behind the river; and Terentius the consul recovered Venusia, with threescore and ten at the most in his company. That he was so ill attended, it is no marvel; for Venusia lay many miles off to the southward; so that his nearest way thither had been through the midst of Hannibal's army, if the passage had been open. Therefore it must needs be, that when once he got out of sight, he turned up some by-way, so disappointing the Numidians that hunted contre. Of such as could not hold pace with the consul, but took other ways, and were scattered over the fields, two thousand, or thereabouts, were gathered up by the Numidians, and made prisoners; the rest were slain, all save three hundred, who dispersed themselves in flight, as chance led them, and got into sundry towns. There died in this great battle of Cannæ, besides L. Æmilius Paulus the consul, two of the Roman questors or treasurers, and one and twenty colonels or tribunes of the soldiers, fourscore senators, or such as had borne office, out of which they were to be chosen into the senate. Many of these were of especial mark, as having been ædiles, pretors, or consuls; among whom was Cn. Servilius, the last year's consul, and Minutius, late master of the horse. The number of prisoners taken in this battle Livy makes no greater than three thousand foot and three hundred horse; too few to have defended, for the space of one half-hour, both the Roman camps, which yet the same Livy saith to have been overcowardly yielded up. We may therefore do better to give credit unto one of the prisoners, whom the same historian shortly after introduceth speaking in the senate, and saying that they were no less than eight thousand. It may therefore be, that these three thousand were only such as the enemy spared when the fury of execution was past; but to these must be added about five thousand more, who yielded in the greater camp when their company were either slain or fled. So the reckoning falls out right; which the Romans, especially the consul Varro, had before cast up (as we say) without their host; nothing so chargeable, as now they find it. On the side of Hannibal there died some four

thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse, or thereabouts; a loss not sensible, in the joy of so great a victory; which if he had pursued, as Maharbal advised him, and forthwith marched away towards Rome, it is little doubted but that the war had presently been at an end. But he believed not so far in his own prosperity; and was therefore told, that "he knew "how to get, not how to use a victory."

SECT. IX.

Of things following the battle at Canne.

NOT without good cause doth Polybius reprehend those two historians, Fabius the Roman, and Philinus the Carthaginian; who regarding more the pleasure of them unto whose honour they consecrated their travails, than the truth of things, and information of posterity, magnified indifferently, whether good or bad, all actions and proceedings, the one of his Carthaginians, the other of his Roman quirites and fathers conscript. No man of sound judgment will condemn this liberty of censure which Polybius hath used. For to recompense his juniority, (such as it was,) he produceth substantial arguments to justify his own relation, and confuteth the vanity of those former authors, out of their own writings, by conference of places ill cohering: which pains it is to be suspected that he would not have taken, had he been born in either of these two cities, but have spared some part of his diligence, and been contented to have all men think better, and more honourably than it deserved of his own country. The like disease it is to be feared that we shall hereafter find in others; and shall have cause to wish, that either they were somewhat less Roman, or else that some works of their opposite writers were extant, that so we might at least hear both sides speak: being henceforth destitute of Polybius's help, that was a man indifferent. But since this cannot be, we must be sometimes bold to observe the coherence of things; and believe so much only to be true, as dependeth upon good reason, or (at least) fair probability. This attentive circumspection is

needful even at the present; such is the repugnancy, or forgetfulness, which we find in the best narration of things following the battle of Cannæ. For it is said, that four thousand foot and horse gathered together about the consul Terentius at Venusia; that others, to the number of ten thousand, got into Cannusium, choosing for their captains young P. Scipio and Ap. Claudius; yet that the consul Terentius Varro, joining his company unto those of Scipio at Cannusium, wrote unto the senate, that he had now well near ten thousand men about him; that these letters of the consul were brought to Rome, when the senate was newly risen, that had been taking order for pacifying those tumults in the city, which grew upon the first bruit of the overthrow; and yet, that ambassadors from Capua (after some consultation, whether it were meet to send any, or, without further circumstance, to side with Hannibal) were sent unto Terentius, and found him at Venusia, a pretty while before he wrote those letters, which overtook (in a manner) at Rome the first news of the overthrow. Among such incoherences, I hold it the best way to omit so much as hath not some particular connexion with matter ensuing; mutual dependency in things of this nature being no small argument of truth.

