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takes up the practical side of the philosophy of Socrates. Of Aristippus too, and his pupils, it was

τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδυναῖς κεῖσθαι. γὰρ λόγους περὶ ἡδονῆς ποιουμένους εἰς ὑποψίαν ἤγε τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ λέγειν τέλος εἶναι To ndéws Sv: and of the younger one, ὃς καὶ σαφῶς ὡρίσατο τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ζῇν, ἡδονὴν ἐντάττων τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν. This testimony appears to be further corroborated by the fact that Aristotle, in refuting the doctrine of pleasure, Eth. x. 2, does not mention Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as its representative. To this must be added what Sosicrates and others, according to Diog. 84, maintained, that Aristippus left no writings; which would at least point to a lower development of his teaching. Diog. ii. 64 does not quite prove so much: πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, ̓Αντισθένους, Αἰσχίνου: for, according to 84 in our text, Panatius is quoted as an authority for a number of dialogues of Aristippus. It may therefore be asked with Brandis, ii. a, 92, whether in 64, Aristippus' name has not been omitted by some oversight; on the other hand, Διατριβαὶ were hardly dialogues: cf. Susemihl, Rhein. Mus. N. F. xxvi. 338. For these reasons Ritter, ii. 93, supposes that the views of Aristippus were not reduced to a connected form till a later time. The assertion of Sosicrates however appears to be without foundation; for Dio

genes gives two lists of the
ael works of Aristippus, which
agree in the main, and one of
which was acknowledged by
Sotion and Panætius. Theo-
pompus knew of writings of
his, for according to Athen. xi.
508, c, he accused Plato of
plagiarism from the diatribes
of Aristippus. Allowing then
that subsequent additions were
made to the writings of Aris-
tippus, it cannot be supposed
that the whole collection is
spurious. Perhaps in ancient
times, and in Greece proper,
these writings were less diffused
than those of the other fol-
lowers of Socrates. This fact
may easily be explained, sup-
posing the greater part of them
not to have been written till
Aristippus had returned to his
native country. It may also be
the reason why Aristotle never
mentions Aristippus; perhaps

he omitted him because he in-
cluded him among the Sophists,
Metaph. iii. 2, 996, a, 32. The
remarks of Eusebius can only
be true in one sense, viz., that
the elder Aristippus does not
make use of the expression
Téλos, and does not put his sen-
tences in the form which sub-
sequently prevailed in the
Schools. That he recommended
pleasure, that he declared it to
be a good in the most decided
manner, that thus the leading
features of the Cyrenaic teach-
ing are due to him, cannot be
doubted, taking into account
the numerous witnesses which
affirm it, nor would the unity

CHAP.
XIV.

CHAP.
XIV.

(1) Their general position.

asserted, as well as of the Cynics, that they neglected questions touching nature and logic, giving to the study of ethics 1 exclusive value. Nor is this assertion disproved by the fact that they were themselves unable to keep clear of theory, the sole object of their teaching being to establish ethics, and indeed their own exclusive pursuit of ethics.2 The end to be secured by philosophy is the happiness of mankind. On this point Aristippus and Antisthenes agree. Antisthenes,

of his School be otherwise

comprehensible. Doubtless
Plato wrote the Philebus with
an eye to this philosopher, and
Speusippus had written
on
Aristippus, Diog. iv. 5.

1 Diog. ii. 92 : ἀφίσταντο δὲ
καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐμφαινο-
μένην ἀκαταληψίαν, τῶν δὲ λογικῶν
διὰ τὴν εὐχρηστίαν ἥπτοντο. Με-
λέαγρος δὲ καὶ Κλειτόμαχος

φασὶν αὐτοὺς ἄχρηστα ἡγεῖσθαι τό τε φυσικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ διαλεκτικόν. δύνασθαι γὰρ εὖ λέγειν καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκτὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν περὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐκφεύγειν τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον ἐκμεμαθηκότα. Sext. Math. vii. 11: δοκοῦσι δὲ κατά τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9 : ̓Αρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος τέλος ἀγαθὼν τὴν ἡδονήν, κακῶν δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην φυσιολογίαν περιγράφει, μόνον ὠφέλιμον εἶναι λέγων τὸ ζητεῖν' ̔́Οττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται, which is also told of Socrates and Diogenes. Arist. Met. ii. 2, 996, 2, 32: ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν

