takes up the practical side of the philosophy of Socrates. Of Aristippus too, and his pupils, it was τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδοναῖς κεῖσθαι. ael γὰρ λόγους περὶ ἡδονῆς ποιουμέ. νους εἰς ὑποψίαν ἥγε τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ λέγειν τέλος είναι Tò ndéws Sv: and of the younger one, ds kal σaps ploaтo Téλos εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ζῇν, ἡδονὴν ἐντάττων τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν. This testimony appears to be further corroborated by the fact that Aristotle, in refuting the doctrine of pleasure, Eth. x. 2, does not mention Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as its representative. To this must be added what Sosicrates and others, according to Diog. 84, maintained, that Aristippus left no writings; which would at least point to a lower development of his teaching. Diog. ii. 64 does not quite prove so much: πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικών διαλόγων παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, ̓Αντισθένους, Αἰσχίνου: for, according to 84 in our text, Panatius is quoted as an authority for a number of dialogues of Aristippus. It may therefore be asked with Brandis, ii. a, 92, whether in 64, Aristippus' name has not been omitted by some oversight; on the other hand, Διατριβαὶ were hardly dialogues: cf. Susemihl, Rhein. Mus. N. F. xxvi. 338. For these reasons Ritter, ii. 93, supposes that the views of Aristippus were not reduced to a connected form till a later time. The assertion of Sosicrates however appears to be without foundation; for Dio genes gives two lists of the works of Aristippus, which agree in the main, and one of which was acknowledged by Sotion and Panætius. Theopompus knew of writings of his, for according to Athen. xi. 508, c, he accused Plato of plagiarism from the diatribes of Aristippus. Allowing then that subsequent additions were made to the writings of Aristippus, it cannot be supposed that the whole collection is spurious. Perhaps in ancient times, and in Greece proper, these writings were less diffused than those of the other followers of Socrates. This fact may easily be explained, supposing the greater part of them not to have been written till Aristippus had returned to his native country. It may also be the reason why Aristotle never mentions Aristippus; perhaps he omitted him because he included him among the Sophists, Metaph. iii. 2, 996, a, 32. The remarks of Eusebius can only be true in one sense, viz., that the elder Aristippus does not make use of the expression Téλos, and does not put his sentences in the form which subsequently prevailed in the Schools. That he recommended pleasure, that he declared it to be a good in the most decided manner, that thus the leading features of the Cyrenaic teaching are due to him, cannot be doubted, taking into account the numerous witnesses which affirm it, nor would the unity CHAP. XIV. CHAP. (1) Their general position. asserted, as well as of the Cynics, that they neglected questions touching nature and logic, giving to the study of ethics 1 exclusive value. Nor is this assertion disproved by the fact that they were themselves unable to keep clear of theory, the sole object of their teaching being to establish ethics, and indeed their own exclusive pursuit of ethics.2 The end to be secured by philosophy is the happiness of mankind. On this point Aristippus and Antisthenes agree. Antisthenes, 1 Diog. ii. 92 : ἀφίσταντο δὲ καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐμφαινομένην ἀκαταληψίαν, τῶν δὲ λογικῶν διὰ τὴν εὐχρηστίαν ἥπτοντο. Μελέαγρος δὲ καὶ Κλειτόμαχος φασὶν αὐτοὺς ἄχρηστα ἡγεῖσθαι τό τε φυσικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ διαλεκτικόν. δύνασθαι γὰρ εὖ λέγειν καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκτὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν περὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐκφεύγειν τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον ἐκμεμαθηκότα. Sext. Math. vii. 11: δοκοῦσι δὲ κατά τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ασπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9 : Αρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος τέλος ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἡδονήν, κακῶν δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην φυσιολογίαν περιγράφει, μόνον ὠφέλιμον εἶναι λέγων τὸ ζητεῖν· Οττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται, which is also told of Socrates and Diogenes. Arist. Met. ii. 2, 996, a, 32: ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινες οἷον Αρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς [τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας] ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσ θαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same in Alex. on the passage Schol. in Arist. 609, b, 1; Ps. Alex. on Met. xiii. 3; 1078, 2, 33; Ibid. 817, a, 11; Syrian in Metaph. Arist. Τ. V. 844, b, 6; 889, b, 19. Compare the language of Aristippus in Diog. ii. 71, 79; Plut. Ed. Pr. 10, 7. 2 According to the sense in which it is understood, it is equally true to say that they set logic aside and that they made use of it. See p. 347, 2. Of what was afterwards called logic, they appropriated just as much as was necessary for their theory of knowledge, but they assigned no independent value to it, nor did they extend their study of it beyond what was wanted for their purposes. Conf. Sen. Ep. 89, 12: Cyrenaici naturalia cum rationalibus sustulerunt et contenti fuerunt moralibus, sed hi quoque, quae removent, aliter inducunt. however, knows of no happiness which does not immediately coincide with virtue, and thus makes virtue the only object in life. Aristippus, on the other hand, considers only enjoyment an end in itself, and only pleasure an unconditional good,' regarding everything else as good and desirable only in as far as it is a means to enjoyment.2 Both Schools therefore at the very commencement diverge in opposite directions, their divergence, however, not preventing their subsequent approach to a greater extent than might seem at first sight to be possible. CHAP. XIV. The ground thus occupied was worked out by (2) FeelAristippus and his pupils as follows.3 Perceptions, only object 'Aristippus in Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9 : ἐμαυτὸν τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένος ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 131: alii voluptatem summum bonum esse voluerunt : quorum princeps Aristippus. Ibid. Fin. ii. 6, 18; 13, 39; Diog. 87: dovnv ὴν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, 88 : ἡ ἡδονὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἱρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν. Athen. xii. 544, a: ['АрíστITπos] àπode§άμevos τὴν ἠδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν BEBAĥobal. Euseb. 