CHAP.
XIV.

mon feelings, and when two persons say that they have felt the same thing, neither of them can be certain that he has experienced the same feeling as the other, since he is only conscious of his own state and not of that of another.'

Thus, like Protagoras, the Cyrenaics regard all notions as relative and individual; their view differing from his in this respect only that they refer notions more directly to internal feelings, and leave out of sight 3 Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flow

that this doctrine did not be- έχουσιν· έκαστος γάρ του ιδίου
long to the whole School, nor πάθους αντιλαμβάνεται, το δε ει
can this be intended. Conf. c. τούτο το πάθος από λευκού εγγί-
18, 31)... καιόμενοι γάρ έλεγον νεται αυτό και το πέλας, ούτ'
και τεμνόμενοι γνωρίζειν, ότι πα- αυτός δύναται λέγειν, μή αναδεχό-
σχοιέν τι: πότερον δε το καλον είη μενος το του πέλας πάθος, ούτε και
πυρ και το τέμνον σίδηρος ουκ έχειν πέλας, μη αναδεχόμενος το εκείνου
eiteiv. Sextus, Math. vi. 53, τάχα γαρ εγώ μεν ούτω
says: μόνα φασίν υπάρχειν τα συγκεκριμαι ως λευκαίνεσθαι υπό
πάθη, άλλο δε ουθέν. όθεν και του έξωθεν προσπίπτοντος, έτερος
την φωνήν, μή ούσαν πάθος αλλά δε ούτω κατεσκευασμένην έχει την
πάθους ποιητικήν, μή γίνεσθαι των αίσθησιν, ώστε ετέρως διατεθήναι,
υπαρκτών. But this is inaccu- in support of which the example
rate. The Cyrenaics, we gather of a jaundiced or diseased eye.
from the above, cannot have sight is adduced. It follows
denied the existence of things, then : κοινά μεν ημάς ονόματα
but only our knowledge of their τιθέναι τοις πράγμασι, πάθη δε γε
existence. This whole theory έχειν ίδια.
probably belongs to the elder 2 Zeller's Phil. d. Griech, i.
Aristippus, as will be probable 869.
from a passage in Plato soon to 3 The last point has been too
be mentioned. Against Tenne- much lost sight of by Schleier-
man's notion (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. macher (Plato's Werke, ii. 1,
106) that it first came from 183), who considers the de.
Theodorus, see Wendt, Phil. scription of the Protagorean
Cyr. 45.

teaching in the Theatetus to be 1 Sert. Math. vii. 195 : ένθεν chiefly meant for Aristippus, ουδε κριτήριόν φασι είναι κοινόν whose view does not absolutely ανθρώπων, ονόματα δε κοινά τίθεσθαι coincide with that of Protagoτους κρίμασι. λευκόν μέν γάρ τι See Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 37. και γλυκύ καλούσι κοινώς πάντες, On the other hand, the differκοινόν δέ τι λευκόν ή γλυκύ ουκ ence between them is exagger

CHAP.
XIV.

as something not wanted for their purposes and transcending the limits of human knowledge. If knowledge, however, be confined to knowledge of feelings, it follows on the one hand that it would be absurd to seek for a knowledge of things, such knowledge being once for all impossible; and thus the sceptical attitude assumed by the Cyrenaics in respect to knowledge, was the ground of their conviction of the worthlessness of all physical enquiries. On the other hand, for this very reason feeling only can give

ated by the Academician in Hermann appeals,for they do not
Cic. (see p. 348, 1), who ascribes make Protagoras more subjec-
to Protagoras a view entirely tive than Aristippus, but Aris-
different from that of the Cy- tippus more subjective than Pro-
renaics, and by Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. tagoras. In the next place it is
19, 5, who after discussing the not correct. Of course Prota-
Cyrenaics introduces Protagoras goras did not deny that certain
with these words : έπεται τούτοις names were used by all, he even
ούν συνεξετάσαι και τους την εναν- treated himself of the άρθότης
τίαν βαδίζοντας, και πάντα χρήναι ονομάτων (Zeller's Phil. d. Griech.
πιστεύειν ταϊς του σώματος αισθή- i. 933, 1), but what is the use
GEOIV oplo quévous, for Protagoras of agreeing in names when the
only asserted the truth of all things differ ? The Cyrenaics
perceptions in the sense that are only more accurate than
they were all true for him who Protagoras in asserting that
perceived them, that things perceptions which are called by
were to each one what they ap- the same name are not the same
peared to him to be. In this in different persons. But there
sense the Cyrenaics, as Sextus is no disagreement in the teach.
has rightly shown, declared all ing of the two.
to be true, but both they and i Had they acted consistently
Protagoras 'said nothing about they must have regarded as such
objective truth. Hermann's every attempt at a natural ex-
objection here to Ges. Ab. planation of our perceptions.
235, on the ground that Prota- We must, therefore, not be mis-
goras was far more subjective led by Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi
than Aristippus, since Aristip- Sec. Epic. 4, 5, p. 1069, so as to
pus presupposed an agreement attribute to them the view of
amongst men in describing their Democritus about pictures and
impressions, is still more at emanating forms.
variance with the statements of 2 As Diog. ii. 92 remarks.
Cicero and Eusebius, to which (See p. 346, 1.)

