was it indeed impossible to hold a country of so large extent, and so open a coast as that of Spain, free from all incursion of the enemy; especially the affection of the naturals being (as in a new conquest) ill established. A better way therefore it had been to make a running war, by which the Romans might have been found occupied, even with the ordinary Carthaginian garrisons, or some little addition thereunto. For if it were thought meet to defer the prosecution of their main intendment against Rome itself, until such time as every little thorn were pulled out of the sides of so great a province, then must Emporia have been besieged and forced; which, by reason of alliance with the Massilians, gave unto the Romans, at all times when they pleased, a ready and secure harbour. But the town of Emporia was too strong to be won in haste; it had long defended itself against the Barbarians, having not above four hundred paces of wall to the main land, and exceedingly well fortified; a great Spanish town of the same name lying without it, that was three miles in compass, very strong likewise, and friend unto the Grecians, though not overmuch trusted. Wherefore to force this town of Emporia, that was, besides the proper strength, like to be so well assisted by the Massilians, Romans, and some Spaniards, would have been a work of little less difficulty than was the Roman war (in appearance) after the battle at Cannæ; yea it had been in effect none other than to alter the seat of the war, which Hannibal had already fixed, with better judgment, near unto the gates of Rome. The difficulty of this attempt being such as caused it altogether to be forborne, great folly it was to be much troubled about expelling the Romans utterly out of Spain; whom they might more easily have diverted thence, and drawn home to their own doors, by making strong war upon their city. For even so the Romans afterwards removed Hannibal into Afric, by sending an army to Carthage; and by taking the like course, they now endeavoured to change the seat of the war, transferring it out of Italy into Spain. But the private affections of men, regarding the common good no

otherwise than as it is accessary to their own purposes, did make them easily wink at opportunities, and hope that somewhat would fall out well of itself, though they set not to their helping hands. Hanno was a malicious wretch; yet they that thought him so were well enough contented to hearken unto his discourses as long as they were plausible, and tended to keep the purse full. In the mean while they suffered Hannibal and all the noble house of Amilcar to weary themselves in travail for the commonwealth; which all Carthage in general highly commended, but weakly assisted, as if the industry of these Barchines had been somewhat more than needful. Surely the Carthaginians, in general, were far less honourable than the people of Rome; not only in government of their subject provinces, but in administration of their own estate; few of them preferring the respect of the weal public above their private interest. But as they thrived little in the end by their parsimony used toward their own mercenaries, when the former Roman war was finished; so the conclusion of this war present will make them complain, with feeling sighs, of their negligence in supplying Hannibal, after the victory at Cannæ; when gladly they would give all their treasures to redeem the opportunity that now they let pass, as if it were cost enough to send a few handfuls into Spain.

That both the Spanish business and the state of Afric itself depended wholly, or for the most part, upon success of things in Italy, the course of actions following will make manifest. Particularly how matters were ordered in Spain by the Carthaginian governors, it is very hard, and almost impossible to set down. For though we must not reprehend, in that worthy historian Livy, the tender love of his own country, which made him give credit unto Fabius and others; yet must we not, for his sake, believe those lies which the unpartial judgment of Polybius hath condemned in the writers that gave them original. It were needless to rehearse all that may be found in h Polybius concerning the untruth of that Roman historian Fabius. h Polyb. 1. 1.

One example may suffice: he saith of Amilcar and his men at Eryx, in the former war, that having clean spent their strength, and being even broken with many miseries, they were glad to submit themselves unto the Romans. Contrary hereunto, we find in the Life of Amilcar, set down by Æmilius Probus, that Eryx was in such sort held by the Carthaginians, that it seemed to be in as good condition as if in those parts there had not been any war. These words being referred to the brave resolution of the Carthaginian soldiers, and the singular virtue of their general infusing such spirit into them, may be taken as not overliberal. For in the treaty of peace between Amilcar and Catulus, when the Roman first of all required that this garrison of Eryx should lay down their arms, and forsake Sicily, threatening that otherwise he would not talk of any composition; Amilcar boldly bade him choose whether he would talk of it or no; for that the arms which his country had put into his hands to use against her enemies, it was not his purpose to yield up unto them. Now since the Romans, contrary to their custom upon like advantages, were content to let Amilcar have his will, and not to stand with him upon point of honour, whilst otherwise they might quietly rid their hands of him; plain enough it is, that they were far from thinking him a man consumed with miseries, as Fabius would have him seem. Hereunto agrees the relation of Polybius; who flatly, and by name, chargeth Fabius with untruth, saying, that howsoever Amilcar and his soldiers had endured all extremity, yet they behaved themselves as men that had no sense thereof; and were as far from being either vanquished or tired as were their enemies. Such being the difference between Fabius, (as also perhaps between other old writers of the Roman story,) and those that had more regard of truth than of flattering the mighty city of Rome; we must take it in good part, that howsoever Livy introduceth Hanno in one place, joining very foolishly his own shameful overthrow at the islands i Ægateis, with the great services of Amilcar at Eryx, as if Ægateis insulas, Erycemque ante oculos proponite, &c. Liv. l. 21.