When Hannibal had sacked the Roman camp, and trussed up the spoils, forthwith he dislodged, and marched away into Samnium; finding a disposition in the Hirpines, and many other people thereabout, to forsake the Roman party, and make alliance with Carthage. The first town that opened the gates unto him was Cossa, where he laid up his baggage; and leaving his brother Mago to take in other places, he hasted into Campania. The general affection of the multitude, in all the cities of Italy, was inclinable unto him; not only in regard of their grievous losses sustained abroad in the fields, which the Romans themselves, who could not hinder him from spoiling the country, especially the poorer sort of them, did hardly endure; but in a loving respect unto that great courtesy (as it seemed) which he used unto such of them as became his prisoners.

For as at other times, so now also, after his great victory at Cannæ, he had lovingly dismissed as many of the Italian confederates of Rome as fell into his hands; rebuking them gently for being so obstinate against him that had sought to deliver them from bondage. Neither spared he to win their love with gifts; pretending to admire their valour, but seeking indeed, by all ways and means, to make them his, whilst all other motives were concurrent. At this time also he began to deal kindly (though against his nature) with his Roman prisoners; telling them, that he bore no mortal hatred unto their estate, but, being provoked by injuries, sought to right himself and his country; and fought with them to try which of the two cities, Rome or Carthage, should bear sovereign rule, not which of them should be destroyed. So he gave them leave to choose ten of their number, that should be sent home to treat with the fathers about their ransom; and together with these he sent Carthalo, a nobleman of Carthage, and general of his horse, to feel the disposition of the senate; whether it were bowed as yet by so much adversity, and could stoop unto desire of peace. But with the Romans these arts prevailed not, as shall be shewed in due place. The people of Italy, all or most of them, save the Roman colonies, or the Latins, were not only weary of their losses past, but entertained a deceivable hope of changing their old society for a better. Wherefore, not only the Samnites, Lucans, Brutians, and Apulians, ancient enemies of Rome, and not until the former generation, utterly subdued, began to reassume their wonted spirits; but the Campans, a nation of all other in Italy most bound unto the state of Rome, and by many mutual affinities therewith as straitly conjoined as were any, save the Latins, changed on a sudden their love into hatred; without any other cause found than change of fortune.

Campania is the most goodly and fruitful province of Italy, if not (as some then thought) of all the earth: and the city of Capua, answerable unto the country whereof it was head, so great, fair, and wealthy, that it seemed no less convenient a seat of the empire, than was either Rome or

Carthage. But of all qualities, bravery is the least requisite unto sovereign command. The Campans were luxurious, idle, and proud; and valuing themselves, like jays by their feathers, despised the unfortunate virtue of the Romans, their patrons and benefactors. Yet were there some of the principal among them, as in other cities, that bore especial regard unto the majesty of Rome, and could not endure to hear of innovation. But the plebeian faction had lately so prevailed within Capua, that all was governed by the pleasure of the multitude; which wholly followed the direction of Pacuvius Calavius, an ambitious nobleman, whose credit grew and was upheld by furthering all popular desires, whereof the conjunction with Hannibal was not the least. Some of the Capuans had offered their city to the Carthaginians shortly after the battle of Thrasymene; whereupon chiefly it was that Hannibal made his journey into Campania; the dictator Fabius waiting upon him. At that time, either the nearness of the Roman army, or some other fear of the Capuans, hindered them from breaking into actual rebellion. They had indeed no leisure to treat about any articles of new confederacy; or had leisure served, yet were the multitude (whose inconstant love Hannibal had won from the Romans by gentle usage, and free dismissing of some prisoners in good account among them) unable to hold any such negotiation without advice of the senate, which mainly impugned it. So they that had promised to yield up their town to Hannibal, and to meet him on the way with some of their nobility, that should assure him of all faithful meaning, were driven to sit still in a great perplexity; as having failed to let in this their new friend, yet sufficiently discovered themselves to draw upon them the hatred of the Romans. In this case were no small number of the citizens; who thereupon grew the more incensed against their senate, on whom they cast all the blame, easily pardoning their own cowardice. The people, holding so tender a regard of liberty, that even the lawful government of magistrates grieved them with an imaginary oppression, had now good cause to fear, lest the senators