1. c. p. 296, 1. The same view is mentioned and attacked by Plato, Gorg. 491, E.; Rep. vi. 505, B. (See above p. 312, 1), and Philebus, 11, B., where it is thus described : Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα, Ibid. 66, D.: Tȧyaldν étífero ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παν· τελῆ. That Plato had Aristip pus in mind will be presently 2 Diog. ii. 91: Thy opóνnow 3 The Cyrenaics divided their ethics into five parts. Sext. Math. vii. 11: καίτοι περιτρέ πεσθαι τούτους ἔνιοι νενομίκασιν ings the of knowledge. СНАР. being feelings of a change within ourselves, do not supply us with the least information as to things in themselves. We may be indeed conscious of having a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth; but whether the object which causes the sensation is sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same thing often produces an entirely different effect upon different persons. How then can we be sure, that in any given case, whether owing to the nature of our organism or to the circumstances under which we receive the impression, things do not appear to us entirely different from what they are in themselves? Knowledge, therefore, is limited to our own feelings; as to these we are never mistaken; but of things in themselves we know absolutely nothing.' Just as ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε and universal the division is. That it was not made by Aristippus may be gathered from the statements as to his writings. In the division περὶ πίστ TEWV probably the theory of knowledge was treated, and in the preceding one the theory of motion. 1 Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 143: aliud judicium Protagora est, qui putet id cuique rerum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui præter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse judicii. Ibid. 7, 20: de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis, in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse judicium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2, p. 1120: [oi Kvpnvaïkol] тà đáon καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τιθέν τες οὐκ ᾤοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων little do we know of the feelings of other people. There may be common names, but there are no com πίστιν εἶναι διαρκὴ πρὸς τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποστάντες εἰς τὰ πάθη κατέκλεισαν αὑτοὺς. τὸ φαίνεται τιθέμενοι, τὸ δ' ἐστὶ μὴ προσαποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς γλυκαίνεσθαι γὰρ λέγουσι καὶ πικραίνεσθαι καὶ φωτίζεσθαι καὶ σκοτοῦσθαι τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἑκάστον τὴν ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον ἔχοντος· εἰ δὲ γλυκὺ τὸ μέλι καὶ πικρὸς ὁ θαλλὺς κ.τ.λ. ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ θηρίων καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν μὲν δυσχεραινόντων [add τὸ μὲν] τῶν δὲ προσιεμένων τὴν θαλλίαν, καὶ ἀποκαομένων ὑπὸ τῆς χαλάζης, καὶ καταψυχομένων ὑπὸ οἴνου, καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον ἀμβλυωττόντων καὶ νύκτωρ βλεπόντων. ὅθεν ἐμμένουσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ δόξα διατηρεῖ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον· ἐκβαίνουσα δὲ καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα τῷ κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, αὐτήν τε πολλάκις ταράσσει καὶ μάχεται πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντία πάθη καὶ διαφόρους φαντασίας λαμβάνοντας. Sext. Math. vii. 191, who gives the most detailed account, but probably to a great extent in his own language: φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἄψευστα τύγχανειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπιὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευ στον ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασὶ, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως . . ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστι ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι. just as a diseased eye or a mad brain always sees things different from what they are. οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. If, therefore, we understand by φαινόμενα individual impressions (πάθη), it must be said πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ καὶ κατα ληπτά. If, on the contrary, every name means the thing by which the impression is produced, all φαινόμενα are false and cannot be known. Strictly speaking, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικὸν τάχα μέν ἐστιν ὃν οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν. καὶ ταύτῃ περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τά γε οἰκεῖα πάντες ἐσμὲν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πάντες πλανώμεθα· κἀκεῖνα μέν ἐστι καταληπτὰ, τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς καθεστώσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις, παρὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς αἰτίας. See Pyrrh. i. 215; Diog. ii. 92 : τά τε πάθη καταληπτὰ, ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτὰ, οὐκ ἀφ ̓ ὧν γίνεται. Ibid. 93: τὰς αἰσθήσεις μὴ πάντοτε αληθεύειν. Ibid. 95 of the School of Hegesias, which does not in this respect differ from others: ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀκριβούσας τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν. Aristotle in Eus. Præp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1: ἑξῆς δ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ λέγοντες μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. τοῦτο δ' εἶπον ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Κυρήνης (which in the face of the definite statements of Cicero, Plutarch and Sextus, does not prove CHAP. XIV. |