Page images


ignorance and wrong-doing. Occasionally he himself displayed a fearlessness and an indifference to life? which would have done honour to a Cynic. Not that the theory of pleasure was therewith surrendered, but the older setting of that theory was changed. In place of individual pleasures, a state of mind was substituted, independent of the mere feelings of enjoyment and pleasure. Instead of a cheerful resignation to the impressions of the moment, the highest good was made to consist in rising superior to circumstances.

Hegesias went a step further. He, too, adheres to the general maxims of Aristippus. With him good is identical with pleasure, evil with unhappiness: all that we do, we do only for ourselves; if services are rendered to others, it is only because advantages are expected in return. But on looking

(2) Hegesias.

· Diog. 98 : Téos d'úne dubave 102; Plut. Exil. 16; Philo, Qu. χαράν και λυπήν την μεν επί Omn. Pr. Tib. p. 606, 884, C.) φρονήσει, τήν δ' επί αφροσύνη • that Lysimachus threatened to åvald opóvno i kaì dikalogúvnv, crucify him, upon which Theoκακά δε τας εναντίας έξεις, μέσα dorus uttered the celebrated dè ñdovnu każ móvov. That justice saying, that it was indifferent should be reckoned among to him whether he went to good things may be brought corruption in the earth or in into agreement with what is the air. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102; quoted p. 266, 3. It is to be Valer. Max. vi. 2, 3; Plut. An. recommended, because it pro- Vitios. 3, p. 499; Stob. Floril. tects us from the unpleasant 2, 23, attribute another saying consequences of forbidden ac- to him on the same occasion, tions, and from the disquiet attributing to Anaxarchus the which the prospect of these above passage in Stob. Floril. consequences produces, al. 2, 23. though such actions are not in 3 Diog. ii. 93 : oi dè 'Hynolako themselves inadmissible. λεγόμενοι σκοπούς μεν είχον τους

2 When at the court of Ly- αυτούς ηδονήν και πόνον, μήτε δε simachus, he So enraged the χάριν τι είναι μήτε φιλίαν μήτε latter by his frankness (Diog. ευεργεσίαν, διά το μή δι' αυτά ταύτα


round to discover wherein true pleasure is to be found, Hegesias met with no very consoling answer. Our life, he says, is full of trouble; the numerous sufferings of the body affect the soul also, disturbing its peace; fortune in numberless ways crosses our wishes; man cannot reckon upon a satisfactory state of mind, in a word, upon happiness. Even the practical wisdom, upon which Aristippus relied, affords to his mind no security; for perceptions, according to the old Cyrenaic maxim, not showing us things as they are in themselves, if we are always obliged to act according to probabilities, who can be sure that our calculations will come true ?? And if happiness cannot be had, it is surely foolish to try for it; enough if we can but fortify ourselves against the sufferings of life; freedom from pain, not pleasure, is our goal. Yet how may this goal be reached in a world where so much trouble and pain falls to our


αιρείσθαι ημάς αυτά, αλλά δια τας p. 343, 1.
χρείας αυτάς [probably αυτών], hog. 95 : ανήρουν δε και τας
ών απόντων μηδ' εκείνα υπάρχειν. αισθήσεις ουκ ακριβούσας την ετί-
Ibid. 95 : τόν τε σοφον εαυτου γνωσιν, των τευλόγως φαινομένων
ένεκα πάντα πράξειν ουδένα γαρ πάντα πράττειν. We insert this
ηγείσθαι των άλλων επίσης άξιον sentence in the connection of
αυτώ καν γαρ τα μέγιστα δοκή the doctrine of Hegesias, where
παρά του καρπούσθαι, μη είναι it most probably belongs, with-
αντάξια ών αυτός παράσχη. Epiph. out, however, unconditionally
Exp. Fid. 1089, B., says the guaranteeing for it this rela-
same, but less accurately. tion.

1 Diog. 94 : την ευδαιμονίαν Diog. 95 : τόν τε σοφόν ουχ
όλως αδύνατον είναι το μεν γαρ ούτω πλεονάσειν εν τη των αγαθών
σώμα πολλών αναπεπλήσθαι παθη- αιρέσει, ώς εν τη των κακών φυγή,
μάτων, την δε ψυχήν συμπαθείν τέλος τιθέμενον το μή επιπόνως την
τω σώματι και ταράττεσθαι, την μηδε λυπηρώς· και δη περιγένεσθαι
δέ τύχην πολλά των κατ' ελπίδα τοίς αδιαφορήσασι, περί τα ποιητικά
κωλύειν ώστε διά ταύτα ανύ- της ηδονής.
παρκτον την ευδαιμονίαν είναι, See

[ocr errors]


lot? Clearly not at all as long as peace of mind depends upon external things and circumstances; contentment is only then sure, when we are indifferent to everything which produces pleasure or pain.' These, as Hegesias observes, depend ultimately, not upon things, but upon our attitude towards things; in itself nothing is pleasant or unpleasant, but makes a varied impression, according to our tone and condition. Neither riches nor poverty affect the happiness of life; the rich not being happier than the poor. Neither freedom, nor slavery, high nor low rank, honour nor dishonour, are conditions of the amount of pleasure we receive. Indeed, life only appears a good thing to a fool; to the wise man it is indifferent.3 No Stoic or Cynic could more sternly denounce the value of external things than the pupil of Aristippus here does. With these principles is connected the noble and thoroughly Socratie maxim that faults do not call for anger, nor human beings for hatred; but only for instruction, since no one intentionally does what is wrong;4 desiring what is pleasant, everyone desires what is good ; and as the wise man does not allow his peace of mind to depend on things external, neither does he allow it to be ruffled by the faults of others.