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both of them had had a like event; yet elsewhere he forbeareth not to put a more likely tale (though with as impudent a commemoration of his own unhappy conduct) into the same Hanno's mouth, making him say, that the affairs of Carthage went never better than a little before the loss of their fleet in that battle at sea, wherein himself was general. Now concerning the doings of the Scipios in Spain, there is cause to wish that this Fabius, with Val. Antias, and others of the like stamp, had either written (if they could not write more temperately) nothing at all, or that the tender affection of Livy to his Rome had not caused him to think too well of their relations; which are such as follow.

SECT. XI.

Strange reports of the Roman victories in Spain, before Asdrubal the son of Amilcar followed thence his brother Hannibal into Italy.

IT hath been shewed already, how P. Cornelius Scipio the consul, returning from Gaul into Italy, to encounter with Hannibal at his descent from the Alps, sent before him his brother Cneus, with part of his fleet and army into Spain. Two Roman legions, with fourteen thousand foot of the confederates, and twelve hundred horse, had been allotted unto this consul, therewith to make war in Spain against Hannibal; who since he was marching into Italy with the strength of his army, P. Scipio believed that a good part of these his own forces might well be spared from the Spanish expedition; and therefore made bold to carry some of the number back with him, sending on his brother with the rest, as his lieutenant. Publius himself remained in Italy all the time of his consulship; which being expired, he was sent proconsul into Spain by the senate, with an army of eight thousand men, and a fleet of thirty galleys.

The acts of these two brethren in their province were very great, and, as they are reported, somewhat marvellous. For they continually prevailed in Spain against the Carthaginians; whom they vanquished in so many battles,

* Liv. 1. 23.

and withdrew from their alliance so many of the Spaniards their confederates, that we have cause to wonder how the enemy could so often find means to repair his forces, and return strong into the field. But as the Romans, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of Carthage, might easily win unto their confederacy as many as were galled with the African yoke, and durst adventure to break it; so the ancient reputation of the first conquerors might serve to arm the naturals against these invaders, and to reclaim those that had revolted unto the Romans, were it only by the memory of such ill success as the like rebellions in former times had found. Hereto may be added the Carthaginian treasure, which easily raised soldiers among those valiant, but (in that age) poor and goldthirsty nations. Neither was it of small importance, that so many of the Spaniards had their children, kinsmen, and friends abroad with Hannibal in his Italian wars, or serving the Carthaginians in Afric. And peradventure, if we durst be bold to say it, the victories of the Scipios were neither so many nor so great as they are set out by Livy. This we may be bold to say, that the great captain Fabius, or Livy in his person, maketh an objection unto Scipio, which neither Scipio nor Livy for him doth answer; "That if As"drubal were vanquished, as Scipio would say, by him in "Spain; strange it was, and as little to his honour, as it "had been extremely dangerous to Rome, that the same ❝ vanquished man should invade Italy." And it is indeed an incredible narration, that Asdrubal being closed in on all sides, and not knowing how to escape out of a battle, save only by the steep descent of rocks, over a great river that lay at his back, ran away with all his money, elephants, and broken troops over Tagus, directly toward the Pyrenees, and so toward Italy; upon which he fell with more than threescore thousand armed soldiers. Neither do I see how it hangs well together, that he chose a piece of ground very defensible, but most incommodious for his retreat, if he should happen to be vanquished; and yet, that he sent all

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1 Liv. 1. 28.