τινες οἷον ̓Αρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς [τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας] ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσα θαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same in Aleæ. on the passage Schol. in Arist. 609, b, 1 ; Ps. Aleæ. on Met. xiii. 3; 1078, 2, 33; Ibid. 817, a, 11 ; Syrian in Metaph. Arist. Τ. V. 844, b, 6; 889, b, 19. Compare the language of Aristippus in Diog. ii. 71,79; Plut. Ed. Pr. 10, 7.

2 According to the sense in which it is understood, it is equally true to say that they set logic aside and that they made use of it. See p. 347, 2. Of what was afterwards called logic, they appropriated just as much as was necessary for their theory of knowledge, but they assigned no independent value to it, nor did they extend their study of it beyond what was wanted for their purposes. τ’Conf. Sen. Ep. 89, 12: Cyrenaici naturalia cum rationalibus sustulerunt et contenti fuerunt moralibus, sed hi quoque, quae removent, aliter inducunt.

however, knows of no happiness which does not immediately coincide with virtue, and thus makes virtue the only object in life. Aristippus, on the other hand, considers only enjoyment an end in itself, and only pleasure an unconditional good,' regarding everything else as good and desirable only in as far as it is a means to enjoyment.2 Both Schools therefore at the very commencement diverge in opposite directions, their divergence, however, not preventing their subsequent approach to a greater extent than might seem at first sight to be possible.

Aristippus in Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9 : ἐμαυτὸν τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένος ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ dioTa BIOTEVE. Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 131 alii voluptatem summum bonum esse voluerunt:

The ground thus occupied was worked out by (2) FeelAristippus and his pupils as follows.3 Perceptions, only object ings the of knowledge.

quorum princeps Aristippus. Ibid. Fin. ii. 6, 18; 13, 39; Diog. 87: dovnv ἣν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, 88 : ἡ ἡδονὴ δι ̓ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν. Athen. xii. 544, a:['ApiσTITπоs] àπode§άμevos τὴν ἠδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν BEBAñola. Euseb. 1. c. p. 296, 1. The same view is mentioned and attacked by Plato, Gorg. 491, E.; Rep. vi. 505, B. (See above p. 312, 1), and Philebus, 11, B., where it is thus described : Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα, Ibid. 66, D.: Tȧyaldv ¿Tíbero ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παν· τελῆ. That Plato had Aristip

pus in mind will be presently
shown in respect of the Phile-
bus, and it is therewith proved
for the Republic, which refers
to the Philebus.

2 Diog. ii. 91: τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν δὲ αἱρετὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα. 92: καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον δὲ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς εἶναι, οὐ δι ̓ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸν ὄντα. Cic. Off. iii. 33, 116: Cyrenaici atque Annicerei philosophi nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt; virtutemque censuerunt ob eam rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. To this sentence of Aristippus, Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 28, and Ast refer the passage of the Phædo, 68, E., but without reason. It refers to common unphilosophical virtue.

3 The Cyrenaics divided their ethics into five parts. Sext. Math. vii. 11: καίτοι περιτρέπεσθαι τούτους ἔνιοι νενομίκασιν

CHAP.
XIV.

