pon, gave to the Romans the honour of many gallant victories. What such help, or what other worldly help than the golden mettle of their soldiers, had our English kings against the French? Were not the French as well experienced in feats of war? yea, did they not think themselves therein our superiors? Were they not in arms, in horse, and in all provision exceedingly beyond us? Let us hear what a French writer saith of the inequality that was between the French and English, when their king John was ready to give the onset upon the Black Prince at the battle of Poictiers: "e John had all advantages over Edward, both of "number, force, show, country, and conceit, (the which is "commonly a consideration of no small importance in worldly "affairs,) and withal the choice of all his horsemen, (esteem"ed then the best in Europe,) with the greatest and wisest "captains of his whole realm." And what could he wish more?

I think it would trouble a Roman antiquary to find the like example in their histories; the example, I say, of a king brought prisoner to Rome by an army of eight thousand, which he had surrounded with forty thousand, better appointed, and no less expert warriors. This I am sure of, that neither Syphax the Numidian, followed by a rabble of half scullions, as Livy rightly terms them, nor those cowardly kings Perseus and Gentius, are worthy patterns. All that have read of Cressy and Agincourt will bear me witness, that I do not allege the battle of Poictiers for lack of other as good examples of the English virtue; the proof whereof hath left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of France, than ever did the valour of the Romans. If any man impute these victories of ours to the long-bow, as carrying further, piercing more strongly, and quicker of discharge than the French cross-bow, my answer is ready; that in all these respects, it is also (being drawn with a

d John de Serres.

• Jean avoit tout l'avantage par dessus Edouard, le nombre, la force, le lustre, le pays, le préjugé (qui n'est pas communement une considération

de peu d'importance aux affaires du monde) et avec soi l'élite de sa cavallerie, lors estimée la meilleure de tout son royaume.

weapon

strong arm) superior to the musket; yet is the musket a of more use. The gun and the cross-bow are of like force when discharged by a boy or woman, as when by a strong man; weakness, or sickness, or a sore finger, makes the long-bow unserviceable. More particularly, I say, that it was the custom of our ancestors to shoot for the most part pointblank, and so shall he perceive that will note the circumstances of almost any one battle. This takes away all objection; for when two armies are within the distance of a butt's length, one flight of arrows, or two at the most, can be delivered before they close. Neither is it in general true, that the long-bow reacheth further, or that it pierceth more strongly than the cross-bow; but this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule. If any man shall ask, how then came it to pass that the English won so many great battles, having no advantage to help him? I may, with best commendation of modesty, refer him to the French historian; who, relating the victory of our men at Crevant, where they passed a bridge in face of the enemy, useth these words; "fThe "English comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was "accustomed to gain every where, without any stay; he "forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the passage." Or I may cite another place of the same author, where he tells how the Britons, being invaded by Charles the Eighth, king of France, thought it good policy to apparel a thousand and two hundred of their own men in English cassocks, hoping that the very sight of the English red cross would be enough to terrify the French. But I will not stand to borrow of the French historians (all which, excepting De Serres and Paulus Æmilius, report wonders of our nation) the proposition which first I undertook to maintain, That the military virtue of the English, prevailing against all manner of difficulties, ought to be preferred before that of the Romans, which was assisted with all advantages that could be desired. If it be demanded, Why then did not our kings finish the conquest, as Cæsar

66

f John de Serres.

without offence,) that acidæ, of whom the

had done? my answer may be, (I hope our kings were like to the race of the old poet Ennius gave this note: Belli potentes sunt mage quam sapienti potentes; "They were more warlike than politic." Who so notes their proceedings, may find that none of them went to work like a conqueror, save only king Henry the Fifth, the course of whose victories it pleased God to interrupt by his death. But this question is the more easily answered, if another be first made; Why did not the Romans attempt the conquest of Gaul before the time of Cæsar? why not after the Macedonian war? why not after the third Punic, or after the Numantian? At all these times they had good leisure; and then especially had they both leisure and fit opportunity, when under the conduct of Marius they had newly vanquished the Cimbri and Teutones, by whom the country of Gaul had been piteously wasted. Surely the words of Tully were true, that with other nations the Romans fought for dominion, with the Gauls for preservation of their own safety.

