them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all: for hitherto the enemy retiring, after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it were continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for, in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates, and in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Euboea, and which before had a much shorter pas sage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thousand slaves, the greater part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a great scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.* He In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island; and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it: that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition, and the situation of the city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and in trepidity; that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.† This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuse, which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to surprise the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also; and with twenty-five ships sailed to fight the thirty-five Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour; and opposed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out. Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by daybreak; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage, the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour, after having forced the Athenians, bulged furiously, one against the other, as they entered it in disorder; and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost A. M. 2591. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. 1. vi. p. 494-496. et 502-504. Diod. 1. xiii. P. 140 three; and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp. The Syracusans also raised three trophies for the capture of the three forts; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, while the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously; whereas, after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting, the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Atheni ans could have no provisions but from the point of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into great consternation. There was afterwards a little skirmish in defending a stoccade, which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, advanced it as near as possible to the stoccade, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships which carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two; the besieged defending themselves with their harbour, and the enemies with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were ⚫ immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.* One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet, and other succours sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; nor to tack about after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of that harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.t Gylippus, therefore, first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advan ced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; while the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their gal leys set sail. Nicias did not care to venture a second battle, saying, as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment, should he, as his troops were in Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 500, 501. t Ilid. p. 500-13. Pict. in Nic p. 590. Diod. ferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command of Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this Occasion was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed, should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans ighty. : The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great har bour, without engaging; and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired; and it was just the same with the land forces. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them in safety, in case he should be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly but having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transport ships. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sailyards of those ships, to which were fixed dolphins of lead,* which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once.⚫ The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners. This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind; and he was now involved in greater than any of them by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. While he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such an air as should fill the enemy with dread; it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thousand fighting men, and about three thousand archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.† This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities; all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, to increase daily! Demosthenes, having made an exact inquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time as Nicias had done, This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold who, having spread a universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes, that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war: otherwise, he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting undeci sive battles; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expenses. Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were on the point of abandoning them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion. Ás Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terins, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. Such," said they, are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the eneiny; but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and despised. This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to the opinion, of Demosthenes and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce in it. 66 66 Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that, should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, impleinents, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the daytime undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryalus, as before, unperceived by the sentinels; attacked the first intrenchment, and stormed it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marched forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, marched under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe, and recover from their surprise, they were stopt on a sudden by the Boeotians, who made a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulsed them with great shouts, and made a dreadful slaughter. This spread a universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled, either forced along such as were ad vancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turned their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians sought for one another to no purpose: and from their often asking the word, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because, by their being together, and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those whe fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices. SECTION XIV.—THE ATHENIANS AGAIN HAZARD A SEA-FIGHT, AND ARE DE FEATED. NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXEcuted. THE Athenian generals, after sustaining so great a loss, were in a great dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing; and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise the blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.* Nicias was sensible, that the arguments his colleague used were very just; and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, the report of which would certainly reach the enemy, should complete the ruin of their affairs, and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose: and that otherwise they would be highly displeased; that as those who were to judge them, had not been eye witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion, and at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well, as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens. These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only proper choice they could make, would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay. Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to re Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 531-520. Plia Nic. p. 538-542. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142. |