СНАР. (2) Hegesias. ignorance and wrong-doing. Occasionally he himself displayed a fearlessness and an indifference to life 2 which would have done honour to a Cynic. Not that the theory of pleasure was therewith surrendered, but the older setting of that theory was changed. In place of individual pleasures, a state of mind was substituted, independent of the mere feelings of enjoyment and pleasure. Instead of a cheerful resignation to the impressions of the moment, the highest good was made to consist in rising superior to circumstances. Hegesias went a step further. He, too, adheres to the general maxims of Aristippus. With him good is identical with pleasure, evil with unhappiness all that we do, we do only for ourselves; if services are rendered to others, it is only because advantages are expected in return.3 But on looking 1 Diog. 98: Téλos d'úπeλáμßave χαρὰν καὶ λυπήν· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ φρονήσει, τὴν δ ̓ ἐπὶ ἀφροσύνῃ· ἀγαθὰ δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις, μέσα dè dovǹv kaì Tóvov. That justice should be reckoned among good things may be brought into agreement with what is quoted p. 266, 3. It is to be recommended, because it protects us from the unpleasant consequences of forbidden actions, and from the disquiet which the prospect of these consequences produces, although such actions are not in themselves inadmissible. 2 When at the court of Lysimachus, he so enraged the latter by his frankness (Diog. 102; Plut. Exil. 16; Philo, Qu. Omn. Pr. Tib. p. 606, 884, C.) that Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, upon which Theodorus uttered the celebrated saying, that it was indifferent to him whether he went to corruption in the earth or in the air. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102; Valer. Max. vi. 2, 3; Plut. An. Vitios. 3, p. 499; Stob. Floril. 2, 23, attribute another saying to him on the same occasion, attributing to Anaxarchus the above passage in Stob. Floril. 2, 23. 3 Diog. ii. 93 : οἱ δὲ Ηγησιακοί λεγόμενοι σκοποὺς μὲν εἶχον τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον, μήτε δὲ χάριν τι εἶναι μήτε φιλίαν μήτε εὐεργεσίαν, διὰ τὰ μὴ δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα 1 XIV. round to discover wherein true pleasure is to be CHAP. found, Hegesias met with no very consoling answer. Our life, he says, is full of trouble ; the numerous sufferings of the body affect the soul also, disturbing its peace; fortune in numberless ways crosses our wishes; man cannot reckon upon a satisfactory state of mind, in a word, upon happiness. Even the practical wisdom, upon which Aristippus relied, affords to his mind no security ; for perceptions, according to the old Cyrenaic maxim, not showing us things as they are in themselves, if we are always obliged to act according to probabilities, who can be sure that our calculations will come true ? 2 And if happiness cannot be had, it is surely foolish to try for it; enough if we can but fortify ourselves against the sufferings of life; freedom from pain, not pleasure, is our goal. Yet how may this goal be reached in a world where so much trouble and pain falls to our αἱρεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς χρείας αὐτάς [probably αὐτῶν], ὧν ἀπόντων μηδ' ἐκεῖνα ὑπάρχει». Ibid. 95 : τόν τε σοφὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα πράξειν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπίσης ἄξιον αὐτῷ· κὰν γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα δοκῇ παρά του καρποῦσθαι, μὴ εἶναι ἀντάξια ὧν αὐτὸς παράσχῃ. Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, B., says the same, but less accurately. • Diog. 94: τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅλως ἀδύνατον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα πολλῶν ἀναπεπλῆσθαι παθημάτων, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν συμπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ ταράττεσθαι, τὴν δὲ τύχην πολλὰ τῶν κατ ̓ ἐλπίδα κωλύειν· ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα ἀνύπαρκτον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι. See p. 343, 1. 2 Diog. 95 : ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀκριβούσας τὴν ἐτίο γνωσιν, τῶν τ ̓ εὐλόγως φαινομένων πάντα πράττειν. We insert this sentence in the connection of the doctrine of Hegesias, where it most probably belongs, without, however, unconditionally guaranteeing for it this relation. 3 Diog. 95 : τόν τε σοφὸν οὐχ οὕτω πλεονάσειν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρέσει, ὡς ἐν τῇ τῶν κακῶν φυγῇ, τέλος τιθέμενον τὸ μὴ ἐπιπόνως ζῆν μηδὲ λυπηρῶς· ὃ δὴ περιγένεσθαι τοῖς ἀδιαφορήσασι, περὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς. CHAP. lot? Clearly not at all as long as peace of mind depends upon external things and circumstances; contentment is only then sure, when we are indifferent to everything which produces pleasure or pain.1 These, as Hegesias observes, depend ultimately, not upon things, but upon our attitude towards things; in itself nothing is pleasant or unpleasant, but makes a varied impression, according to our tone and condition.2 Neither riches nor poverty affect the happiness of life; the rich not being happier than the poor. Neither freedom, nor slavery, high nor low rank, honour nor dishonour, are conditions of the amount of pleasure we receive. Indeed, life only appears a good thing to a fool; to the wise man it is indifferent.3 No Stoic or Cynic could more sternly denounce the value of external things than the pupil of Aristippus here does. With these principles is connected the noble and thoroughly Socratie maxim that faults do not call for anger, nor human beings for hatred, but only for instruction, since no one intentionally does what is wrong; desiring what is pleasant, everyone desires what is good; and as the wise man does not allow his peace of mind to depend on things external, neither does he allow it to be ruffled by the faults of others. 