was here at least subordinated to what with Socrates was a bare outwork, and almost an obstruction to his leading thought. Granting that Aristippus was not a false follower of Socrates,' he was certainly a very one-sided follower, or rather he, among all the followers of Socrates, was the one who least entered into his master's real teaching. CHAP. Side by side with this foreign element, the genuine Points Socratic teaching cannot be ignored in the Cyrenaic blance. of resem school. In that school there are in fact two elements, the combination of which constitutes its peculiarity. One of these is the doctrine of pleasure as such, the other, the limitation of that doctrine by the Socratic demand for intellectual circumspection-the principle that prudence is the only means for arriving at true pleasure. The former element, taken alone, would lead to the conclusion that sensual enjoyment is the only object in life; the latter, to the strict Socratic doctrine of morals. By uniting both elements Aristippus arrived at the conviction-which is stamped on all his language, and on which his personal character is a standing comment that the surest way to happiness is to be found in the art of enjoying the pleasures of the moment with perfect freedom of soul. Whether this is indeed possible, whether the two leading thoughts in his system can be harmonised at all, is a question which it seems never occurred to Aristippus. We can only answer it in the negative. That freedom of soul, that philosophic independence As Schleiermacher maintains, Gesch. d. Phil. 87. СНАР. E. The later Cyrenaics. (1) Theo dorus. at which Aristippus aimed, can only be secured by soaring above the impressions of the senses and the particular circumstances of life to such an extent that happiness becomes independent of these surroundings and feelings. Conversely, when the enjoyment of the moment is the highest object, happiness can only be felt in proportion as circumstances give occasion to agreeable feelings; all unpleasant impressions being disturbers of happiness. It is impossible to abandon the feelings freely to the enjoyment of what is present, without at the same time being disagreeably affected by what is unpleasant. Abstraction, whereby alone this might be done, is distinctly forbidden; Aristippus requiring the past and the future to be ignored and the present only to be considered. Apart therefore from other defects, this theory suffers from contradiction in its fundamental principles, the injurious effects of which for the whole system could not fail to follow. As a matter of fact they soon appeared in the teaching of Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris; hence the interest which the history of the later Cyrenaics possesses. About the same time that Epicurus was giving a new form to the philosophy of pleasure, Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris, within the Cyrenaic School, were advocating views partly agreeing with those of Epicurus, partly going beyond his doctrine of pleasure. Theodorus, on the whole, adhered to the principles of Aristippus, not hesitating, unscrupulous as he was, to push them to their most extreme conse 1 quences. The value of an action depending upon its results to the doer, he concluded that any and every action might under circumstances be allowed. If certain things pass for immoral, there is a good reason why this should be so, if the masses are to be kept within bounds: the wise man, tied by no such prejudice, need not, in suitable cases, be afraid of adultery, theft, and sacrilege. If things exist for use, beautiful women and boys are not made only for ornament. Friendship, it seemed to him, may be dispensed with; for the wise man is self-sufficing and needs no friends, and the fool can make no sensible use of them.3 Devotion to one's country he considered ridiculous; for the wise man is a citizen of the world, and will not sacrifice himself and his wisdom to benefit fools. The views of his School respecting the Gods and religion were also expressed @paoutaros is the term used of him by Diog. ii. 116; and this epithet is fully justified by a passage like that, vi. 97. 2 Diog. ii. 99. That Theodorus said this and similar things, cannot be doubted after the definite and explicit testimony of Diogenes. It is true that, in Plut. Tranq. Anim. 5, p. 567, Theodorus complains that his pupils misunderstood him a statement which, if it be true, probably refers to the practical application of his principles. He may have led a more moral life than Bio (Diog. iv. 53; Clemens, Pædag. 