men, and that virtue is the result of teaching. He further maintains that virtue is an inalienable possession; for what is once known can never be forgotten. He thus bridges over a gulf in the teaching of Socrates by a system in which Sophistical views' contributed no less than practical interests to make virtue in itself independent of everything external.8 Wherein, however,


Compare the saying attri- καθ' απάντων έστιν άλλοι δε buted to Antisthenes in Ρlut. περί τας έριδας διατρίβουσι κ.τ.λ. Sto. Rep. 14, 7, p. 1040, and to The expression of uèv, . . οι Diogenes in Diog. 24 : eis tov dè does not prove that the first βίον παρεσκευάζεσθαι δεϊν λόγον ή of these statements belongs to βρόχον. Also Diog. 3.

a different school from that 2 Schol. Lips. on Π. Ο. 123 to which the second belongs. (Winckelmann, p. 28) : 'Αντι. 5 Diog. 12 : αναφαίρετον όπλων σθένης φησίν, ώς εί τι πράττει και η αρετή. Χen. Mem. i. 2, 19: σοφος κατά πάσαν αρετήν ενεργεί. ίσως ούν είπoιεν αν πολλοί των

3 Dag. 12 according to Dio- φασκόντων φιλοσοφείν, ότι ουκ cles: ανδρός και γυναικός ή αυτή αν ποτε και δίκαιος άδικος γένοιτο, αρετή.

ουδέ ο σώφρων υβριστής, ουδέ άλλο 4 Diog. 10: διδακτήν απεδείκνυε ουδέν, ών μάθησίς έστιν, ο μαθών ('Αντισθένης) την αρετήν. 105 : ανεπιστήμων άν ποτε γένοιτο. αρέσκει δ' αυτούς και την αρετήν 6 The maxim that prudence διδακτών είναι, καθά φησίν 'Αντι- is insuperable. See p. 142, 3. σθένης εν τω Ηρακλεί, και ανα- 7 The maxim that you cannot πόβλητον υπάρχειν. Without forget what you know is only doubt the reference in Isocr. the converse of the Sophistic Hel. i. 1 is also to Antisthenes. maxim that you cannot learn Isocrates quotes the passages what you do not know. just given, with the sentence 8 It is only independent of of Antisthenes which was dis- external circumstances, when cussed p. 300, 2, added: κατα- it cannot be lost: for since the γεγηράκασιν οι μεν ου φάσκοντες wise and virtuous man will οϊόν τ' είναι ψευδή λέγειν ουδ' never, as long as he continues αντιλέγειν. . οι δε διεξιόντες wise and virtuous, forego his ως ανδρία και σοφία και δικαιοσύνη wisdom and virtue, and since, ταυτόν εστι και φύσει μεν ουδέν according to the teaching of αυτών έχομεν, μία δ' επιστήμη Socrates, no one intentionally


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true prudence consisted the Cynics could not say more precisely. If it were described as knowledge concerning the good, this, as Plato justly observed, was simply a tautology. If, on the contrary, it were said to consist in unlearning what is bad, neither does this negative expression lead a single step further. So much only is clear, that the prudence of Antisthenes and his School invariably coincides with a right state of will, of firmness, of self-control and of uprightness, thus bringing us back to the Socratic doctrine of the oneness of virtue and knowledge. Hence by learning virtue, they understood

x moral exercise rather than intellectual research. They would not have recognised the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between a conventional and a philosophical, an ethical and an intellectual virtue; does wrong, it follows that έφη, το κακά απομαθείν. The knowledge can only be taken same is found in Exc. e Floril. away by a cause foreign to the Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 34 (Stob. will of the individual.

Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193). 1 Plato, Rep. vi. 505, Β.: 4 Compare pp. 292, 1; 303, 2 αλλά μην τόδε γε οίσθα, ότι τους and 3. μεν πολλοίς ηδονή δοκεί είναι το 5 Here it may suffice to call αγαθόν, τοις δε κομψοτέροις φρόνη. to mind what has been said p.

και ότι γε, ώ φίλε, οι 292, 1, and what Diogenes in τούτο ηγούμενοι ουκ έχουσι δείξαι Diog. 70 says: διττήν δ' έλεγες ήτις φρόνησις, αλλ' αναγκάζονται είναι την άσκησιν, την μεν ψυχιτελευτωντες την του αγαθού κήν, την δε σωματικήν ταύτην φάναι. If the Cynics are not

(the text here appears here exclusively meant, the faulty) καθ' ήν εν γυμνασία συνεpassage at any rate refers to χείς [συνεχεί] ? γινόμεναι [αι] them.

φαντασίαι ευλυσίαν προς τα της

αρετής έργα παρέχονται είναι δ' 3 Diog. 8, according to Pha- ατελή την ετέραν χωρίς της ετέρας nias : ('Αντισθένης) ερωτηθείς υπό παρετίθετο δε τεκμήρια του του ... τί ποιών καλός κάγαθος ραδίως από της γυμνασίας εν τη έσοιτο, έφη: εί τα κακά & έχεις αρετή καταγίνεσθαι (to be at ότι φευκτά έστι μάθοις παρά των home in); for in every art pracειδότων. Ιbid. 7: ερωτηθείς τί tice makes perfect ; 71: ουδέν γε των μαθημάτων αναγκαιότατον, μήν έλεγε το παράπαν εν τω βίω

σις. • • •

2 1. C.

and in answer to Meno's 1 question, whether virtue CHAP.