1 See preceding note. 2 Diog. 94: púσel t' ovdèv ådù ἢ ἀηδὲς ὑπελάμβανον· διὰ δὲ σπάνιεν ἢ ξενισμὸν ἢ κόριν τοὺς μὲν ἥδεσθαι τοὺς δ ̓ ἀηδῶς ἔχειν 3 Ibid. 95: καὶ τῷ μὲν ἄφρονι τὸ ζῆν λυσιτελές, εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φρονίμῳ ἀδιάφορον • which pro 4 bably only bears the sense given in the text. Similarly Epiphanius, l. c. ; conf. p. 343, 1. 4 Ibid. : ἔλεγον τὰ ἁμαρτήματα συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ἑκόντα ἁμαρτάνειν, αλλά TIVI πάθει κατηναγκασμένον· καὶ μὴ μισήσειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μεταδιδάζειν. СНАР. XIV. In the theory of Hegesias it is seen more decidedly even than in that of Theodorus, that the doctrine of pleasure is unsatisfactory. It is even expressly admitted that human life has about it more of sorrow than joy, and hence a perfect indifference to things outward is insisted upon. But what right has Hegesias to identify pleasure with the good, and pain with evil? After all, the good is that which is the condition of our well-being; if this be indifference rather than pleasure, indifference and not pleasure is the good; the doctrine of pleasure has come round to its opposite-the Cynic independence of everything external. Not that the Cyrenaic school could avow this as its general principle without surrendering its own position; still it is distinctly avowed within that school that pleasure is not in all cases the highest motive. Anniceris indeed maintained that the aim (3) Anniof every action is the pleasure resulting therefrom; and, like the older Cyrenaics, he would not hear of a general aim of life, nor substitute freedom from pain in the place of pleasure.1 He observed too that by pleasure only our own pleasure can be understood; for of the feelings of others, according to the old 1 Clemens, Strom. ii. 417, B.: οἱ δὲ ̓Αννικέρειοι καλούμενοι τοῦ μὲν ὅλου βίου τέλος οὐδὲν ὡρισμένον ἔταξαν, ἑκάστης δὲ πράξεως ἴδιον ὑπάρχειν τέλος, την ἐκ τῆς πράξεως περιγινομένην ἡδονὴν, οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τουτἐστι τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, ἀθετοῦσι νεκροῦ κατάστασιν άπокаλOÛνTES. See p. 354, 1. This would justify the inaccurate statement in Diog. ii. 96: oi 8 ceris. CHAP. teaching of his School, we can know nothing. Yet pleasure is not only caused by enjoyments of the senses, but by intercourse with other men and by honourable pursuits. Hence, Anniceris allowed to friendship, gratitude, family affection, and patriotism an independent value, quite apart from the benefit resulting from these relations. He even went so far as to say that the wise man would make sacrifices for them, nor would his happiness suffer from his so doing, even if there remained to him but little actual enjoyment.3 This admission brought him round to the ordinary view of life, to which he approximated still further by attaching less value to prudence, the second element in the Cyrenaic doctrine of morals, than Aristippus had done. In fact, he denied that prudence alone is sufficient to make us safe and to raise us above the prejudices of the masses; there must be practice as well, to overcome the effect of perverse use.1 1 Diog. 96: τήν τε τοῦ φίλου εὐδαιμονίαν δι ̓ αὐτὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀρετὴν, μηδὲ γὰρ αἰσθητὴν τῷ πέλας ὑπάρχειν. See p. 350, 1. 2 Clemens, 1. c. continues : χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. Comp. Cic. Off. iii. 33, 116. See p. 347, 2. The expression in Clement, τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως περιγινομένην ἡδονὴν, probably refers not only to the pleasure resulting from an action, but to the pleasure immediately bound up therewith. s Diog. 96: ἀπέλιπον δὲ καὶ φιλίαν ἐν βίῳ καὶ χάριν καὶ πρὸς γονέας τιμὴν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τι πράξειν. ὅθεν, διὰ ταῦτα κἂν ὀχλήσεις ἀναδέξηται ὁ σοφὸς, οὐδὲν ἧττον εὐδαιμονήσει, κἂν ὀλίγα ἡδέα περιγένηται αὐτῷ. Ibid. 97 : τόν τε φίλον μὴ διὰ τὰς χρείας μόνον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ὧν ὑπολειπουσῶν μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν γεγονυίαν εὔνοιαν· ἧς ἕνεκα καὶ πόνους ὑπομενεῖν, καί τοι τιθέμενον ἡδονὴν τέλος καὶ ἀχθόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ στέρεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅμως ἑκουσίως ὑπομενεῖν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν φίλον στοργήν. 4 Ibid. 96 : μὴ εἶναί τε αὐτάρκη τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ θαῤῥῆσαι καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ὑπεράνω γενέσθαι· δεῖν δ ̓ ἀνεθίζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἐκ πολλοῦ συντραφεῖσαν ἡμῖν φαύλην διάθεσιν, |