CHAPTER I.

THE REGULATION OF THE IDEAS AND VOLITIONS.

IN describing the relations between the brain and the inferior centres of nervous activity, it was necessary to give some account of the origin of Ideas, and of the influence of association in causing their recall. This account, however, was intended to illustrate the mode of action peculiar to the brain, rather than the ideas themselves, which are the fruits or results of its operations; and, in the present chapter, it will be proper to pursue a different course. The attention of the reader will, therefore, be directed to the process of ideation, apart from all notice of its material organ; and to the conditions, and the control, of the associative tendency, apart from all considerations of physical change.

Commencing with the formation of ideas, it will be remembered that they arise, in the mind of a child, as interpretations, so to speak, of its feelings. A simple idea, when first excited, is a perception of the nature or immediate cause of a sensation. For example, the idea of hardness would be immediately consequent upon the feel of a resisting substance; that of roundness, upon the sight or touch of a spherical object; that of colour, upon the sight of something possessing

it; and so on. These, after having once been impressed upon the consciousness, may return before it at any time; and their return is commonly dependent upon the law of association, which tends to reproduce former combinations of thought. From this it happens that all the simple ideas excited by the several sensible qualities of a familiar object, by its hardness, its outline, its colour, etc, etc., are so constantly united in the mind, and are habitually contemplated in such immediate succession, that the separation between them ceases to be perceived; and they form, in the aggregate, an idea of the object itself, in which all its known qualities are included. Such ideas are said to be complex; and, from the results of a natural and unavoidable comparison between them, a third, and more advanced class, soon begins to be developed.

This third class of ideas, consisting of those which are denominated abstract, has its origin, probably, in a kind of analysis of that knowledge which the possession of several complex ideas will afford. The child is insensibly led to perceive that those qualities, whose recognition was among the first operations of his consciousness, may be possessed in common by distinct objects, and may be combined in widely different proportions. Hence he will abstract (i. e. separate or withdraw) these qualities, in his mind, from the other qualities of the objects in which he is accustomed to see them; and will be enabled to imagine their existence by themselves, or under circumstances of which he has, as yet, had no experience.

In this manner, the knowledge of objects and of

their qualities being gradually enlarged by observation, it is possible to conceive the formation of a great number of ideas, both simple and complex ; some of them sensational, and having reference only to external things; others intellectual, and dealing with the mind itself, and with its relations to the surrounding universe.

But, as the growth and the mental capacity increase, the child is taught to distinguish its ideas by names; and, with the gradual mastery of language, there dawns a new era upon the intellectual life. The several qualities, ascertained by the other senses, can then be combined into new complex ideas, in conformity with verbal descriptions; and, not only so, but the sense of hearing itself is enabled to convey new qualities to the mind, its impressions being strictly objective, and holding the same position in regard to the brain, as those arising either from sight or touch. The combination of all these sources of information, (especially when the advancement of each successive age is rendered permanent by written records), appears to be sufficient for the gradual acquirement of all human knowledge; in so far as it relates to the conditions, or the occurrences, of the present state of being, and is not concerned with those truths which are learned from Revelation alone.

There is one important class of intellectual ideas, comprising those sentiments to which the term moral is applied in common parlance; and serving to illustrate how completely the human mind is dependent, for the comprehension of anything, upon the simple

ideas of qualities which result from the first contact of an infant with the world around it; qualities which the adult can scarcely appreciate more clearly, except in recognizing various degrees of their presence, and of their display. Many of the moral feelings arise spontaneously in the minds of all persons; although their intensity and combinations vary, in accordance with differences of education or temperament. But the method of expressing or describing them is derived entirely from a metaphorical application of certain words, which have been invented in order to express the material qualities, or physical changes, of the universe; and, except by this means, it is impossible to convey any idea of their nature or effects. The generic term emotion, and the description of moral excellence by words which signify physical elevation, such as high, lofty, exalted, and the like, are examples sufficient to illustrate the real nature of the language of the passions. It frequently happens, too, that the sensational idea thus blended with the intellectual, and used as the medium of its expression, absolutely obscures the mental consciousness with regard to the true nature of the conception at issue. A striking instance of this is furnished by the great mass of unreflecting persons, who suffer an idea of physical elevation to blend itself, however confusedly, with their notions of the Divine Attributes.

Having thus glanced at the sources from which ideas first enter the mind, it will be requisite to consider, at somewhat greater length, the manner in which they are habitually recalled to it; or, in other words, to describe that spontaneous succession of

the thoughts, which, during our waking hours, is continued without intermission.

In the ordinary state of consciousness, each idea that is brought before the mind, is found, after a brief period, to suggest another; and then to be disregarded, in order that the attention may dwell upon its successor. The transitions thus effected may either be extremely gradual, as in the case of connected reasoning; or they may pass through various degrees of abruptness, to that complete dislocation of the thoughts which is characteristic of some of the forms of insanity. Every idea may be regarded as a centre, from which a great number of lines diverge; each of them affording a track, along which the mind may travel in its farther progress: and the selection that is made between them being sometimes guided by definite rules; sometimes left to the most casual combination of circumstances. There are, however, for almost every individual, certain directions more attractive than the rest; and certain classes of ideas which take the firmest hold upon the memory, and present themselves most readily to the consciousness. These peculiarities may always be ascribed to the influence of volitional, or of automatic, attention; and the thoughts are said either to be directed, or to be led, into the particular channel of their exercise.

It is readily apparent that each successive link in a chain of ideas must afford a fresh starting point to the mind, and one that may turn its attention towards a new subject, having little or no connection with those which it had previously contemplated. But it is

For an example of this see page 50.