were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth, could not persuade themselves, that a man, who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had used essences and perfumes; had worn the rich stuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and the profusion of all things. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon like, he would assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural to him; and though he inwardly Ead an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple and unconstrained air. With some, he bad all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal and austere; in lonia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure, made up his whole life; in Thrace, he was always on horseback or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.*

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timea, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leoty chides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call hin Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

SECTION XI.-DESCRIPTION OF SYRACUse.

As the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history, the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients, I therefore judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which will also be found the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its two harbours, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful and most powerful among the Grecian cities. We are told its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, however cloudy it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.t

It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.§

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, viz. the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, viz. Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added. The ISLAND, situated to the south, was called Noos. (Nasos) signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. This quarter or division of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it, master of the two ports which surround it. It was for this reason the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusans to inhabit the island.||

There was in this island a very famous spring, called Arethusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow

Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

† Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117-119. Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nulla unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent.A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709.-Strad. 1. vi. p. 269. Strab. I. vi. P. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. 1. iii. e. 26."

Cic. Verr. 8. n. 26.

Cic. Verr. 2. n. 97.

of probability, supposed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the spring or fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction which gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:

ACHRADINA, situated entirely on the sea-side, towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

TYCHE, SO called from the temple of fortune, Tuxn which embel'ished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was thickly inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated on the north of the city.

EPIPOLE, was a hill outside of the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the foot of Euryalus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops, against the attacks of the enemy: Euryalus was the pass of entrance which led to Epipolæ. On Epipole was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after (under Dionysius the tyrant) that Epipole was surrounded with walls, and enclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called NEAPOLIS, that is, the New City, which covered Tyche.

The river Anapis ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two marshes, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lysimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympus standing there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city. *

Syracuse had two harbours, very near one another, and separated only by the island, viz. the great harbour, and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with the buildings of the city.†

The great harbour was a little more than five thousand paces or two leagues in circumference. It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed on one side by the point of the island Ortygia, and on the other, by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or castle of the same name. Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus. SECTION XII.-NICIAS, AFTER SOME ENGAGEMENTS, BESIEGES SYRACUSE, &c.

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

At the end of the summer, news was brought to Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to attack him even in his camp; and asked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Sy

*Plut. in Dionys. Vit. p. 970.

Portus habet prope in ædificatione aspectuque urbus inclusos.-Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117. According to Strabo, it is eighty stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proo hat this passage of Strabo is incorrect.-Cluver. p. 167.

racuse The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution, and world not fail to charge him, the instant be should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, would, upon the first advice they should have of their march, fall upon him, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and to be able to seize without opposition upon an advantageous post, which a Syracusan exile had discovered him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false information to be given to the enemy, viz. that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take place on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans, on this promise, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by daybreak in the great harbour; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy, finding themselves shamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuse; and, in the greatest rage, drew up in order of battle, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain accompanied with thunder and lightning, falling unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were unexperienced, and the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempest, while their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the season and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracurans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia, to prevent its being plundered.*

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself only had been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with a design to return early in the next spring, and lay siege to the city. To do this, they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, who, they supposed would join them the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sert an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the borders of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that the enemy, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune, rather than to their merit; that the command being equally divided among so many leaders (fifteen) tended inc vi

Thucyd. 1. vi. p. 453-461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 137, 138.

tably to confusion and disobedience, and had been prejudicial to them; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recall their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. They accordingly took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city, called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea shore, where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

The ambassadors of Syracuse, having arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily, and at the same time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it never being able to recover that blow; for by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malcontents and partisans of Sparta.* Nicias had received some succour from Athens. It consisted of two hundred and fifty horsemen, whom the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horse in Sicily, the troops bringing only the furniture, and of forty horse archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thousand French crowns. Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures; however, when once he entered upon an action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracusans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to their city; and knowing that they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the hill of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching, therefore, down into the meadow or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed seven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; and commanded them to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had no time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the ene

Thucyd. 1. vi. p. 471.-482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535.
†Three hundred and thirty thousand dollars.
A. M. 3590.
13

VOL. II.

I

Diod. 1. xiii. p. 138.
Ant. J. C. 414.

my's having the least suspicion of his design. Having arrived at the port of Trogilus, near Leontium which is but a quarter of a league, six or seven fur longs, from Epipolæ, he set his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a stoccade.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryalus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis, at about a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced in confusion, but were easily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead on the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians three hundred horse, to which some of the Sicilian allies added a hundred more; that, with the two hundred and fifty sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of six hundred and fifty borse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea."

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche, as far as Trogilus, situated on the sea-side. This work was carried on with a rapidity that terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of the work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation, northward, was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians, and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, or at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any farther progress in their work; or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible, with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

They accordingly, came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and, in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracusan soldiers who had been left to guard the wall very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard, they detached three hundred chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent