Natural Theology: Or, Essays on the Existence of Deity and of Providence, on the Immateriality of the Soul, and a Future State, Volume 2

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Page 592 - Thou art, of what sort the eternal life of the saints was to be, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.
Page 296 - Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ; Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, "Surely the darkness shall cover me," even the night shall be light about me. Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and...
Page 621 - It is the very nature of compassion or sympathy, as the word implies, to "rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep.
Page 296 - Surely the darkness shall cover me; even the night shall be light about me.' 12 Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the night shineth as the day; the darkness and the light are both alike to thee.
Page 264 - Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously ; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.
Page 179 - Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others which fall under daily observation.
Page 594 - Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.
Page 374 - Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with matter: that we cannot conceive how medullary substance can perceive, remember, judge, reason ? I acknowledge that we are entirely ignorant how the parts of the brain accomplish these purposes...
Page 129 - ... exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist ; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being ; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.
Page 124 - To suppose two or more different natures existing of themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, implies this plain contradiction; that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and, consequently, neither of them will be necessarily existing.

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