CHAP.
XIV.

the rule by which the aim of actions is determined and their value tested. For things being only known to us in our own feelings, the production of certain feelings is all that can be attained by action; hence the best thing for us will be what is most gratifying to our feelings. Here from the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge follow those ethical principles, which in other ways also it was their main object to establish.

All feeling, as Aristippus assumes, following Protagoras, consisting in an emotion in him who experiences it, if the motion be gentle, there arises a feeling of pleasure; if rough and violent, of pain ; if again

(3) Pleasure and μαι».

1 Seart. Math. vii. 199 : ανάλογα και την λείαν της σαρκός κίνησιν δε είναι δοκεί τους περί κριτηρίων τέλος είναι λέγει. Math. vii. 199: λεγομένοις κατά τούτους τους άν- των γάρ πάθων τα μέν έστιν ηδέα, δρας και τα περί τελών λεγόμενα τα δε αλγεινά, τα δε μεταξύ. That διήκει γαρ τα πάθη και επί τα these statements come, on the τέλη. Ιbid. 200.

whole, from the elder Aristip2 Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32, pus, appears to be established by says of the younger Aristippus several passages in the Philebus. on the authority of Aristocles : After Socrates (p. 31, B.) has τρείς γάρ έφη καταστάσεις είναι there shown that pain consists περί την ημετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν in a violation, and pleasure in μεν καθ' ήν αλγούμεν, έoικυίαν τω a restoration, of the natural κατά θάλασσαν χειμώνι • ετέρον δε connection between the parts of καθ' ήν ηδόμεθα, το λείω κύματι a living being, he appends (p. έφομοιουμένην· είναι γαρ λείαν κί- 42, D.) the question : What νησιν την ηδονήν ουρίω παραβαλ. would happen if neither of these λομένην ανέμω· την δε τοίτην changes were to take place ? μέσης είναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ήν The representative of the theory ούτε αλγούμεν ούτε ηδόμεθα, γαληνή of pleasure havinganswered in a παραπλήσιον ούσαν. Diog. ii. 86, way afterwards repeated by says almost the same thing of Plato, Rep. ix. 583, C., that in the older Cyrenaic school : dúo this case there would be neither πάθη υφίσταντο, πόνος και ηδονήν, pleasure nor pain, he continues: την μεν λείαν κίνησιν την ηδονήν, κάλλιστ’ είπες • αλλά γαρ, οιμαι, τον δε πόνον τραχείαν κίνησιν. τόδε λέγεις, ως αεί τι τούτων Ibid. 89, 90 : μέσας τε αναγκαίον ημίν συμβαίνειν, ώς οι στάσεις ανόμαζον αηδονίαν και σοφοί φασιν· αεί γάρ άπαντα άνω απονίαν. Sert. Pyrrh. 1. 215: τε και κάτω δει. Accordingly [ή Κυρηναϊκή αγωγή] την ηδονήν the answer is modified to mean

κατα

CHAP.
XIV.