See preceding note. bably only bears the sense 2 Diog. 94 : Púcel roudèy ý given in the text. Similarly

åndès imendubavov dià dè Epiphanius, 1. c.; conf. p. 343, 1. σπάνιες και ξενισμών η κόριν τους 4 Ιbid. : έλεγον τα αμαρτήματα μεν ήδεσθαι τους δ' αηδώς έχειν συγγι ώμης τυγχάνειν ου γαρ

3 Ιbid. 95: και τω μεν άφρονι εκόντα αμαρτάνειν, αλλά τινι το ζην λυσιτελές, είναι, το δε πάθει καταναγκασμένος και μη φρονίμω αδιάφορον: which pro- μισήσειν, μάλλον δε μεταδιδάζειν.

In the theory of Hegesias it is seen more decidedly CHAP.

XIV. even than in that of Theodorus, that the doctrine of pleasure is unsatisfactory. It is even expressly admitted that human life has about it more of sorrow than joy, and hence a perfect indifference to things outward is insisted upon. But what right has Hegesias to identify pleasure with the good, and pain with evil ? After all, the good is that which is the condition of our well-being; if this be indifference rather than pleasure, indifference and not pleasure is the good; the doctrine of pleasure has come round to its opposite-the Cynic independence of everything external. Not that the Cyrenaic school could avow this as its general principle without surrendering its own position ; still it is distinctly avowed within that school that pleasure is not in all cases the highest motive. Anniceris indeed maintained that the aim (3) Anni

ceris. of every action is the pleasure resulting therefrom ; and, like the older Cyrenaics, he would not hear of a general aim of life, nor substitute freedom from pain in the place of pleasure. He observed too that by pleasure only our own pleasure can be understood; for of the feelings of others, according to the old

· Clemens, Strom. ii. 417, B.: statement in Diog. ii. 96 : oi 8' οι δε 'Αννικέρειοι καλούμενοι 'Αννικέρειοι τα μεν άλλα κατά του μεν όλου βίου τέλος ουδέν ταυτά τούτοις–the School of ωρισμένον έταξαν, εκάστης δε Hegesias--and also the asserπράξεως ίδιον υπάρχειν τέλος, την tion (Suid. 'Αννίκ.) that Anni

της πράξεως περιγινομένην ceris, although living, accord. ηδονήν, ούτοι οι Κυρηναϊκοι τον ing to Suidas, in the time of όρον της ηδονής Επικούρου, τουτ. Alexander, was an Epicurean. έστι την του αλγούντος υπεξαί- Cicero and Diogenes likewise ρεσιν, αθετουσι νεκρου κατάστασιν affirm that his School declared årokaroûvtes. See p. 354, 1. This pleasure to be the good. would justify the inaccurate

[ocr errors]


teaching of his School, we can know nothing. Yet pleasure is not only caused by enjoyments of the senses, but by intercourse with other men and by honourable pursuits. Hence, Anniceris allowed to friendship, gratitude, family affection, and patriotism an independent value, quite apart from the benefit resulting from these relations. He even went so far as to say that the wise man would make sacrifices for them, nor would his happiness suffer from his so doing, even if there remained to him but little actual enjoyment. This admission brought him round to the ordinary view of life, to which he approximated still further by attaching less value to prudence, the second element in the Cyrenaic doctrine of morals, than Aristippus had done. In fact, he denied that prudence alone is sufficient to make us safe and to raise us above the prejudices of the masses ; there must be practice as well, to overcome the effect of perverse use.*

Diog. 96 : τήν τε του φίλου πράξειν. όθεν, διά ταύτα καν όχλήευδαιμονίαν δι' αυτήν μή είναι σεις αναδέξηται ο σοφός, ουδέν αρετήν, μηδέ γάρ αισθητήν τη ήττον ευδαιμονήσει, κάν ολίγα ήδέα πέλας υπάρχειν. See p. 350, 1. περιγένηται αυτό. Ιbid. 97 : τον Clemens,

1. C. continues : τε φίλον μή διά τάς χρείας μόνον χαίρειν γάρ ήμας μή μόνον επί αποδέχεσθαι, ών υπολειπουσών μη ήδοναίς, αλλά και επί ομιλίαις και επιστρέφεσθαι· αλλά και παρά την επί φιλοτιμίαις. Comp. Cic. Off. γεγονοίαν εύνοιαν' ής ένεκα και iii. 33, 116. See p. 347, 2. πόνους υπομενείν, και τοι τιθέμενον The expression in Clement, την ηδονήν τέλος και αχθόμενον επί τη εκ της πράξεως περιγινομένην στέρεσθαι αυτής όμως εκουσίως ηδονήν, probably refers not only υπομενειν διά την προς τον φίλον to the pleasure resulting from στοργήν. . an action, but to the pleasure 4 Ιbid. 96 : μή είναι τε αυτάρκη immediately bound up there- τον λόγον προς το θαρρήσαι και with. .

της των πολλών δόξης υπεράνω 3 Diog. 96 : απέλιπον δε και γενέσθαι· δείν δ' ανεθίζεσθαι διά φιλίαν εν βίω και χάριν και προς την πολλού συντραφείσαν ημίν γονέας τιμήν και υπέρ πατρίδος τι φαύλην διάθεσιν,


« PreviousContinue »