CHAP. mon feelings, and when two persons say that they have felt the same thing, neither of them can be certain that he has experienced the same feeling as the other, since he is only conscious of his own state and not of that of another.1 Thus, like Protagoras,2 the Cyrenaics regard all notions as relative and individual; their view differing from his in this respect only that they refer notions more directly to internal feelings, and leave out of sight Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flow 3 that this doctrine did not belong to the whole School, nor can this be intended. Conf. c. 18, 31) . . . καιόμενοι γὰρ ἔλεγον καὶ τεμνόμενοι γνωρίζειν, ὅτι πασχοιέν τι πότερον δὲ τὸ καῖον εἴη πῦρ ἢ τὸ τέμνον σίδηρος οὐκ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. Sextus, Math. vi. 53, says: μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ οὐθέν. ὅθεν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν, μὴ οὖσαν πάθος ἀλλὰ πάθους ποιητικὴν, μὴ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑπαρκτῶν. But this is inaccurate. The Cyrenaics, we gather from the above, cannot have denied the existence of things, but only our knowledge of their existence. This whole theory probably belongs to the elder Aristippus, as will be probable from a passage in Plato soon to be mentioned. Against Tenneman's notion (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 106) that it first came from Theodorus, see Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 45. 1 Sext. Math. vii. 195 : ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασι εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινά τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασι. λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται. τὸ δὲ εἰ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἐγγίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ πέλας, οὔτ ̓ αὐτὸς δύναται λέγειν, μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ τοῦ πέλας πάθος, οὔτε ὁ πέλας, μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ ἐκείνου τάχα γὰρ ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω συγκέκριμαι ὡς λευκαίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν προσπίπτοντες, ἕτερος δὲ οὕτω κατεσκευασμένην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστε ἑτέρως διατεθῆναι, in support of which the example of a jaundiced or diseased eyesight is adduced. It follows then: κοινὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς ὀνόματα τιθέναι τοῖς πράγμασι, πάθη δέ γε ἔχειν ἴδια. 2 Zeller's Phil. d. Griech, i. 869. 3 The last point has been too much lost sight of by Schleiermacher (Plato's Werke, ii. 1, 183), who considers the description of the Protagorean teaching in the Theatetus to be chiefly meant for Aristippus, whose view does not absolutely coincide with that of Protagoras. See Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 37. On the other hand, the difference between them is exagger If as something not wanted for their purposes and transcending the limits of human knowledge. knowledge, however, be confined to knowledge of feelings, it follows on the one hand that it would be absurd to seek for a knowledge of things, such knowledge being once for all impossible; and thus the sceptical attitude assumed by the Cyrenaics in respect to knowledge, was the ground of their conviction of the worthlessness of all physical enquiries. On the other hand, for this very reason feeling only can give ated by the Academician in Cic. (see p. 348, 1), who ascribes to Protagoras a view entirely different from that of the Cyrenaics, and by Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5, who after discussing the Cyrenaics introduces Protagoras with these words : ἕπεται τούτοις οὖν συνεξετάσαι καὶ τοὺς τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίζοντας, καὶ πάντα χρῆναι πιστεύειν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσιν ὁρισαμένους, for Protagoras only asserted the truth of all perceptions in the sense that they were all true for him who perceived them, that things were to each one what they appeared to him to be. In this sense the Cyrenaics, as Sextus has rightly shown, declared all to be true, but both they and Protagoras said nothing about objective truth. Hermann's objection here to Ges. Ab. 235, on the ground that Protagoras was far more subjective than Aristippus, since Aristippus presupposed an agreement amongst men in describing their impressions, is still more at variance with the statements of Cicero and Eusebius, to which 2 Hermann appeals, for they do not make Protagoras more subjective than Aristippus, but Aristippus more subjective than Protagoras. In the next place it is not correct. Of course Protagoras did not deny that certain names were used by all, he even treated himself of the ἀρθότης ὀνομάτων (Zeller's Phil. d. Griech. i. 933, 1), but what is the use of agreeing in names when the things differ? The Cyrenaics are only more accurate than Protagoras in asserting that perceptions which are called by the same name are not the same in different persons. But there is no disagreement in the teaching of the two. 1 Had they acted consistently they must have regarded as such every attempt at a natural explanation of our perceptions. We must, therefore, not be misled by Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi Sec. Epic. 4, 5, p. 1069, so as to attribute to them the view of Democritus about pictures and emanating forms. 2 As Diog. ii. 92 remarks. (See p. 346, 1.) CHAP. CHAP. (3) Pleasure and μαικ. the rule by which the aim of actions is determined and their value tested. For things being only known to us in our own feelings, the production of certain feelings is all that can be attained by action; hence the best thing for us will be what is most gratifying to our feelings.' Here from the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge follow those ethical principles, which in other ways also it was their main object to establish. All feeling, as Aristippus assumes, following Protagoras, consisting in an emotion in him who experiences it, if the motion be gentle, there arises a feeling of pleasure; if rough and violent,2 of pain; if again • Sext. Math. vii. 199: ἀνάλογα δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίων λεγομένοις κατὰ τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ περὶ τελῶν λεγόμενα· διήκει γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ τέλη. Ibid. 200. 