CHAP.
XIV.

being feelings of a change within ourselves, do not supply us with the least information as to things in themselves. We may be indeed conscious of having a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth; but whether the object which causes the sensation is sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same thing often produces an entirely different effect upon different persons. How then can we be sure, that in any given case, whether owing to the nature of our organism or to the circumstances under which we receive the impression, things do not appear to us entirely different from what they are in themselves? Knowledge, therefore, is limited to our own feelings; as to these we are never mistaken; but of things in themselves we know absolutely nothing.' Just as

ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε
τὸν περὶ τῶν αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν
τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν
καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πράξεων
καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ
τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστ
τεων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων
τόπος, φασὶν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους
ἐτύγχανεν, ὁ δὲ περὶ πίστεων ἐκ
TOU XOYIKOû. Sen. Ep. 89, 12
(according to what has been
said, p. 346, 2): in quinque enim
partes moralia dividunt, ut una
sit de fugiendis et expetendis,
altera de adfectibus, tertia de
actionibus, quarta de causis,
quinta de argumentis: causæ
rerum ex naturali parte sunt,
argumenta ex rationali, acti-
ones ex morali. We cannot,
however, tie our faith to this
account, not knowing how the
subject was divided among
these several parts, nor how old

and universal the division is. That it was not made by Aristippus may be gathered from the statements as to his writings. In the division περὶ πίσTEWV probably the theory of knowledge was treated, and in the preceding one the theory of motion.

1 Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 143 : aliud judicium Protagoræ est, qui putet id cuique rerum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui præter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse judicii. Ibid. 7, 20: de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis, in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse judicium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2, p. 1120: [oi Kvpnvaïkoì] тà táon καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες οὐκ ᾤοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων

little do we know of the feelings of other people. There may be common names, but there are no com

πίστιν εἶναι διαρκῆ πρὸς τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποστάντες εἰς τὰ πάθη κατέκλεισαν αὑτοὺς. τὸ φαίνεται τιθέμενοι, τὸ δ' ἐστὶ μὴ προσαποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς . . . γλυκαίνεσθαι γὰρ λέγουσι καὶ πικραίνεσθαι καὶ φωτίζεσθαι καὶ σκοτοῦσθαι τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἑκάστον τὴν ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον ἔχοντος· εἰ δὲ γλυκὺ τὸ μέλι καὶ πικρὸς ὁ θαλλὺς κ.τ.λ. ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ θηρίων καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν μὲν δυσχεραινόντων [add τὸ μὲν] τῶν δὲ προσιεμένων τὴν θαλλίαν, καὶ ἀποκαομένων ὑπὸ τῆς χαλάζης, καὶ καταψυχομένων ὑπὸ οἴνου, καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον ἀμβλυωττόντων καὶ νύκτωρ βλεπόντων. ὅθεν ἐμμένουσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ δόξα διατηρεῖ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον· ἐκβαίνουσα δὲ καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα τῷ κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, αὐτήν τε πολλάκις ταράσσει καὶ μάχεται πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντία πάθη καὶ διαφόρους φαντασίας λαμβάνοντας. Seat. Math. vii. 191, who gives the most detailed account, but probably to a great extent in his own language: φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἄψευστα τύγχανειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπιὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασὶ, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως . ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστι ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος

γλυκανθῆναι. just as a diseased eye or a mad brain always sees things different from what they are. οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. If, therefore, we understand by φαινόμενα individual impressions (πάθη), it must be said πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ καὶ καταληπτά. If, on the contrary, every name means the thing by which the impression is produced, all φαινόμενα are false and cannot be known. Strictly speaking, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικὸν τάχα μέν ἐστιν ὂν οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν. καὶ ταύτῃ περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τά γε οἰκεῖα πάντες ἐσμὲν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πάντες πλανώμεθα· κἀκεῖνα μέν ἐστι καταληπτὰ, τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς καθεστώσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις, παρὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς αἰτίας. See Pyrrh. i. 215; Diog. ii. 92 : τά τε πάθη καταληπτὰ, ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτὰ, οὐκ ἀφ ̓ ὧν γίνεται. Ibid. 93: τὰς αἰσθήσεις μὴ πάντοτε ἀληθεύειν. Ibid. 95 of the School of Hegesias, which does not in this respect differ from others : ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀκριβούσας τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν. Aristotle in Eus. Præp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1: ἑξῆς δ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ λέγοντες μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. τοῦτο δ' εἶπον ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Κυρήνης (which in the face of the detinite statements of Cicero, Plutarch and Sextus, does not prove

CHAP.
XIV.

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