15, A.), and yet have expressed the logical consequences of the Cyrenaic teaching. But it is Drog. 98, and Epiphanius, CHAP. XIV. CHAP. 1 without reserve; Bio 2 and Euemerus herein following his example. For all that, the theory of The atheism of Theodorus, which, besides bringing down on him an indictment at Athens, gained for him the standing epithet ǎ0eos (he was called @eds according to Diog. ii. 86, 100, in allusion to a joke of Stilpo's, but probably Kar' avrípaσiv for ǎ0eos), will be frequently mentioned. In Diog. 97 he says: . . . πаνтáπασw ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας καὶ αὐτοῦ περιετύχομεν βιβλίῳ ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ περὶ θεῶν ok εὐκαταφρονήτῳ· ἐξ οὗ φασιν Ἐπίκουρον λάβοντα τὰ πλεῖστα eireiv. The last statement can only apply to the criticism of belief in the Gods generally, for Epicurus peculiar views about them were certainly not shared by Theodorus. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218; Math. ix. 51, 55, mentions him among those who deny the existence of the Gods, with the addition: dia τοῦ περὶ θεῶν συντάγματος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούμενα ποικίλως ἀνασκευάσας. Cic. (N. D. i. 1, 2) says: nullos [Deos] esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Ibid. 23, 63: Nonne aperte Deorum naturam sustulerunt? Ibid. 42, 117: Omnino Deos esse negabant, a statement which Minuc. Fel. Oct. 8, 2, and Lact. Ira Dei, 9, probably repeat after him. Likewise Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 4, p. 1075, says: Even Theodorus and those who shared his views did not declare God to be corruptible, ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν ὡς ἔστι τι aplapтov. Epiph. (Expos. Fid. 1089, A.) also asserts that he denied the existence of a God. In the face of these agreeing testimonies, the assertion of Clemens (Pædag. 15, A.), that Theodorus and others had wrongly been called atheists, and that they only denied the popular Gods, their lives being otherwise good, can be of little weight. Theodorus no doubt denied the Gods of the people in the first place, but it was not his intention to distinguish between them and the true God. The anecdotes in Diog. ii. 101, 116, give the impression of insincerity. 2 Diog. iv. 54: woλλà de kal ἀθεώτερον προσεφέρετο τοῖς ὁμι λοῦσι τοῦτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσas but in his last illness he was overcome with remorse, and had recourse to enchantments. The argument quoted by Sen. Benef. vii. 7, 1, to prove that every one and that no one commits sacrilege is more a rhetorical and intellectual work of skill. The view of Euemerus respecting the Gods is briefly as follows: There are two kinds of Gods-heavenly and incorruptible beings, who are honoured by men as Gods, such as the sun, the stars, the winds; and dead men, who were raised to the rank of Gods for their benefits to mankind. Diodorus in Eus. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 52. To the latter class of beings Euemerus referred the whole of Mythology, and supposed it to be a history of princes and Aristippus did not altogether satisfy him. He was fain to admit that pleasure and pain do not merely depend on ourselves and our inner state, but also in a great measure on external circumstances; and he therefore sought such a definition of the highest good as should secure happiness to the wise man, and make that happiness dependent on his prudence.1 This result, he thought, would be reached if happiness were made to consist, not in individual pleasures, but in a cheerful state of mind-and conversely evil, not in individual feelings of pain, but in an unhappy tone of mind; for feelings being the effects of impressions from without, states of mind are in our own power.2 Accordingly, Theodorus asserted that in themselves pleasure and pain are neither good nor bad; goodness consists in cheerfulness, evil in sadness; the former proceeds from prudence, the latter from folly; therefore pursue prudence and justice, eschew princesses, Uranus, Cronus, Zeus, Rhea, &c. For further particulars respecting this rationalising history of the Gods, consult Steinhart, Allg. Encyclo. Art. Euhemerus. V. Sieroka, De Euhemero. 1 These reasons are not mentioned in so many words, but they follow from Theodorus' positions about the highest good, and also from the stress which, according to Diog. 98, he laid on the avтáρreia of the wise man, and the difference he made between wisdom and folly. 2 Probably what Cic. (Tusc. iii. 13, 28; 14, 31) quotes as Cyrenaic doctrine belongs to CHAP. XIV. |