aim of mankind to procure for themselves the highest sum total of enjoyments that can be in this life. Such a principle requires the past and the future as well as the present to be included in the pursuit, neither of which are in our power, and which certainly afford no enjoyment. A future feeling of pleasure is an emotion which has not yet begun; a past one is The one only rule of one which has already ceased. life is to cultivate the art of enjoying the present moment. Only the present is ours. Forbear then to trouble for that which is already past and for that what may never be yours.2 1 Diog. 87 : δοκεῖ δ ̓ αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας διαφέρειν. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, ευδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ αἱ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. εἶναι τε τὴν μερικὴν ἡδονὴν δι' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴν· τὴν δ ̓ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. 89: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. Ibid. 91: ἀρκεῖ δὲ κἂν κατὰ μίαν [ἡδονὴν] τις προσπίπτουσαν ἡδέως ἐπανάγῃ. Athen. xii. 544, a : ['Αρίστιππος] ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβλῆσθαι καὶ μονόχρονον αὐτὴν εἶναι· παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀσώτοις οὔτε τὴν μνήμην τῶν γεγονυιῶν ἀπολαύσεων πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡγούμενος οὔτε τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐσομένων, ἀλλ ̓ ἑνὶ μόνῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνων τῷ πάροντι, τὸ δὲ ἀπολελαυκέναι καὶ ἀπολαύσειν οὐδὲν νομίζων πρὸς αὑτὸν, τὸ μὲν ὡς οὐκ ἔτ ̓ ὂν, τὸ δὲ οὔπω καὶ ἄδηλον. 2 Diog. 66 : ἀπέλανε μὲν γὰρ CHAP. XIV. CHAP. (5) Modified form of this extreme view. The character of the things whence the feeling of pleasure arises is in itself unimportant. Every pleasure as such is a good, nor is there in this respect any difference between one enjoyment and another. They may spring from various, even from opposite sources, but considered by themselves, they are all alike, one is as good as the other, a pleasurable emotion, and as such always a natural object of desire.' The Cyrenaics therefore can never allow that there are pleasures not only declared by law and custom to be bad, but bad by their very nature. In their view pleasure may be occasioned by a disreputable action, but in itself it is nevertheless good and desirable.2 At the same time this principle received several limitations by means of which its severity was con¬ siderably toned down, and its application restricted. In the first place, the Cyrenaics could not deny that Διογένης βασιλικὸν κύνα ἔλεγεν 1 Diog. 87: μὴ διαφέρειν τε tarchus replies: πῶς λέγεις ὦ Σώκρατες ; οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι ταγα θόν, εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονὰς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς. Just as little will Protarchus (36, C.) allow that there is imaginary pleasure and pain. See p. 347, 1. 2 Diog. 88 : εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν κἂν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσχημοτάτων γένηται, καθά φησιν Ιππόβοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ αἱρέσεων. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις ἄτοπος εἴη, ἀλλ ̓ οὖν ἡ ἡδονὴ δι ̓ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν. To the same effect is the passage quoted from the Philebus on p. 358, 1. notwithstanding the essential likeness there were yet differences of degree in feelings of pleasure: for allowing that every pleasure as such is good, it does not follow that the same amount of good belongs to all as a matter of fact one affords more enjoyment than another, and therefore deserves to be preferred to it. Just as little did it escape their notice, that many enjoyments are only purchased at the cost of greater pain; hence they argue unbroken happiness is so hard to gain. They therefore required the consequences of an action to be taken into account; thus endeavouring again to secure by an indirect method the contrast between good and evil which they would not at first allow to attach to actions themselves. An action should be avoided when therefrom more pain follows than pleasure; hence a man of sense will abstain from things which are con 2 Diog. 87 says that the Cyrenaics denied a difference in degrees of pleasure, but this is undoubtedly a mistake. Diog. ii. 90, says that they taught that bodily feelings of pleasure and pain were stronger than mental ones. See p. 358, 3. Plato too, Phil. 45, A.: 65 E., in the spirit of this School, talks of μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, nor is there the slightest reason