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takes up the practical side of the philosophy of Socrates. Of Aristippus too, and his pupils, it was


της ευδαιμονίας την υπόστασιν genes gives two lists of the έλεγεν εν ηδοναίς κείσθαι. . åel works of Aristippus, which γαρ λόγους περί ηδονής ποιουμέ- agree in the main, and one of νους εις υποψίαν ήγε τους προσιόν- which was acknowledged by τας αυτή του λέγειν τέλος είναι Sotion and Panetius. . TheoTo ndéws Sîv: and of the younger pompus knew of writings of one, δς και σαφώς ορίσατο τέλος his, for according to Athen. xi. είναι το ηδέως ζην, ηδονήν έντάτ. 508, C, he accused Plato of των την κατά κίνησιν. . This plagiarism from the diatribes testimony appears to be further of Aristippus. Allowing then corroborated by the fact that that subsequent additions were Aristotle, in retuting the doc- made to the writings of Aristrine of pleasure, Eth. x. 2, tippus, it cannot be supposed does not mention Aristippus, that the whole collection is but Eudoxus, as its representa- spurious. Perhaps in ancient tive. To this must be added times, and in Greece proper, what Sosicrates and others, these writings were less diffused according to Diog. 84, main- than those of the other fol. tained, that Aristippus left no lowers of Socrates. This fact writings; which would at least may easily be explained, suppoint to a lower development posing the greater part of them of his teaching. Diog. ii. 64 not to have been written till does not quite prove so much : Aristippus had returned to his πάντων μέντοι των Σωκρατικών native country. It may also be διαλόγων παναίτιος αληθείς είναι the reason why Aristotle never δοκεί τους Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφώντος, mentions Aristippus ; perhaps 'Αντισθένους, Αισχίνου: for, ac- he omitted him because he in. cording to 84 in our text, cluded him among the Sophists, Panætius is quoted as an au- Metaph. iii. 2, 996, a, 32. The thority for a number of dia- remarks of Eusebius can only logues of Aristippus. It may be true in one sense, viz., that therefore be asked with Bran- the elder Aristippus does not dis, ii. a, 92, whether in 64, make use of the expression Aristippus' name has not been téaos, and does not put his senomitted by some oversight; on tences in the form which subthe other hand, Διατριβαι were sequently prevailed in the hardly dialogues : cf. Susemihl, Schools. That he recommended Rhein. Mus. N. F. xxvi. 338. pleasure, that he declared it to For these reasons Ritter, ii. 93, be a good in the most decided supposes that the views of manner, that thus the leading Aristippus were not reduced to features of the Cyrenaic teacha connected form till a later ing are due to him, cannot be time. The assertion of Sosi- doubted, taking into account crates however appears to be the numerous witnesses which without foundation ; for Dio- affirm it, nor would the unity


CHAP. asserted, as well as of the Cynics, that they neglected XIV.

questions touching nature and logic, giving to the (1) Their study of ethics' exclusive value. Nor is this assertion general position. disproved by the fact that they were themselves un

able to keep clear of theory, the sole object of their teaching being to establish ethics, and indeed their own exclusive pursuit of ethics. The end to be secured by philosophy is the happiness of mankind. On this point Aristippus and Antisthenes agree. Antisthenes, of his School be otherwise τινες οδον 'Αρίστιππος προεπηλάcomprehensible. Doubtless κιζον αυτάς [τας μαθηματικάς Plato wrote the Philebus with επιστήμας] εν μέν γάρ ταϊς άλλαις an eye to this philosopher, and τέχναις, και ταϊς βαναυσοις, οίον Speusippus had written

τεκτονική και σκυτική, διότι Aristippus, Diog. iv. 5.

