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the Sapóviov in the sense of Socrates, no genius, no separate and distinct person, can be understood, but only indefinitely some heavenly voice or divine revelation. No passage in Plato or Xenophon speaks of Socrates holding intercourse with a genius.1 We only hear of a divine or heavenly sign,2 of a voice heard by Socrates,3 of some supernatural guidance by which many warnings were vouchsafed to him." All that these expressions imply is, that Socrates was conscious within of divine revelations, but how produced and whence coming they say absolutely nothing, nay their very indefiniteness proves clearly enough, that neither Socrates nor his pupils had any
daioviov. Theæt. 151, A.: Tò
5 Doubtless Socrates regarded God or the deity as its ultimate source. But he expresses nc opinion as to whether it came herefrom.
very clear notion on the subject.' These revelations, moreover, always refer to particular actions, and
1 It is much the same thing whether τὸ δαιμόνιον be taken for a substantive or an adjective. The probable rights of the case are, as Krische, Forsch. 229 remarks, that Xenophon uses it as a substantive θεῖον or ὁ θεὸς, whereas Plato uses it as an adjective, explaining it as δαίμονιον σημεῖον, and says δαιμόνιόν μοι γίγνεται. The grammar will admit of either. Conf. Arist. Rhet. ii. 23, 1398 a, 15. When, therefore, Ast cites Xenophon against Plato's explanation of δαιμόνια as δαιμόνια πράγματα, he probably commits a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. The very difference between Xenophon and Plato proves how loosely Socrates spoke of the δαιμόνιον.
2 This applies to all the instances of its intervention mentioned by Plato and Xenophon. They are the following: (1) Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, where Socrates, when urged to prepare a defence, replies: ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος, φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. (2) Plato Apol. 31, D.: Why did not Socrates busy himself with political matters? The δαιμόνιον was the reason : τοῦτ ̓ ἔστιν μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. (3) Ibid. (after his condemnation): a singular occurrence took place, yàp εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν νυνὶ δὲ, . . .
οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ ̓ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. (4) Plato, Theæt. 151, A.: if sucli as have withdrawn from my society, again return, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ. Add to these cases a few others in which Socrates himself more or less jokes about the δαιμόνιον, which deserve to be mentioned because it there appears in the same character as elsewhere. (5) Xen. Symp. 8, 5, where Antisthenes throws in Socrates' teeth: τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι τοτὲ δ ̓ ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος. (6) Plato Phædr. 242, B., when Socrates wished to depart: τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπίεναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. (7) Ibid. Euthyd. 272, E.; as Socrates was about to leave the Lyceum, ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, he therefore sat down again, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus really came in. In all these cases the daμóviov appears to have been an inward voice deterring the philosopher from a particular action. Even the more general statement that the δαιμόνιον always made its warnings heard whenever So
according to Plato assume the form of prohibitions. Sometimes the Saμóviov stops him from saying or doing something.1 It only indirectly points out what should be done, by approving what it does not forbid. In a similar way it indirectly enables Socrates to advise his friends by not hindering him from approving their schemes, either by word or by silence.2 The subjects respecting which the vov only have reference to particular future actions (not only of Socrates, but of others), from which it dissuades. The two latter authorities are, however, worthless.
crates thought of a political career, falls in with this conception of it. In a similar sense the passage in the Republic vi. 496, D. should be understood, when Socrates remarks that most of those who
had the capacity for philosophy were diverted therefrom by other interests, unless peculiar circumstances kept them, such as sickness, which was a hindrance to political life. τὸ δ ̓ ἢμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γὰρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ η οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The heavenly sign keeps Socrates true to his philosophical calling, by opposing him whenever he contemplates taking up anything else, as for instance, politics. Consequently, not even this passage compels us to give another meaning to its utter ances than they bear according to Plato's express words, as conveying a judgment respecting the admissibility of definite action, either contemplated or commenced by Socrates. Even at the commencement of the spurious ‘Alcibiades,' this is all that is discussed, and in the Theages. 128, D., the prophecies of the dauó
1 Apol. 31, D.: ὅτι μοι θεῖόν
2 From the Platonic statements respecting the δαιμόνιον which have just been given, Xenophon's statements differ, making it not only restraining but preventing, and not only having reference to the actions of Socrates but to those of other people. Mem. i. 1, 4 (Apol. 12): τὸ γὰρ δαιμόνιον ἔφη σημαίνειν, καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προσηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίVOVTOS καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθοaμένοις μετέμελε. Ibid. iv. 3, 12 : σοὶ δ ̓ ἔφη (Euthydemus), ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι (sc. οἱ θεοὶ) εἴγε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπό σου προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν kal & μh. Still both statements may be harmonised as in the
heavenly voice makes itself heard are in point of value and character very different. Besides a concern of such deep personal interest to Socrates as his judicial condemnation, besides a question having such a farreaching influence on his whole activity as that whether he should take part in public life or not, it expresses itself on occasions quite unimportant.' It is in fact a voice so familiar to Socrates and his friends, that whilst regarded as a something enigmatical, mysterious, and unknown before, affording, too, a special proof of divine providence, it can nevertheless be discussed without awe and mystery in easy and even in flippant language. The facts of the phenomenon resolve themselves into this, that not unfrequently Socrates was kept back by a dim feeling based on no conscious consideration, in which he discerned a heavenly sign and a divine hint, from carrying out some thought or intention. Were he asked why this sign had been vouchsafed to him, from his point of view the reply would be, because that from which it deterred him would be harmful to himself or others. In order, therefore, to justify
text. Evidently Plato is more
before all things at proving
: πάνυ πυκνή. Ibid.
3 It will be subsequently
the utterances of the Saíuoviov, and to give its raison d'être, he attempted to prove that the actions which it approved or occasioned were the most beneficial and advantageous.' The Saíuoviov appeared therefore to him as an internal revelation from heaven respecting the result of his actions, in a word as an internal oracle. As such it is expressly included, both by Xenophon 2 and Plato,3 under the general conception of divination, and placed on a par with divination by sacrifice and the flight of birds. Of it is therefore true what Xenophon's Socrates remarks respecting all divination, that it may only be resorted to for cases which man cannot discover himself by reflection.*
2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 3; iv. 3, 12; i. 4, 14. Conf. Apol. 12.
3 Apol. 40, A.; Phæd. 242, C.; Euthyphro, 3, B.
4 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 6: тà μèv ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ ̓ ἄν πραχθῆναι ὁ περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἂν ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα. For this reason, therefore, divination was required: TEKTOVIKOV μèv yàp χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἶκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετέα ἐνόμιζε εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι Toîs aveрúτois. The greatest things, however, as is immediately explained, are the consequences of actions, the question whether they are useful