Therefore they attempted not the conquest of Gaul, until they were lords of all other countries to them known. We on the other side held only the one half of our own island, the other half being inhabited by a nation (unless perhaps in wealth and numbers of men somewhat inferior) every way equal to ourselves; a nation, anciently and strongly allied to our enemies the French, and in that regard enemy to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us; and the greater danger at our backs, where commonly we felt, always we feared, a stronger invasion by land, than we could make upon France, transporting our forces over sea.

It is usual with men that have pleased themselves, in admiring the matters which they find in ancient histories, to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any take upon him, by way of comparison, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well persuaded, that as the divided virtue of this our island hath given more noble proof of itself, than under so worthy a leader that Roman army could do, which afterwards could win Rome and all her empire, making

Cæsar a monarch; so hereafter, by God's blessing, who hath converted our greatest hinderance into our greatest help, the enemy that shall dare to try our forces will find cause to wish, that, avoiding us, he had rather encountered as great a puissance as was that of the Roman empire. But it is now high time that, laying aside comparisons, we return to the rehearsal of deeds done; wherein we shall find how Rome began, after Pyrrhus had left Italy, to strive with Carthage for dominion in the first Punic war.

SECT. II.

The estate of Carthage before it entered into war with Rome. THE city of Carthage had stood above six hundred years, when first it began to contend with Rome for the mastery of Sicily. It forewent Rome one hundred and fifty years in antiquity of foundation; but in the honour of great achievements it excelled far beyond this advantage of time. For Carthage had extended her dominion in Africa itself, from the west part of Cyrene to the straits of Hercules, about one thousand and five hundred miles in length, wherein stood three hundred cities. It had subjected all Spain, even to the Pyrenean mountains, together with all the islands in the Mediterranean sea to the west of Sicily, and of Sicily the better part. It flourished about seven hundred and thirty years before the destruction thereof by Scipio, who, besides other spoils, and all that the soldiers reserved, carried thence four hundred and seventy thousand weight of silver, which make of our money (if our pounds differ not) fourteen hundred and ten thousand pound sterling. So as this glorious city ran the same fortune which many other great ones have done, both before and since; the ruin of the goodliest pieces of the world foreshews the dissolution of the whole.

About one hundred years after such time as it was cast down, the senate of Rome caused it to be rebuilt, and by Gracchus it was called Junonia: it was again and again abandoned and repeopled, taken and retaken; by Gensericus the Vandal, by Belisarius under Justinian, by the

Persians, by the Egyptians, and by the Mahometans: it is now nothing. The seat thereof was exceeding strong, and, while the Carthaginians commanded the sea, invincible. For the sea compassed it about, saving that it was tied to the main by a neck of land; which passage had two miles and more of breadth, (Appian saith three miles and one furlong;) by which we may be induced to believe the common report, that the city itself was above twenty miles in compass; if not, that of Strabo, affirming the circuit to have been twice as great.

It had three walls without the wall of the city; and between each of those, three or four streets, with vaults under ground of thirty foot deep, in which they had place for three hundred elephants, and all their food. Over these they had stables for four thousand horse, and granaries for all their provender. They had also lodging in these streets between these outwalls for four thousand horsemen and twenty thousand footmen, which (according to the discipline used now by those of China) never pestered the city. It had towards the south part the castle of Byrsa, to which Servius gives two and twenty furlongs in compass, that make two miles and a half. This was the same piece of ground which Dido obtained of the Libyans, when she got leave to buy only so much land of them as she could compass with an ox hide. On the west side it had also the salt sea, but in the nature of a standing pool; for a certain arm of land, fastened to the ground on which the city stood, stretched itself towards the west continent, and left but seventy foot open for the sea to enter. Over this standing sea was built a most sumptuous arsenal, having their ships and galleys riding under it.

The form of their commonweal resembled that of Sparta, for they had titulary kings, and the aristocratical power of senators. But (as Regius well observeth) the people in later times usurped too great authority in their councils. This confusion in government, together with the trust that they reposed in hired soldiers, were helping causes of their destruction in the end. Two other more forcible causes of