βέλτιον ή χείρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, 1 Diog. ii. 92 : αφίσταντο δε τάς δε μαθηματικάς ουθένα ποιείσκαι των φυσικών δια την εμφαινο- θαι λόγον περί αγαθών και κακών. μένην ακαταληψίαν, των δε λογικών The same in Αlex. on the pasδια την ευχρηστίαν ήπτοντο. Με- sage Schol. in Arist. 609, b, 1; λέαγρος δε. και Κλειτόμαχος Ps. Αlex. on Met. xiii. 3; 1078,

φασιν αυτούς άχρηστα ηγεί- 8, 33 ; Ιbid. 817, 8, 11; Syrian σθαι τό τε φυσικόν μέρος και το in Μetaph. Arist. T. V. 844, b, διαλεκτικόν, δύνασθαι γάρει λέγειν 6; 889, b, 19. Compare the και δεισιδαιμονίας εκτός είναι και language of Aristippus in Diog. τον περί θανάτου φόβον εκφεύγειν ii. 71, 79; Ρlut. Ed. Ρr. 10, 7. τον περί αγαθών και κακών λόγον 2 According to the sense in εκμεμαθηκότα. Sext. Math. vii. which it is understood, it is 11: δοκούσι δε κατά τινας και οι equally true to say that they από της Κυρήνης μόνον ασπάζεσθαι set logic aside and that they το ηθικόν μέρος παραπέμπειν δε το made use of it. See p. 347, 2. φυσικών και το λογικόν ως μηδέν Of what was afterwards called προς το ευδαιμόνως βιούν συνερ- Iogic, they appropriated just as yoûvta. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. much as was necessary for their 8, 9: 'Αρίστιππος ο Κυρηναίος theory of knowledge, but they τέλος αγαθών την ηδονήν, κακών assigned no independent value δε την άλγηδόνα, την δε άλλην to it, nor did they extend their φυσιολογίαν περιγράφει, μόνον study of it beyond what was ωφέλιμον είναι λέγων το ζητείν • wanted for their purposes. “Οττι τοι εν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' Conf. Sen. Ep. 89, 12: Cyrenαγαθόν τε τέτυκται, which is also aici naturalia cum rationalibus told of Socrates and Diogenes. sustulerunt et contenti fuerunt Arist. Met. ii. 2, 996, a, 32: moralibus, sed hi quoque, quae ώστε δια ταύτα των σοφιστών removent, aliter inducunt.

however, knows of no happiness which does not im- CHAP.

XIV. mediately coincide with virtue, and thus makes virtue the only object in life. Aristippus, on the other hand, considers only enjoyment an end in itself, and only pleasure an unconditional good,' regarding everything else as good and desirable only in as far as it is a means to enjoyment. Both Schools therefore at the very commencement diverge in opposite directions, their divergence, however, not preventing their subsequent approach to a greater extent than might seem at first sight to be possible.

The ground thus occupied was worked out by (2) FeelAristippus and his pupils as follows. Perceptions, only object