XIII. was produced by exercise or instruction, they would have replied, that practice was the best instruction. He who has attained to virtue by the help of the (2) Wis

dom and Cynic teaching, is a wise man. Everyone else is

Folly. lacking in wisdom. To tell the advantages of the one, and the misery of the other, no words are too strong for the Cynics. The wise man never suffers want, for all things are his. He is at home everywhere, and can accommodate himself to any circumstances. Faultless and love-inspiring, fortune cannot touch him. An image of the divinity, he lives with the Gods. His whole life is a festival, and the Gods, whose friend he is, bestow on him everything.3 The reverse is the case with the great bulk of mankind. Most of them are mentally crippled, slaves of fancy, severed only by a finger's breadth from madness. To find a real man, you must look for him with a lantern in broad daylight. Misery and stupidity are χωρίς ασκήσεως κατορθούσθαι, δυ- αγαθός, ή εκόντες ή άκοντες ουδέν νατήν δε ταύτην παν εκνικήσαι. λέγουσιν. Yet Diogenes (in Plato, Meno, init.

Diog. 89) allows that no one is 2 Diog. 11: αυτάρκη τείναι perfectly free from faults. τον σοφόν πάντα γάρ αυτού 3 Diogenes, in Diog. 51: τους είναι τα των άλλων. Ιbid. 12 αγαθούς άνδρας θεών εικόνας είναι. (according to Diocles): τω Ιbid. 37, 72 : των θεών έστι σοφώ ξένον ουδέν ουδ' άπορον. πάντα· φίλοι δε οι σοφοί τοίς αξιέραστος και αγαθός. Ιbid. 105: θεοίς· κοινά δε τα των φίλων. αξιέραστόν τε τον σοφών και ανα- πάντ' άρα εστι των σοφών. μάρτητος και φίλον το ομοίω, τύχη Diog. in Ρlut. Tran. Αn. 20: τε μηδεν επιτρέπειν. See p. 303, ανήρ αγαθώς πάσαν ημερών

The passage in Arist. Eth. εορτήν ηγείται ; Exc. e Floril. Ν. vii. 14, 1053, b, 19, probably Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 76: 'Αντιalso refers to the Cynics : οι δε σθένης ερωτηθείς υπό τινος τι διτον τρολιζόμενον και τον δυστυ- δάξει τον υιόν, είπεν· ει μεν θεοίς χίαις μεγάλους περιπίπτοντα ευ- μάλλει συμβιούν, φιλόσοφον, ει δε δαίμονα φάσκοντες είναι, εάν η ανθρώποις, ρήτορα.

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CHAP the universal fate of mortals. Accordingly all manXIIL

kind are divided into two classes. Innumerable fools stand opposite to a small number of wise men. Only a very few are happy through prudence and virtue. All the rest live in misfortune and folly, only the fewest of all being aware of their deplorable

state. D. The Following out these principles, the Cynics conpractical ceived it to be their special mission to set an example effects of their themselves of strict morality, of abstemiousness, of teaching.

the independence of the wise man, and also to exercise a beneficial and strengthening influence on others. To this mission they devoted themselves with extra

4 ordinary self-denial

, not, however, without falling

into such extravagances and absurdities, such offensive coarseness, utter shamelessness, overbearing self-conceit, and empty boasting, that it is hard to say whether their strength of mind rather calls for admiration, or their eccentricities for ridicule; and

1 Diog. 33: åvatýpous reye had found nowhere, but boys, (Διογένης) ου τους κωφούς και he had found in Lacedaemon. τυφλούς, αλλά τους μη έχοντας Ιbid. 41 ; the story of Diogenes πήραν. . Ibid. 35: Toùs atein with his lantern. Ibid. 86; στους έλεγε παρά δάκτυλον μαίνε- verses of Crates on the stupiolal. Compare what has been dity of mankind. Compare said of Socrates p. 121, 2, Ibid. also Stob. Floril. 4, 52. Dio47: Toùs phropas kai távtas tous genes in Exc. e Floril. Joan. êvdugonogoûvtas Tploavpárous à Damasc. ii. 13, 75, says that πεκάλει αντί του τρισαθλίους. the vilest thing upon earth is a Ibid. 71: Instead of becoming man without culture. Either happy by practice of virtue, Diogenes or Philiscus asserts in men napà tùy ăvolav kakodaljo- Stob. Flor. 22, 41 (Conf. Diog. νούσι. Ibid. 33: προς τον vi. 80): ο τυφος ώσπερ ποιμήν ου ειπόντα Πύθια νικώ άνδρας, εγώ θέλει [τους πολλούς] άγει. Comμεν ούν, είπεν, άνδρας, συ δ' άν- pare p. 292, 2. δράποδα. . Ibid. 27: men he

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