2 Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32, says of the younger Aristippus on the authority of Aristocles: τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι · ἑτέρον δὲ καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἐφομοιουμένην· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τοίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαληνῇ παραπλήσιον οὖσαν. Diog. ii. 86, says almost the same thing of the older Cyrenaic school: δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονὴν, τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχεῖαν κίνησιν. Ibid. 89, 90: μέσας τε κατα στάσεις ὠνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 215: [ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγὴ] τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν τέλος εἶναι λέγει. Math. vii. 199: τῶν γὰρ πάθων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ ἀλγεινά, τὰ δε μεταξύ. That these statements come, on the whole, from the elder Aristippus, appears to be established by several passages in the Philebus. After Socrates (p. 31, B.) has there shown that pain consists in a violation, and pleasure in a restoration, of the natural connection between the parts of a living being, he appends (p. 42, D.) the question: What would happen if neither of these changes were to take place? The representative of the theory of pleasure having answered in a way afterwards repeated by Plato, Rep. ix. 583, C., that in this case there would be neither pleasure nor pain, he continues: κάλλιστ ̓ εἶπες · ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὡς ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ. Accordingly the answer is modified to mean we are in a state of repose, or the motion is so weak as to be imperceptible, there is no feeling either of pleasure or pain. Of these three states, only that of pleasure is absolutely desirable. Hereto nature bears witness; all following pleasure as the highest end, and avoiding nothing so carefully as pain,' unless indeed their judgment be perverted by unfounded fancies. To put freedom from pain in the place of 2 that great changes produce pleasure and pain, but small ones neither. To the same view he comes back (on p. 53, C.), with the words: ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκοάμεν, ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ TOUTOV TOV AоYOU TIXELOVσ μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. These latter words clearly prove that the assertion, all pleasure consists in motion, had been uttered by some one else, when Plato wrote the Philebus; and since with the exception of Aristippus no one is known to whom they could be referred (Protagoras did not draw the ethical conclusions of his principles), since moreover this assertion is universally attributed to the School of Aristippus, since too the epithet koupòs suits him best, it is most probable that both this passage and the passage connected with it on the two kinds of motion and rest, are his. The same applies to the remark, that small changes make no impression. Likewise, Diog. ii. 85, says of Aristippus: Téλos d' ἀπόφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην, according to which not every slight mo tion is felt or produces pleasure. Perhaps it is in reference to this that Arist. Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a, 12, says: did kai oỷ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθήτην γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. Nor can we allow that there is a discrepancy (as Susemihl, Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil. ii. 35, note, 720 asserts) between the language of Plato, p. 42, D., and the statements which attribute to Aristippus the assumption of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain. Hence we cannot countenance the conjecture that Aristippus acquired from Plato the more accurate limitation of his teaching. Why did not Aristippus say: We are at all times in a state of gentle or violent motion, but pleasure or pain only arises, when we become conscious of this motion? Yet this is exactly what he did say according to Diogenes, and what Plato makes his representative say, though certainly not without some conversational help. A A 1 Diog. 88; 87; Plato, Phil. 11, B. See above p. 347, 1. 2 Diog. ii. 89: dúvaobai dé φασι καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν τινας μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι κατὰ διαστροφήν. CHAP. XIV. CHAP. (4) The highest good. pleasure would not be correct, for where there is no emotion, enjoyment is as little possible as pain, the condition being one of insensibility, as in sleep. Thus the good comes to be identical with what is agreeable—with pleasure ; the evil, with what is disagreeable, or unpleasant; what affords neither pleasure nor pain can be neither good nor evil.2 From this view it follows, as a matter of course, that individual feelings of pleasure must, as such, be the ends of all actions. Simple repose of mind, that freedom from pain, in which Epicurus at a later time placed the highest good, cannot, for the reason just given, be this good.3 It also appeared to the Cyrenaics unsatisfactory to make the happiness of the whole life the point to be kept in 1 Diog. 89 : ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις (ὡς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικούρῳ) δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή, οὐδέ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα, μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως. ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἷον καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις. Such explicit statements probably belong to a later time, and are due principally to the School of Anniceris in contrast to Epicurus, according to Clemens, Strom. ii. 417 Β. view, and to make it the ἡδονὴν μέντοι τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἣν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, καθά φησι καὶ Παναίτιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἱρέσεων, οὐ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐπ ̓ ἀναιρέσει ἀλγηδόνων καὶ οἷον ἀνοχλησίαν, ἣν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἀποδέχεται καὶ τέλος εἶναί φησι. Perhaps the words in Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 18 (after his having said similar things, i. 1, 39), are taken from a similar passage: aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur, quam Aristippus, i.e. qua sensus dulciter ac jucunde movetur. . . nec Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in voluptate ponit non dolere. 13, 39: Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium ; quos non est veritum in ea voluptate quæ maxime dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere, contemnentes istam va* See p. 300, 1. Diog. ii. 87: cuitatem doloris, 2 Sext. Matt. vii. 199: Tà μèv ἀλγεινὰ κακά φασιν εἶναι, ὧν τέλος ἀλγηδὼν, τὰ δὲ ἡδία ἀγαθὰ, ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἀδιάψευστον ἡδονὴ, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακὰ, ων τέλος τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν, ὅπερ πάθος εστί μεταξύ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀλγηδόνος. See p. 352, 2. |