of knoni Aristippus in Xen. Mem. ii. pus in mind will be presently

ledge. 1, 9 : euautdy Tolvuv Táttw eis shown in respect of the Phileτους βουλομένος ή δαστά τε και bus, and it is therewith proved ήδιστα βιοτεύειν. . Cio. Acad. iv. for the Republic, which refers 42, 131 : alii voluptatem sum- to the Philebus. mum bonum esse voluerunt: ? Diog. ii. 91: Thy opórnowy quorum princeps Aristippus. αγαθόν μέν είναι λέγουσιν, ου δι' Ibid. Fin. ii. 6, 18; 13, 39 ; εαυτήν δε αιρετήν, αλλά διά το εξ Diog. 87: ģdovny ήν και αυτής περιγινόμενα. 92 : και τον τέλος είναι, 88 : η ηδονή δι' αυτήν πλούτον δε ποιητικόν ηδονής είναι, αιρετή και αγαθόν. Αthen. xii. ου δι' αυτόν αιρετών όντα. Cic. 544, a:['AplotitTOS] årrodešćuevos Off. iii. 33, 116 : Cyrenaici atτην ηδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος είναι que Annicerei philosophi nomέφη και εν αυτή την ευδαιμονίαν inati omne bonum in voluptate Bebañolai. Euseb. 1. c. p. 296, posuerunt; virtutemque censu1. The same view is mentioned erunt ob eam rem esse laudanand attacked by Plato, Gorg. dam, quod efficiens esset vol. 491, E.; Rep. vi. 505, B. (See uptatis. To this sentence of above p. 312, 1), and Philebus, Aristippus, Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 11, B., where it is thus des- 28, and Ast refer the passage of cribed : pianbos uèi toivuv ayaddy the Phædo, 68, E., but without είναι φησι το χαίρειν πάσι ζώοις reason. . It refers to common και την ηδονήν και τέρψιν και όσα unphilosophical virtue. του γένους εστί τούτου σύμφωνα, , 3 The Cyrenaics divided their I bid. 66, D. : tåyaddy éríbeto ethics into five parts. Sext. ημίν ηδονήν είναι πάσαν και παν- . Math. vii. 11: καίτοι περιτρέτελή. That Plato had Αristip- πεσθαι τούτους ένιοι νενομίκασιν


being feelings of a change within ourselves, do not supply us with the least information as to things in themselves. We may be indeed conscious of having a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth ; but whether the object which causes the sensation is sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same thing often produces an entirely different effect upon different persons. How then can we be sure, that in any given case, whether owing to the nature of our organism or to the circumstances under which we receive the impression, things do not appear to us entirely different from what they are in themselves? Knowledge, therefore, is limited to our own feelings ; as to these we are never mistaken ; but of things in themselves we know absolutely nothing.'

Just as

εξ ών το ηθικόν διαιρούσιν είς τε and universal the division is.
τον περί των αιρετών και φευκτών That it was not made by Aris-
τόπον και εις τον περί των παθών tippus may be gathered from
και έτι εις τον περί των πράξεων the statements as to his wri- .
και ήδη τον περί των αιτίων, και tings. In the division περί πίσ.
τελευταίον εις τον περί των πίσ- . TEWV probably the theory of
τεων: εν τούτοις γαρ και περί αιτίων knowledge was treated, and in
τόπος, φασίν, εκ του φυσικού μέρους the preceding one the theory of
ετύγχανεν, ο δε περί πίστεων εκ motion.
του λογικού. . Sen. Ep. 89, 12 i Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 143 : aliud
(according to what has been judicium Protagoræ est, qui
said, p. 346, 2): in quinque enim putet id cuique rerum esse, quod
partes moralia dividunt, ut una cuique videatur: aliud Cyren-
sit de fugiendis et expetendis, aicorum, qui præter permo-
altera de adfectibus, tertia de tiones intimas nihil putant esse
actionibus, quarta de causis, judicii. Ibid. 7, 20: de tactu,
quinta de argumentis: causæ et eo quidem, quem philosophi
rerum ex naturali parte sunt, interiorem vocant, aut doloris
argumenta ex rationali, acti. aut voluptatis, in quo Cyren.
ones ex morali. We cannot, aici solo putant veri esse judi.
however, tie our faith to this cium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2, p.
account, not knowing how the 1120: [oi Kupnvaïkol] Tà rán
subject was divided among και τας φαντασίας εν αυτοίς τιθέν-
these several parts, nor how old τες ουκ ώοντο την άπό τούτων