for equalising all enjoyments in their system. They could not allow that there was an absolute difference of value between them, some being good and others bad; but they had no occasion to deny a relative difference between the more or less good, and they might even allow of different kinds of plea- 2 Diog. 90: διδ [?] καὶ καθ ̓ αὑτὴν CHAP. XIV. CHAP. XIV. demned by the laws of the state and public opinion.' Lastly, they also directed their attention to the difference between bodily and mental pleasures.2 Holding bodily pains and pleasures to be more pungent than those of the mind; 3 perhaps even attempting to show that all pleasure and its opposite are in the last resource conditioned by bodily feelings; 1 Diog. 93: μηδέν τι εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, the value of every action depending on the pleasure which follows it, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει, ὁ μέντοι σπουδαῖος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον πράξει διὰ τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας καὶ δόξας. Wendt (Phil. Cyr. 25) calls this statement in question without reason. It is quite consistent in Aristippus, and is met with in Epicurus; Zeller, Stoics, &c.; but he is right (Ibid. 36, 42) in rejecting Schleiermacher's hypothesis (Pl. W. ii. 1, 183; ii. 2, 18), that in the Gorgias Aristippus is being refuted under the name of Callicles, and in the Cratylus 384, Diogenes under that of Hermogenes. 2 Which, strictly speaking, they could only have done by saying that one portion of our impressions appears to us to come from the body, another not; for they had long since given up all real knowledge of things. But their consistency hardly went so far as this. 3 Diog. ii. 90: TоλÙ μÉVTOL τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χείρους τὰς σωματικάς· ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάVoyτas. (The same, Ibid. x. 137.) χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ πονεῖν, οἰκει 4 ότερον δὲ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ὑπελάμβανον· ὅθεν καὶ πλείονα οἰκονομίαν περὶ θάτερον ἐποιοῦντο. This is indicated by the expression οἰκειότερον in the above passage also. See p. 359, 2. To say that not all pleasure and pain is connected with bodily states, may be harmonised with this statement by taking it to be their meaning, that not every feeling has its immediate object in the body, without, however, denying more remote connection between such feelings and the body. Joy for one's country's prosperity might in their minds be connected with the thought that our own happiness depends on that of our country. It can only be considered an opponent's exaggeration for Panatius and Cicero to assert that the Cyrenaics made bodily pleasure the end of life. (See p. 354, 3.) Acad. iv. 45, 139: Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur. The highest good Aristippus deClared consists not in bodily pleasure, but in pleasure generally. If he regarded bodily pleasure as the strongest, and in this sense as the best, it by no means follows that he excluded mental pleasures from Cic. they nevertheless contended that there must be a something besides sensuous feelings, or it would be impossible to explain how unequal impressions are produced by perceptions altogether alike :—the sight, for instance, of the sufferings of others, if they are real, gives a painful impression; if only seen on the stage, a pleasurable one.1 They even allowed that there are pleasures and pains of the mind which have no immediate reference to any states of the body. The prosperity, for instance, of our country fills us with as much pleasure as does our own.2 Although therefore pleasure is in general made to coincide with the good, and pain with evil, the Cyrenaics are far from expecting happiness to result from the mere satisfaction of animal instincts. For a true enjoyment of life, you not only need to weigh the value and the consequences of every enjoyment, but you need also to acquire the proper disposition of mind. The most essential help to a pleasant life is prudence,3 not only because it supplies that presence of mind which is never at a loss for means, but, mainly, because it teaches how to make a proper use of the the idea of good. Indeed, his remarks respecting the value of prudence make this probable. See Wendt, 22. 1 Diog. 90: λέγουσι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ὅρασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι ἡδονὰς, τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ ̓ ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς. The same is found in Plut. Qu. Conv. v. 1, 2, 7, p. 674. Here belongs Cic. Tusc. ii. 13, 28. 2 Diog. 89: où ráσas μévтol 4 CHAP. XIV. |