we are in a state of repose, or the motion is so weak
as to be imperceptible, there is no feeling either of
pleasure or pain. Of these three states, only that
of pleasure is absolutely desirable. Hereto nature
bears witness; all following pleasure as the highest
end, and avoiding nothing so carefully as pain,' unless
indeed their judgment be perverted by unfounded
fancies. To put freedom from pain in the place of
that great changes produce tion is felt or produces plea-
pleasure and pain, but small sure. Perhaps it is in reference
ones neither. To the same view to this that Arist. Eth. N. vii.
he comes back (on p. 53, C.), 13, 1153, a, 12, says : did kai oủ
with the words : άρα περί ηδονής καλώς έχει το αισθητην γένεσιν
ουκ ακηκοάμεν, ώς αεί γένεσίς φάναι είναι την ηδονήν. Νor can
έστιν, ουσία δε ουκ έστι το παράπαν we allow that there is a dis-
ndovñs ; Kombo gàp on tives aở crepancy (as Susemihl, Genet.
TOÛTOV Tov byov &TIXelpolloi Entw. d. Plat. Phil. ii. 35, note,
unvuelv suiv, ols dei xéply éxelv. 720 asserts) between the lan-
These latter words clearly prove guage of Plato, p. 42, D., and
that the assertion, all pleasure the statements which attribute
consists in motion, had been to Aristippus the assumption of
uttered by some one else, when an intermediate state between
Plato wrote the Philebus ; and pleasure and pain. Hence we
since with the exception of cannot countenance the con-
Aristippus no one is known to jecture that Aristippus acquired
whom they could be referred from Plato the more accurate
(Protagoras did not draw the limitation of his teaching.
ethical conclusions of his prin- Why did not Aristippus say:
ciples), since moreover this as- We are at all times in a state
sertion is universally attributed of gentle or violent motion, but
to the School of Aristippus, pleasure or pain only arises,
since too the epithet kouds when we become conscious of
suits him best, it is most pro- this motion? Yet this is exactly
bable that both this passage what he did say according to
and the passage connected with Diogenes, and what Plato
it on the two kinds of motion makes his representative say,
and rest, are his. The same thongh certainly not without
applies to the remark, that some conversational help.
small changes make no impres- Diog. 88; 87; Plato, Phil.
sion. Likewise, Diog. ii. 85, 11, B. See above p. 347, 1.
says of Aristippus : Téos ? Diog. ii. 89 : Qúvaolau dé
απόφαινε την λείαν κίνησιν εις φασι και την ηδονήν τινας μή
αίσθησιν αναδιδομένην, according αιρείσθαι κατά διαστροφήν.
to which not every slight mo-

AA

CHAP.
XIV.

(4) The highest good.

pleasure would not be correct, for where there is no emotion, enjoyment is as little possible as pain, the condition being one of insensibility, as in sleep. Thus the good comes to be identical with what is agreeable—with pleasure; the evil, with what is disagreeable, or unpleasant; what affords neither pleasure nor pain can be neither good nor evil.

From this view it follows, as a matter of course, that individual feelings of pleasure must, as such, be the ends of all actions. Simple repose of mind, that freedom from pain, in which Epicurus at a later time placed the highest good, cannot, for the reason just given, be this good. It also appeared to the Cyrenaics unsatisfactory to make the happiness of the whole life the point to be kept in view, and to make it the

' Diog. 89 : η δε του αλγούντος ηδονήν μέντοι την του σώματος υπεξαίρεσις (ώς είρηται παρ' 'Επι- ήν και τέλος είναι, καθά φησι και κούρη) δοκεί αυτοίς μή είναι ηδονή, Παναίτιος εν τω περί των αιρέσεων, ουδέ η αηδονία άλγηδών. εν κινή- ου την καταστηματικήν ηδονήν σει γαρ είναι αμφοτέρα, μη ούσης την επ' αναιρέσει άλγηδόνων και της απονίας ή της αηδονίας κινή- οιον ανοχλησίαν, ήν ο Επίκουρος σεως. επεί η απονία οδον καθεύ- αποδέχεται και τέλος είναι φησι. δοντός έστι κατάστασις. Such Perhaps the words in Cic. Fin. explicit statements probably be- ii. 6, 18 (after his having said long to a later time, and are due similar things, i. 1, 39), are principally to the School of taken from a similar passage : Anniceris in contrast to Epi- aut enim eam voluptatem tuecurus, according to Clemens, retur, quam Aristippus, i.e. qua Strom. ii. 417 Β.

sensus dulciter ac jucunde mo2 Seart. Μatt. vii. 199 : τα μεν vetur ..

... nec Aristippus, qui αλγεινά κακά φασιν είναι, ών τέλος voluptatem summum bonum άλγηδών, τα δε ηδία αγαθά, ών dicit, in voluptate ponit non τέλος εστίν αδιάψευστον ηδονή, τα dolere. 13, 39: Aristippi Cyδε μεταξύ ούτε αγαθά ούτε κακά, renaicorumque omnium ; quos ων τέλος το ούτε αγαθόν ούτε non est veritum in ea voluptate κακόν, όπερ πάθος εστι μεταξύ que maxime dulcedine sensum ηδονής και άλγηδόνος. See p. moveret, summum bonum po352, 2.

nere, contemnentes istam va300, 1. Diog. ii. 87: cuitatem doloris.