little do we know of the feelings of other people. There

may be common names, but there are no com



πίστιν είναι διαρκή προς τας υπέρ γλυκανθήναι. just as a diseased
των πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις, eye or a mad brain always sees
αλλ' ώσπερ εν πολιορκία των εκτός things different from what they
αποστάντες εις τα πάθη κατέκλεισαν are. ούτω και ημάς ευλογώτατόν
αυτούς. το φαίνεται τιθέμενοι, έστι πλέον των οικείων παθών
το δ' έστι μή προσαποφαινόμενοι μηδέν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. If,
περί των εκτός ... γλυκαίνεσθαι therefore, we understand by
γάρ λέγουσι και πικραίνεσθαι και φαινόμενα individual impressions
φωτίζεσθαι και σκοτούσθαι των (πάθη), it must be said πάντα
παθών τούτων εκάστον την ενέργειαν τα φαινόμενα αληθή και
οικείαν εν αυτώ και απερίσπαστον ληπτά. If, on the contrary, every
έχοντος ει δέ γλυκύ το μέλι και name means the thing by which
πικρός και θαλλός κ.τ.λ. υπό πολλών the impression is produced, all
αντιμαρτυρείσθαι και θηρίων και φαινόμενα are false and cannot
πραγμάτων και ανθρώπων, των μεν be known. Strictly speaking,
δυσχεραινόντων [add το μεν] των μόνον το πάθος ημίν εστι φαινό-
δε προσιεμένων την θαλλίαν, και μενον· το δ' εκτός και του πάθους
αποκαομένων υπό της χαλάζης, και ποιητικών τάχα μέν έστιν ον ου
καταψυχομένων υπό οίνου, και προς φαινόμενον δε ημίν. και ταύτη
ήλιον άμβλυωττόντων και νύκτωρ περί μεν τα πάθη τα γε οικεία
βλεπόντων. όθεν εμμένουσα τους πάντες εσμέν απλανείς, περί δε το
πάθεσιν ή δόξα διατηρεί το άνα- εκτός υποκείμενον πάντες πλανώ-
μάρτητον· έκβαίνουσα δε και μεθα κάκείνα μέν έστι καταληπτά,
πολυπραγμονούσα το κρίνειν και τούτο δε ακατάληπτων, της ψυχής
αποφαίνεσθαι περί των εκτός, αυτήν πάνυ ασθενούς καθεστώσης προς
τε πολλάκις ταράσσει και μάχεται διάγνωσιν αυτού παρά τους τόπους,
προς ετέρους από των αυτών εναν- παρά τα διαστήματα, παρά τας
τία πάθη και διαφόρους φαντασίας κινήσεις, παρά τις μεταβολάς, παρά
λαμβάνοντας. Seart. Math. vii. άλλας παμπληθείς αιτίας. See
191, who gives the most detailed Pyrrh. i. 215; Diog. ii. 92 : τα
account, but probably to a great τε πάθη καταληπτά, έλεγον ούν
extent in his own language: αυτά, ουκ αφ' ών γίνεται. Ιbid.
φασιν ουν οι Κυρηναϊκοί κριτήρια 93 : τας αισθήσεις μη πάντοτε
είναι τα πάθη και μόνα καταλαμ- αληθεύειν. Ιbid. 95 of the School
βάνεσθαι και άψευστα τύγχανειν, of Hegesias, which does not in
των δε πεποιηκότων τα πάθη μηδέν this respect differ from others :
είναι καταληπιόν μηδέ αδιάψευ- ανήρουν δε και τας αισιήσεις ουκ

ότι μέν γάρ λευκαινόμεθα, ακριβούσας την επίγνωσιν. Αrisφασι, και γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν totle in Eus. Prep. Εν. xiv. 19, λέγειν αδιαψεύστως . ότι δε 1: εξής δ' αν ελεν οι λέγοντες μόνα το εμποιητικών του πάθους λευκόν τα πάθη καταληπτά. τούτο δ' έστι ή γλυκύ έστιν, ουχ οιόν τ' είπον ένιοι των εκ της Κυρήνης αποφαίνεσθαι. εικός γάρ έστι και (which in the face of the defiυπό μη λευκού τινα λευκαντικώς nite statements of Cicero, Pluδιατεθήναι και υπό μη γλυκέoς tarch and Sextus, does not prove


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